

**SHRI RAGHAVENDRA
HIS LIFE And WORKS**

VOL VI

BRAHMASUTRAS
with
THE COMMENTARY OF MADHYA
AND THE FIVE GLOSSES OF
SHRI RAGHAVENDRA
PART I


By
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SHRI RAGHAVENDRA HIS LIFE AND WORKS

VOL. VI



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TO

SHRI RAGHAYENDRA

For Light and Guidance

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P R E F A C E

A new venture has been made in preparing Vol. VI and the next two Volumes. We mean to offer the five glosses of Shri Raghavendra (भावदीप, न्यायमुक्तावलि, तंत्रदीपिका, तत्त्वपञ्जरि, प्रकाश) in three Vols : Vol-VI, VII, and VIII. When we found that these five glosses referred directly or indirectly to Brahma Sutra and Bhashya of Madhva on it we felt the necessity of giving Sutras and Bhashya at the top for immediate reference by the reader while reading the five glosses. Besides, there is no English Translation of Madhva Bhashya on the Sutras available in the market. Moreover for a comprehensive idea of the Subject-matter of the Sutras a reading of the Sutras and Madhva Bhashya on it, is essential as preperation for the understanding of the five glosses. Reading of the five glosses without reading Sutra and Bhashya is as defective as reading of criticism of Hamlet without reading the drama 'Hamlet'.

We mean to give certain suggestions to readers of the Volume. They may read this book Adhikarana by Adhikarana. Going through all the Sutras of the Adhikarana with the help of Bhashya they may first form a Comprehensive idea of the Subject matter of the Adhikarana. When that has

firmly Settled in their mind they may read the first four glosses at the Second reading. That will enlarge their vision and make clear their understanding. Thus prepared they may enter into the fifth gloss, Prakasha. By itself Prakasha may require two readings. Then we assure you that you enjoy the reading of the book with exhilarating pleasure and enlightened understanding. we assure you also that your sincere painstaking would be amply rewarded by the dawn of a spiritual Light in your mind and an ecstatic delight surging up in your heart. we bid 'Bon Voyage' to our readers before they start their expedition on this vast ocean of Spiritual Knowledge.

May God Hari bless you with energy and understanding.

Kartika Pratipada
of Nala Samvatsara
Gadag.
24th Oct 1976

} G. B. Joshi

BRAHMASUTRAS

with
the commentary of Madhva and the five
glosses of

SHRI RAGHAVENDRA

Introduction

In III IV and V volumes the readers have already been introduced to the famous exposition of Brahmasutras, Nyaya Sudha of Shri Jayateertha (being an exhaustive elucidation of Anuvyakhyana of Shri Madhvacharya) along with the gloss Parimala of Shri Raghavendra. Now the present VI volume consists of all his other works on the commentary of Shri Madhva on Br. Sutra. First there is 1) Bhavadeepa a lucid exposition of Tattvapra-kashika of Jayateertha which undertakes to explain the Bhashya, a commetary of Madhva on Brahmasutras. Then there are three other works of Shri Raghavendra, 2) Tattvamanjari which enalarges and explains Anu bhashya of Shri Madhva, 3) Tantradeepika, which epitomises all that has been discussed in the works of Shri Madhva on the Brahmasutras. And then 4) Nyaya Muktavali which treats of arrangement of Adhikaranas involved in the Brahmasutras

Then there is the famous Tatparya chandrika of Shri Vyasateertha expostulating the thoughts and ideas in Tattva Prakashika of Jayateertha, on the basis of funda-mental philosophical axioms and surveying critically other

interpretations of sutras in the frame work of Adhikaranas, on the back-ground of Badarayana's philosophical thought gathered from an independent study of the sutras themselves. Shri Raghavendra has written 5) Prakasha throwing a flood light of exposition on the terse expression of complicated thoughts, corroborative references, unusual usages and the hollowness of reasoning involved in the arguments of the opponents.

A word about the plan of the present volume : sutra and Madhva Bhasya are literally translated at the beginning. Just below this in a smaller type, all these elucidations, explanations, glosses, and notes, are pressed into a continuous flow with their demarkations, yet not affecting the smooth and progressive running of subject matter. Our aim is to offer the readers a pleasant and interesting reading from the metaphysical and exegetical compositions of Shri Raghavendra as given in the notes mentioned above, on the Brahma Sutras and Madhva Bhasya.

Tattva Prakashika of Jayateertha will open the topic and chandrika will be mentioned here and there to give a proper philosophical dimension to the treatment. Bhava-deepa will lead us up the path (तत्त्वमंजरी, न्यायमुक्तावली, and तंत्रदीपिका) will give us Topics about, the interpretation of sutra, the division into Adhikarnas and the Logical syllogisms involved in the sutra are all made clear in their proper contexts. Last comes Prakasha, notes on Chandrika by Raghavendra, to wind up the whole discussion, into a convincing Judgement.

A few foot notes on difficult words or phrases will be supplied at the foot explaining, or defining, or commenting or corroborating them.

Short notes on the works, which form the stuff of this book :

1) Brahma Sutras :

Short aphoristic statements, made by Shri Badarayana amounting to 564 sutras in number, comprise Brahma sutras. They are reasonings to decide the interpretation of the vedic statements when there is ambiguity and confusion about the meaning. They are divided into four Adhyayas and each Adhyaya is again divided into four Padas. Each Pada consists of Adhikaranas which are the topics discussed.

2) Bhashyas on the Brahma Sutras :

These Brahma sutras being brief in expression gave scope to different interpretations. Brahma was said to be Nirguna according to some while guna purna according to others. Complete merging of the individual into Brahma was called Mukti by some; while retaining of individuality, attaining perfection to its full capacity was Mukti according to others. Such divergences of interpretations made the composition more confounding.

Such Bhashya Karas who created confusion were many, in number. We shall note only two, Shankara and Ramanuja who came before Madhva.

So we shall read about Shankara's Bhashya and Ramanuja's Bhashya which shall be critically reviewed for comparing and contrasting them with Madhva's Bhashya. So Bhashyas are interpretations of Brahma sutras according to each Bhashyakara, like Shankara, Ramanuja and Madhva.

3) Tattva Prakashika :

It is a lucid elucidation of the Bhashya of Madhva, by the famous commentator Jayateertha. The short sutras

are expounded by Madhva in a laconic style necessitating intelligent expansion of the ideas involved and Jayateerth has enlarged Madhva Bhashya with critical notes, with rich references throwing a great light on the Bhashya of Madhva and his contention.

4) Tatparya-Chandrika of Vyasaraja :

It is a critical gloss on Tattvapraakashika but more than that it covers the whole range of sutra interpretations by all the Bhashyakaras, and critically reviews those interpretations of the sutras and mercilessly exposes them when they grievously fail in their mission. His vast reading and deep thinking has superbly qualified him for this task. His logical arguments, his ingenious presentation, his dispassionate survey, have accorded him a respectful place in the field of exegetical interpretation and dialectical discussion.

5) Bhava Deepa of Shri Raghavendra :

Raghavendra acknowledges that Vyasaraja has already written a gloss named chandrika on it. But he says that it is written for learned scholars and he is writing Bhavadeepa a commentary on the same Tattvapraakashika, so as to help common readers to understand Tattvapraakashika. Bhavadeep is more textual than critical. While chandrika takes to critical survey of other commentaries and notes with dispassionate interest maintaining a high standard of judgement and using acknowledged instruments of criticism. The very axioms of philosophical judgement according to others are questioned and their veracity and soundness are doubted.

Besides, Bhavadeepa claims to take for consideration later attack on Dvaitism which is not at all referred to in Chandrika.

6) Tattva Manjari :

It is written by Raghavendra to enlarge and expand what has been written very succinctly by Madhva in Anubhashya, which is one of the four commentaries of Madhva. Raghavendra acknowledges his inability to express the hidden thoughts in Anubhashya. Still he undertakes that work as duty bound and disposes it off according to his capacity. That the work of expansion will be within the frame work of Brahma sutras is the assurance, Raghavendra gives us at the very outset.

7) Tantradeepika :

It is an independent attempt to epitomise, all that has been stated by Brahmasutras, in a closely knit argumentation conforming to the rules of syllogistic logic without any digressions. In this arrangement there is the opposer's view and then in contradiction there is the sidhanti's view. Its arrangement is strictly in conformity with the sutras, following the syntactical meaning of the sutra with its authorised implications.

8) Nyaya Muktaavali :

This work is called by the author Shri Raghavendra as 'the necklace of the learned,' Hence it is a book meant to be read by the learned. It is devoted to the study of Brahmasutras showing how each Adhikarana or sutra topic is related to what has gone before (except the first Adhikaran) and how it is contextually included into the subject matter of Pada and Adhyaya. Then each Adhikarana is treated with its five constituents Vix the subject matter, the doubt, the opponent's view and the final decision, then the purpose, of the whole of the treatment This is an analytical treatment of the Brahma-
sutra

9) Last is *Prakashā* which is an elucidating gloss on *Tatparyā Chandrika* of *Vyasarāja*. It has the respectful appellation of *Tippaṇi* of *Raghavendra*. But he calls it *Vyakhyā* or commentary on *Chandrika*. Because it is the first and direct exposition of the *Chandrika* of *Vyasarāja*. Through rich imagination *Raghavendra* exactly locates the doubts and difficulties of the ordinary readers of *Chandrika* and explains them to their satisfaction. It is an indispensable guide to the study of *Chandrika*.

Bhavadēepa : After the ceremonial salutation of God and Guru, *Raghavendra* justifies his own attempt to elucidate *Tattvapraśaṅkikā* even when there is already a gloss by no less a person than *Vyasarāja*, a prince among dialecticians. *Vyasarāja*'s work is of a very high order and meant for learned scholars. So *Raghavendra* writes *Bhavadēepa* to help common readers to understand *Tattvapraśaṅkikā*. Besides *Raghavendra* in this work makes an attempt to show that later attacks on *Dvaitism* have failed to hit the target.

Spiritual aspirants being exhaustively tired out by various kinds of worldly worries, turn to the *Vedas* which are meant to bestow bliss after completely eradicating all miseries. But these *Vedas* require *Brahmasūtras* to settle their interpretation. And *Madhva*'s *Bhāṣya* has explained these *sūtras*. It is but natural that such an attempt itself should be too difficult to understand. *Jayateertha* wrote *Tattva Prakashika* to elucidate this *Bhāṣya*. This is the history of the origin of *Tattvapraśaṅkikā*.

Tantrādēepikā : This is a collection of the meanings of *Brahma sūtras*. *Vyasarāja*, who has been referred to here by *Raghavendra* has already made a charming collection of this kind. Still *Raghavendra* attempts

a new collection for a special purpose. Here Raghavendra refers to the incarnation of Vyasa and its special mission. The scattered vedas were gathered and divided into groups or shakhas and Brahma sutras were composed to ascertain their meaning, by Vyasa.

Tattva Manjari : After a salutation to Lakshmi Narayan full of auspicious attributes with a severe immunity to derogatory defects, Raghavendra takes to expand what has been briefly stated in Anubhashya of S Bri Madhva. He pleads his inability in this difficult task of exposing and enlarging the hidden thoughts in Anubhashya, which is packed with congested ideas. But Raghavendra assures us that he would be strictly faithful to the meaning of the sutra in expanding the ideas of Anubhashya. In addition to what has been already said about Brahma sutra, he notes that Brahmasutra has suffered much in its meaning because it is given many twists and turns by the ill advised comments, unauthorised interpretations, and hence the necessity of Madhva's commentary on it.

Naya Mukta vali : After bowing down at the feet of Lakshmi Ramana his patent God and his revered Guru Purnabodha, Raghavendra declares that he would write Nyaya Mukta vali the necklace of the learned. Narayana at the request of gods like Brahma (four faced) and Rudra and others, came down to the Earth as Veda Vyasa, who composed Brahma sutras. Now the task before Raghavendra is to supply the five fold constituents of an Adhikarana to make the study of Brahma sutras easy. Through the graceful blessing of his Gurupada, he says he is able to give the five fold frame work of each Adhikarana.

He takes the first Adhikarana (जिज्ञासाधिकरण), and on the strength of shruti (तद्विजिज्ञासस्वतद्ब्रह्मेति) he settles the

subject matter to be the thoughtful meditation of Brahman. Whether to undertake it or not is the doubt. The opponent's view is that one should not undertake (such thankless task). For there is no such serious subject matter. All others than the soul are unreal and illusory according to Advaitin). Vedanta is restricted to the study of the self who is cognised in every piece of experience as 'I'. There is no Apavarga or Moksha and there is no other fruit coveted by man. When there is no subject matter, and no eligible student to study it, hence there cannot be any thing to aspire for. Thus the five necessary requirements for the study of any work are denied to Brahmasutras.

The opponent concedes that Brahman might be the subject matter. Yet its knowledge does not require thoughtful meditation for its production. For Karma alone conduces to knowledge. Karma secures for the soul even the grace of Shri Hari. Even Moksha can be obtained by karma, so says shruti.

Even granting that Moksha can be realised through knowledge and grace, yet an eligible aspirant for this hazardous undertaking is not available. If all those who aspire for Moksha are eligible then even women and fallen Brahmins, and Sudras can claim eligibility, which is strictly denied to them. Such is the opponent's view.

Prakasha : On the style as that of Bhashya or still nearer, of his Guru Vyasaraja in Chandrika, Raghavendra salutes Kamalapati who is said to be all-perfection and complete freedom from flaws or defects, only in reverse order. And then in order of gradation Jayateertha and Vyasateerth are saluted. Raghavendra makes a declaration of his undertaking, the elucidation of Chandrika of Vyasateerth.

The reason is adduced; for, the reverse order of all-perfection' and 'free from imperfection.' It is just to show that one is the cause of the other. Raghavendra then shows how Vyasateertha's Panegyric is also a precis of the whole of the Brahmasutras. For 'Allperfection' is the subject matter of first Adhyaya; 'freedom from flaws or faults' is the topic of the second Adhyaya. 'Giver of Mukti to one having devotion which signifies, by implication, all means, such as detachment, study, and thinking, which form the stuff of the third and fourth Adhyayas.

After that Raghavendra bends down before all those who are concerned with Brahmasutra directly or indirectly. Then he remembers with respect his direct teacher Lakshmi Narayana Muni, who is credited with knowledge of Grammar and of two meemansas (Pramana and Prameya), and of Nyaya. Raghavendra gives the meanings of pada, vakya and pramana, as (पद शब्दशास्त्रं) (Grammar) - वाक्य मीमांसायुग्मं) the two kinds of Meemansa shastras. Pramana is (तर्कशास्त्रं) or Nyaya. But in Gururajeeya (पद) is grammar (वाक्य) is prameya meemansa shastra and (प्रमाण) is pramana meemansa shastra. Vyasateerth has the highest respect for Jayateertha and his work, Tattva prakashika. So in all submissiveness he tries to explain and expand the text of Tattvapraakashika. But Vyasaraaja has a very ambitious scheme before him of giving a co-ordinated statement of all the works on sutra and while doing so if he finds anywhere in these works (Bhashya, Anu Bhashya, Sannyaya Ratnavali Nyaya vivarana and Tattvapraakashika) a point of doubt or ambiguity, he would spare no pains in giving an unambiguous, crystal clear explanation of those points. In every sutra Vyasateertha clearly shows the vindication of his own side and the rebuttal of the

other side. Only he wants the learned to see and recognise them.

In their own way both Vyasateertha and Raghavendra teertha explain the significance of the auspicious salutation of Jayateertha at the beginning of the work. Its importance is explained as 1) means of averting obstacles. 2) following the style of Bhashya in summarising the work on hand, and 3) supplying the four requirements of a new book or a treatise.

Then another Mangala is performed by Jayateertha, explained by Raghavendra as offering evidences to prove the validity of the Brahma sutras on account of the expertness of the speaker and the alertness and willingness of the hearers and the suitability of the occasion. These afford reliability to the person who narrates the truth. This is called Apti and one having this, is called Apta.

Now Brahma sutras have the highest credit of validity on account of the reliability of Vedavyasa. Besides, they are based on shruties and they are found based on close reasoning. Hence they are valid, par excellence.

Jayateertha mentions that Shri Madhva explicitly expresses his salutations to Narayana and declares the beginning of his work Bhashya on the Brahma Sutras. There is a point in choosing Narayana for his salutations. Shri Madhva has chosen Narayana for more than one reason. His aim is to show that Brahman is the subject matter of the sutras and that Brahman is Narayana himself. Besides, Narayana when derived is a marginal summary of the contents of sutras.

Thus begins the Bhashya of Shri Madhva :

Bhashya Having bowed down to Narayana who is full of (auspicious) qualities (perfections) and free

from blemishes, who is fit to be known and approached and who is, besides, the preceptor too (to us), we will comment on the sutras. (the meaning of the sutras is told.)

Bhavadeepa Madhva found the necessity of newly interpreting and rightly interpreting Brahma sutras which had been misinterpreted by so many, differently, and accepted its heavy responsibility. Auspicious salutation alone at the out set charges the work with spiritual efficacy tending towards completion of the work. An explicit Mangala which has been the traditional method of eminent authors to get their work completed without interruption, is that salutation.

Narayana is chosen as the highest among Gods as he is Brahman himself. His supremacy lies in the fact that he is characterised with perfections, qualified with freedom from defects like imperfections. The sense of perfections is the out-come of samanvaya of all words sacred and profane in Para Brahma, by direct denotation of the highest order. The word Narayana itself when derived, discloses the same significance. This derivation is then justified referring to rules of Grammar.

Raghavendra adds a note on the choice of Narayana that it is the most cherished, endowed with special qualities directly related to the work on hand. The Guru is referred in respectable plurality.

Tantra Deepika :

Raghavendra makes preperations to introduce the first sutra.

Tattvamanjari :

Madhva uses this very Mangalacharana for his Anu Bhashya. Raghavendra offers the syntactical sequence of the verse. One characterised with all Perfections bereft

of all blemishes, fit to be known and approached must be bowed down to. Then the import of the sutra is given. Gunas are enumerated as Bliss, Knowledge lustre, strength, nobility, and enterprise. Narayana is packed full with these qualities. The imperfections are cited as 'Anxiety', Torture, contagion of religious merit and demerit, birth and death' and Narayana is bereft of these. The good have to visualise this Narayana, through a course of hearing and thinking and meditating, accompanied with detachment and devotion which all will conduce to divine vision.

This Narayana should be accompanied with the revered preceptor (In the case of Madhva, both God and Guru are one and the same). Guru is used in respectable plural.

The mere mention of the word Narayana, assures us that God is embodied with a body case of Bliss, and consciousness. Hence His embodied State is not incompatible with his freedom from defiling defects, and his glowing perfections. For His body is not made out of the stuff of material elements.

Prakasha :

From the huge community of Vedas, selections were made to constitute the middle size group called Rig Veda and others. Then each Veda was divided into a number of main branches and each main branch was divided into sub branches.

Bhashya :

In the age of Dwapara, knowledge became muddled up everywhere (doubt and misunderstanding prevailed). Brahma, Rudra, Indra and others begged Narayana to ascertain the right knowledge. Then he came down as Veda Vyasa. Immediately

he found people were desirous of realising their good and averting their evil. But they did not know the means to their end. So Vyasa to show them the means divided the Vedas that were in complete disorder into four groups. (Rig, Yajur, Saman, and Atharva.) Then (Rig) veda was divided into 24 branches, (Yajur) veda into hundred and one branches, (Saman) veda into thousand branches and Atharva veda into twelve branches. In order to help their correct interpretation he composed aphorisms (Brahmasutras) (consisting of canons of interpretation). It is stated in Skanda Purana :-

Knowledge had its source in Narayana and it stayed in Kritayuga unaffected. It was distorted, a little, in Tretayuga while in Dwapara the whole of it was distorted.

Through the impact of the curse of Gautama when knowledge was distorted into ignorance, all gods, being confused and led by Brahma, Rudra and others, resorted to Narayana the blameless and the only refuge to them.

When they humbly submitted their mission (for which they had attended on him) to him, he descended to earth as the son of Parashara from Satyavatee. Hari himself restored the vedas, that were in a pell-mell state, to perfect order. He divided them into four classes and (the first, was divided into twenty four branches and (the second) into hundred and one branches and (the third, into) thousand branches and (the fourth) into twelve branches. And for the interpretation of these, he composed the Brahma sutras which are the real sutras. The well-versed in the sutras know a sutra to be, of a few syllables, un-ambiguous, having the

noblest meaning, of universal application, and without indecent or useless letters. Therefore Brahma sutra alone claims the unqualified appellation of 'the sutra'; Just as mere Vyasa is the name of Krishna (Dwaipayana) Vyasa and others are known by their adjectives, so also qualified sutras and other sutras (than Brahma sutra). Thus know the learned. Those who know how to derive real meaning from words and who are well versed in the Vedas say that the word denote the main meaning, when it is not qualified by any adjective and the sub meanings are denoted with the help of adjectives. In these sutras all decisions are applicable to all branches. The other sutras that decided only a few branches are based upon Brahma sutra only. The great Vyasa composed such sutras and re-established knowledge in gods like Brahma and Rudra and others, and among men and manes and birds. Thus plays the great lord sportively.

Bhavadeepa :

By the time Dwapara had set in Dharma had only two legs left and in course of time one more was lost and Dharma stood on only one leg. Then अद्य means 'immediately after his incarnation' Vyasa did not take time to collect knowledge. For he was a born sarvajna (or all knowing).

Veda had become उत्सन्न or obscure by wrong readings and interpolations. There is the original group of veda (मूलवेद). From this original, extractions and excerpts were made and they were called उपवेद subvedas. But these were already divided into Rig Saman, Yajus and Atharva. From Rigveda, Rigveda was extracted and from Sama Sama and from yajus, yajus and from Atharva, Atharva was extracted. These excerpts were called अर्वातस्वेद or intermediary

vedas. These are our Rig, Yajus, Saman and Atharva vedas. These are further divided into its own branches.

This story of the incarnation of Vyasa and his authorship of Brahma sutras provides us with inviolable reliability of the Brahma sutras and ultimately prove their validity as instruments of knowledge.

But Brahma and others are endowed with god-vision and are never clouded with ignorance either through the influence of curse or the impact of time. Yet through sympathy for the wretched sufferers, Brahma and other gods became one with the ignorant and included themselves in the group of the muddle headed.

Raghavendra narrates the story of the curse of Gautama. Before Dwapara a long drought and famine had spread over the whole country except over Gautama's Ashrama which was still rich with crops by the Virtue of the penance of the sage. So all sages stayed in his Ashrama and enjoyed his unstinted hospitality. But after some time there was rain and the fields were green with crops. The sages desired to go back to their hermitages. Gautama flatly refused permission. The sages took to a foul plan and created on the strength of their penance a rickety cow which entered into the field of Gautama tottering and shaky. Gautama threw a blade of grass at her to drive her away. Immediately she fell and died. The sages left the Ashrama on the false plea that he had been contaminated with the sin of killing a cow. Gajanana had conspired in this foul game and was waiting for an opportunity to drive away Ganga from the enviable place of his fathers head, to please his mother Parvati. Accordingly Gautama performed penance to bring down Ganga to the earth. She came down and the cow was restored to life and Gautama cursed the ungrateful sages that they should all become perverted in their thoughts and their

knowledge should be distorted. This was the curse which affected gods and men at the beginning of Dwapara age.

Raghavendra now explains what sutras are. अल्पाक्षरत्व is explained as not exceeding the number of words without which the desired meaning is not fully brought out and not using more words than those, required to express the same meaning. अस्तोम is explained as meaningless words used as in sama veda only to set the hymn to tune; not serving any other purpose at all.

Thus Brahmasutras are unqualified sutras and hence the most important sutras. It was doubted that Jaimini sutras (beginning with अथातो धर्मजिज्ञासा) had already settled the meaning of the vedas and hence Brahma sutras were redundant. Then this doubt had been cleared by some stating that jaimini had interpreted the portion of Karma kanda alone and Brahma sutras would interpret the Jnana kanda of the Vedas. But this argument is shabby. For the whole of the vedas is interpreted as having the import of Brahma by the Brahma sutras. For even in Jaimini sutras it is stated that even karmas are explained for fostering the knowledge of Brahman.

Prakasha :

Brahma sutras were stated to be the best among aphoristic literature. For they were referred to as mere 'Sutras.' In this respect vedas and the words of the savants of vedic lore were summoned as evidences. For the learned cannot state vedas as evidence unless they mention this. The judgements that are arrived at, by the other sutras also are corroborated by the Brahma sutras. In the Bhashya this is expressed as शब्दजातस्य सर्वस्य यत्प्रमाणं इव निर्णयः (The other sutras which are applicable to a few shakhas also depend upon, for their Pramana on Brahmasutras) the genitive after शब्दजात is not used in the sense of 'instru-

mentality' though it is usual, but it is used in the sense of 'agency', on the strength of the sutra 'कर्तृकर्मणोः कृतीति'.

Really speaking a verbal testimony is the instrument of knowledge, and not an agent of knowledge. But here agency is attributed to it considering the intermediary action inherent in the instrument. (Axe is the instrument of cutting and raising up and bringing down is the intermediary action together with which the axe becomes 'the authorised instrument or ka ana.)

After (due eligibility), because (it is conducive to Moksha) one should enter into meditative thinking of Brahma, a store house of auspicious attributes.

Bhavadeepa :

Brahmasutra is a closely-knit composition. No irrelevant extraneous matter can find a place in the body of the sutras. Every pada consists of Adhikaranas. Each Adhikarana must be related to others inclusively or consequentially. Inclusion is usually in Shashtra, Adhyaya, or Pada. The topic or Adhikarana seeking connection with Adhyaya is related to it as a piece of objection, as extension of it, as preface to it, or as exception to it.

Thus sangati or Relationship is of five types: Relation to shastra, Adhyaya, pada, shruti and Adhikarana. In the same manner Adhikarana has the frame-work consisting of five items: 1) subject on hand. 2) Doubt. 3) Objection side. 4) Judgement side. 5) The purpose.

Now Bhashyakara shows this inter-relationship of the sutra. Shruti enjoins enquiry into the subject of Brahma. Hence this has a subject and other prerequisites of discussion. So enquiry is justified and its inclusion in shastra dedicated to discussion of Brahman is also shown. If Enquiry consisting of logical syllogisms is not justified.

the sutras comprising reasonings and forming a shastra would not have been begun.

Prakasba :

But the arrangement of the Adikarnas as shown by others is criticised to be highly unsatisfactory, in the Bhashya of Madhva. Hanumat is used in the place of Madhva in Chandrika. Raghavendra derives the word and explains its parts. When combined Hanumat means Purna Bodha.

Among the defects of the Adhikarana Arrangement, one is chosen as a concrete instance from Bhamati a commentray on shankara Bhashya. The first Jijnasadhikarana is constructed by Bhametikara in the following manner : The internal self is Brahman and is experienced clearly as 'I' and hence it cannot be a doubtful subject for discussion. For no one entertains a doubt about a person who is sitting in broad day light. It cannot be argued that this discussion is for the purpose of dispelling, nescience. For even when the self is being experienced, the nescience is not dispelled.

But the 'I' that is now experienced is cognised as 'fat' as 'an agent'; on the other hand the one expounded by Vedant is contrary to this; and not known to us, and is shrouded in doubt. This Brahma becomes the topic of discussion.

Bhamatikara says that this is not a sound objection. For no doubt by the vedic injunction (स्वाध्यायो अध्येतव्यः) the Veda enjoins vedic study for the purpose of acquiring Dharma which is a perceptible fruit of the study. Imperceptible swarga or heaven is not its fruit. But the direct experience of the internal self is so strong that it does not allow this import of the vedic injunction to prevail. Still

the vedic statement is not futile. It may be used for meditative repetition or in some formal sense. Hence there is no scope for investigation of vedanta. This is the objection side according to Bhamatikara.

But the judgement according to him is that the vedanta expresses as import Brahman to be of the nature of consciousness and bliss. The direct experience of self is set at nought being beset with a doubt of defect, by the authorless and impersonal veda, free from any defect. Direct and perceptual experience of a shell-silver is proved false. Hence this pure Brahman denoted by the Vedanta is not known in the direct experience of the internal self. So there is scope for the investigation of this pure consciousness and bliss as expressed by Vedanta. So there is subject matter and all other requisites to constitute a good Adhikarana. This is the contention of Bhamatikara.

Raghavendra justifies the method of chandrikakara of giving a long argumentation in which both the objection side and judgement side are elaborately treated. Some might contend that if only judgement side is to be found fault with, why not merely state the judgement side of the Bhamatikara? where was the necessity of representing his objection side also? The answer is that judgement side always expects to be prefaced with objection side to be clearly understood. Or it might be that when judgement side is refuted it is generally understood that the objection side too is condemned. Hence both the sides are represented.

Now the refutation of Bhamatikara begins. Vyasaraja bases his refutation on the dictum of Acharya that 'what is there for Ajnana or nescience to obscure when the particularless Atma is accepted as self luminous.' For what is the meaning of 'the pure Self does not shine? Does it

mean 1) Some of it shines or 2) Some of it does not shine ? 4) or something different from Atma also shines ?

All these four alternatives individually are subjected to two more alternatives : 1) Whether that which shines is different from Atma ? or 2) one with Atma ?

The Advaitis on the basis of Mandana's dictum that 'negative attributes do not affect the absolute nature of identity,' think that only difference of positive entities disturb the nature of absolute identity. All these differences end in mutual absence or Abhava and hence these negative non-beings, the Advaitin contends, do not affect the absolute nature of Atman's oneness. This abhava dvaitavada is refuted in full in Nyayamrita. Besides if this vada is true, then the vedas and Brahma sutras would have maintained, according to Advaitin, a second negative or non-being and not integrated and absolute Atma, in nature, as now expounded. And the first sutra would have been, not अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा but अथातो द्वितीय अभावादि जिज्ञासा.

This spirited dialectical warfare continues in spiritual pugnacity, very interesting to intelligent readers. But fearing transgression of limitation of time and space, we cease to follow it in all details.

Conceding the shining of pure chaitanya, still it is found fit for investigation because it is obscured by nescience. When it is the subject of investigation it only proves the existence of Nescience. The modification of mind capable of counteracting Nescience is not yet to be found.

Advaitin maintains that modified mind and pure chaitanya in respect of one subject are both subject to nescience and immune to it, just as the light of the sun and cognition in respect of a pot are both incompatible and compatible with darkness respectively.

But this argument is too shallow. For if pure chaitanya is compatible with nescience, the subjects of pure chaitanya like pleasure and pain also will remain unfelt by us, due to the over-powering nature of Nescience.

The Advaitin might object that pleasure and pain are cognised by chaitanya reflected in modified mind (अतःकरण) and not by unreflected purechaitanya, which is not incompatible with Nescience.

If this is so pleasure and pain would not be considered as having existence as long as they are felt. Besides modified mind in general cannot be incompatible with nescience. Only particular modified mind is found incompatible with nescience.

If particular mind-modification is incompatible with nescience, then mind modification in respect of self is to be found even now. For in Advaitic system direct perception of a pot is chaitanya circumscribed by pot becoming its subject. For mind modification being aware of chaitanya circumscribed by pot is not apprehended by chaitanya cognising Ajnana or nescience and must be considered incompatible with nescience, otherwise it would land us into an absurdity of recognising the non-dispelling of ignorance of chaitra by the modified mind or knowledge of 'chaitra with a stick'.

Thus it is proved that the pure chaitanya is not revealed in our empirical ego awareness. Chandrikakara winds up the discussion thus : In Advaita, Pure chaitanya being self-luminous is ever present. Any thing other than chaitanya, is imagined through ignorance and so cannot be the object of ignorance. Hence there cannot be ignorance of any object in this world. So the four requisites of unknown subject, and the dispelling of ignorance the ignorant

aspirant and their mutual relationship are not available. Hence there are no grounds to justify the commencement of this shastra (Brahmasutra) if we follow the arrangement of Adhikarana as shown by Bhamati.

Chandrikakar in the same manner refutes the exposition of the sutra by Vivaranakara.

Bhashya :

The word अथ in sutra is for the purpose of auspicious prayer (of Vishnu at the commencement of the work to avert obstructions) And it has the sense of 'After acquiring eligibility' The word अतः shows 'purpose'

It is stated in Garuda Purana :

'Oh first poet Brahman (Creator)! All sutras (composed by Vyasa, Jaimini, and others) invariably begin with अथ and अतः at the out-set. What is the explanatory reason for this? what is their meaning and what settles their superiority? oh Brahman tell me all this, so that I know the principle (involved).'

Thus questioned by Narada, Brahma the highest among souls (Jeevas) replied 'In the sense of 'After eligibility' as well as 'auspicious prayer' अथ is used and अतः is used in the sense of 'purposiveness' or अतः means 'through the grace of Vishnu (ऋः) who is the exalted Brahman. For he is said to be the actuator of all impulses of the mind. When the exalted Vishnu desired to create, two things first came out (of his throat)- 'Om' and the word अथ Therefore they are used at the beginning, in this order. Then as the third, appears अतः, expressing that Vishnu (ऋः) being pleased (is the cause of) encourages our investigation

into the field of Brahma or expressing that Moksha or release is caused by enquiry of Brahma. Now the अ of अय and अतः, being the essence of all words, expresses perfections of the exalted *Brahma. And the त and य (coming in these words) express ubiquity and existence of that Vishnu. They both stand for Vishnu and Vayu. It is the opinion of the good that these must be expressed first. Therefore the highly learned realising the real greatness of these two, use these two, at the commencement in the beginning of all sutras.

Bhavadeepa :

Raghavendra puts some of these statements into strict logical form :- For instance अय and अतः are said to be fit for being placed at the sutras. In the same manner ओ also deserves a first place in due order. Because they are essentially superior. Now this essential superiority depends upon the fact that they have come out of Hari's throat for the first time. So the invariable concomitance is that which has come first out of Hari's throat is essentially superior. Here we do not find a direct instance. But that which is first expressed in its kind stands superior to all as Brahma is among gods.

Here Raghavendra raises a doubt from a common reader's point of view. If अतः is the third word at the beginning (ओ is the first and अय is the second) how is it that at the beginning only two (अय and अतः) are mentioned and at the end (अय and अतः) only two are referred;

* Here अ expresses universality of perfections and त suggests temporal and physical pervasiveness. य connotes continuity of invariability.

and (they two only) there is exclusive emphasis on two only ? There is reason for making a distinction between ओं and अय and अतः. For ओं is not syntactically related with the main body of the sentence (अयातो ब्रम्हजिज्ञासा) but is separately pronounced, so that with every other coming sutra it is used unaligned and disconnected with a sentence. While अय and अतः contribute to the import of the sentence and hence they are connected with the sentence.

अकार is said to be the essence of all words, Hence अ connotes all qualities of Vishnu expressed by all words. Or all words are merely explanatory elucidation of the latter अ pregnant with all the attributes of Vishnu.

Tantradeepika :

The sutra is prefaced with one Omkara having two meanings : one is imperceptible and is helpful to stop the study of Veda from being dissipated and dissolved. The other is perceptible and is syntactically connected with the sentence. Still it is recited separately so that it may be recited with the coming sutras. The Last Omkara is merely meant to give imperceptible religious result. It does not form part of this sutra. For this Omkara does not form a part to fulfil any syntactical expectation of the body of sutra. Raghavendra in Tantra deepika gives the total meaning of the sutra thus :- अय after the eligibility of vedic study and religious conviction and self control is secured, अतः as there is the fruit of Moksha (assured to us) born of the grace (of Vishnu) produced by sound knowledge of अः or Brahman who is pleased as the bondage is real, as the vedas are reliable testimony and cognise an established or perfect Being,

ओं ब्रह्मणः जिज्ञासा an enquiry of Brahman who is Vishnu of perfect perfections, must be made. This Enquiry consists of hearing, thinking and meditating (upon) what vedas have stated, or Jijnasa is restricted to only thinking.

By the use of Brahma in the sutra the subject matter of jijnasa has been supplied and ओं also adds to the strength of an inference based on the vedic statement. ओं इत्येदक्षरमुद्रीच मुवासीत in which ओं means 'one full of perfections'.

Again by stating that Brahman the subject of enquiry is referred to by ओं which is a monosyllabic epitome of the whole veda which is an elucidation of that ओं through vyahriti. Gayatree, and Purusha sukta, we only offer the Vedas as evidence to bear the truth. Hence no one can say that enquiry cannot be instituted because it is not upheld by any evidences.

Raghavendra's Gurupada states that ओं supplies a predicate to the question-what is Brahma? It is ओं means a protector (from the root अच् to protect. Brahman or Vishnu is a well known protector) Therefore the words of this sutra अय, अतः and Brahma dispel the doubts of absence of agent, of any fruit, of purpose and of the subject matter (in Brahma enquiry).

Tattva Manjari.

As before, to the objection that Brahma investigation need not be undertaken, as he is known to us in our ego-experience as 'I', the reply is अयातोब्रम्हजिज्ञासा. Vishnu who is ubiquitous and eternal, possesses an infinity of perfections and is the fit person for an all round enquiry. For derivatively both Brahman and Vishnu have the same

meaning. Besides, the two previous sutras सविष्णुराहृद्, तन्ब्रह्मेत्याचक्षते corroborate the truth that Brahman is Vishnu. Hence it is clear that 'I' or Jeeva is not Brahman. So its investigation is justified.

तद्विजिज्ञासस्त्र, तमेवेकं जानथ are not the only instances to prove the investigation of Brahman. सविजिज्ञासितव्यः नारायणो सो परमो विचित्य are also quoted. There is a special point in quoting these instances from Veda. In the first type of instances Brahma is the attribute of the predicate (ब्रम्ह जिज्ञासा) and hence loses its predominance. But, in the second type (सवि जिज्ञासितव्यः) Brahma is the attribute of the subject Viz knowledge. Here its predominance is secure and is suggested by this type of instance. It also suggests that the compound ब्रम्ह जिज्ञासा is not कर्मणिषट्ठि in which Brahma loses its predominance but it is शेषेषट्ठि which retains the predominance of Brahman.

But why should the sutra give scope to an expression (ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा कर्तव्या) when it undermines the importance of Brahman ?

There is reason for it. The sutra shows that it is faithful to shruti. For shruti is तद्विजिज्ञास स्व and sutra follows it. Again Jijnasa is to be shown that it is qualified with 1) eligibility with self control and religious conviction (अथ) and (अतः) 2) and with the motive of realising Moksha through the grace of Hari secured by His vision.

No doubt when Brahma is explained as Vishnu, then some thing other than Jeeva automatically becomes the subject matter of discussion; and when Mukti is declared to be the fruit of Jijnasa, one who aspires for it, is the aspirant. These things are clear. Yet Mukti might

equally be realised through a course of action and hence Mukti cannot be the exclusive result of Jijnasa. Besides every aspirant for Mukti cannot claim a right for entering into investigation of Brahman. For shudra and others are excluded. अथ and अतः serve these two purposes and वि in shruti suggests these two senses. (वि जिज्ञास स्वं) Hence there is no disagreement between shruti and sutra.

That predominantly only Vishnu is to be meditated upon, does not exclude other deities like Lakshmi, Brahma, Rudra and others from being worshipped. These also deserve worship and regard at the hand of the aspirers for Moksha only subordinate to Vishnu (It is stated in Anubasbha).

Nyaya Muktavali.

Now begins the Judgement side. Though the insentient and one's own soul and any other soul, being well recognised cannot be the unknown topic for investigation, yet Brahman who is cited as fit to be enquired in shruti (अथ कस्मादुच्यते ब्रह्मेति ब्रह्मोह्यस्मिन्गुणाः) is described as possessing perfect attributes unlike any other thing. This proves a thing (other than the soul) Viz Vishnu to be a resort of pervasiveness-spatial, temporal, and attributional.

Now this Vishnu is subject to a doubt whether he is possessed of attributes, or attributeless, or possessed of a few attributes. Hence he is fit to be the subject of enquiry. When there is subject matter for investigation there is the man eligible for such enquiry and other prerequisites for the commencement of a work are available. So the first alternative of the opponent does not stand.

Even the second is not tenable. Jijnasa forms the main plank of the means of god-vision and karma only

helps this vision as a subordinate means to it. Though this god-vision is not an end in itself yet it is a means to Mukti through divine grace and hence it is considered as Purushartha.

Karma conduces to create divine grace; but that grace born of karma is of an inferior type and only as grace-produced by godvision has that capacity to produce Mukti.

Bondage (of man) is a matter of our direct experience and hence it is real and requires divine grace for release from it. Moksha won by karma is temporary and has a relapse into samsara.

The third also, hence, is not the right one. For no doubt eligibility for Moksha alone does not qualify him for release from bondage. Yet there is the general qualification of devotion to Vishnu and application to study-self control and strong conviction constitute a distinct eligibility for Jijnasa which thus becomes a fit task for our undertaking.

But this interpretation and exposition does not run contrary to Bhashya and commentary of Jayateerth. For both do not raise the doubt nor clear it about grace being born of Karma and about Moksha being produced by it. For we take our stand on the mention of जिज्ञासोऽथ ज्ञानजात् तत्प्रसादादेव मुच्यते Mukti being generated exclusively by the divine grace born exclusively of vision caused by Jijnasa alone, in Anuvyakhyana.

Here the purpose of discussion in opponent's view and judgement's view is non-commencement and commencement of the work onhand respectively.

Prakasha :

In continuation of the critical survey of the arrangement of Adhikaranas by others, Ramanuja's Purva Paksha

and sidhanta of Jijnasadhikarana is subjected to critical review. In the first sutra the opponent objects to accept the vedic statements as valid in respect of Brahma. For a child not knowing the meaning of words stands by the side of two grown up persons of whom one says to the other 'Bring the cow'. Then the man thus asked brings the cow. Then the child closely observing the activity of the second man reasons to himself. "Activity of bringing a cow is preceded by knowledge. Because it is (human) activity like that of mine." Then he infers that knowledge is originated by some cause which is the statement made by the first elderly man. Further by the method of omission and commission he concludes that the meaning of a word, is arrived at by activity. Hence meaning is some 'becoming' (karya) and not 'Being' (sidha.) So a statement can be an instrument of knowledge only in respect of becoming and not being. But Brahman is a being and hence it is not signified by vedic statement as it does not convey the meaning of a being. So Veda cannot claim the status of an instrument to create the knowledge of Brahman (It is not Pramana). Therefore Brahmasutras to decide the meaning of Vedic statement need not be commenced. According to Ramanuja this is the opponent's view.

Now the judgement side is that the child in its semantic adventure, does not take to such lengthy courses; because they are above its head. The child takes easily to a direct and short method of understanding things. He does not proceed through changing activities (कार्य) to understand the meaning but he approaches finished things (सिद्ध). Some one points to a parent by the finger and saying 'he is your father' and so on. Then the child knows the meaning of 'father'. Besides setting aside the popular

method of understanding the meaning of a word it is selfish to adopt a clumsy method to prove one's theory. Hence the vedic statements can convey the meaning of Brahman a 'being' finished and ready in its form. Therefore Brahma sutras have a legitimate task before them and they are fit to be commenced. This is the judgement side according to Ramanuja.

Let us closely review Ramanuja's interpretation and arrangement of this Adhikarana. He interpretes the sutra as "After a due investigation of Karma, for that very reason investigation into Brahman is to be instituted." All this is well treated in detail in Anuvakhyana, where अतः is interpreted as "Because (it is refuted that meaning refers to activity) the meaning refers to an accomplished thing." Ramanuja's interpretation would have been correct if the opponent had based his argument taking objection to the investigation of karma.

But the followers of Ramanuja attack the Sidhanti with a counter argument. Now Sidhanti proves the existence of a subject matter for enquiry by the use of the word Brahman in the sutra, so as to distinguish it from Jeeva on the strength of Brahma's possession of perfections; in the same manner his followers argue that meaning is understood with reference to a fully perfect Being on the strength of the use of Brahman.

At this stage a rule is framed to anticipate the objectionable side. When an objection can be raised, which can be refuted by reasons shown in the sutra, why should we go in for an objection which can be refuted by outside reasons?

But the shruti is (ब्रह्म विजिज्ञस्व) in which Brahma is known as the object of an activity called knowing expressed by the termination of लोट्. There is no chance for under-

standing the meaning through a finished and ready-made thing. In sutra one shall have to follow the method of shruti and hence the word 'kartavya' is understood.

Had Brahman been in the struti mentioned without verbal connection, then the word कर्तव्य would not have been understood in struti. Then सिद्धे व्युत्पत्ति would have been suggested. Nothing of that kind has happened.

But Ramanuja contends that कार्ये व्युत्पत्ति must be refused to gain validity of evidence for Brahman and there is no such word in the sutra. This is an unavoidable prerequisite for the sidhanti also. Hence he contends that the objection side he has chosen has been justified.

Raghavendra offers classification to avoid wrong understanding. Dharma sutras are said to consist of twenty Lakshanas, where Lakshana means an Adhyaya.

Again the argument against Ramanuja has been resumed. It is his contention that Brahma Vichara has been ushered in because karma Vichara has already been finished. But the word अतः in the sutra does not express the reason for Sidha vyutpatti (purport in a finished Being).

But some one here enters into the lists and argues. A Mundaka vakya is chosen (परीक्ष्य लोकान् कर्म चितान्... तद्विज्ञानार्थं सगुरु मेवाभिगच्छेत्) and recited. Now the doubt is whether this shastra is to be begun or not? In अयमाहुमात्रहृ Jeeva is identical with Brahman. And hence being ever experienced, Brahman need not be discussed. But identity is between two chits only and not between Jeeva and Brahma. And this pure Brahma is now hidden from us and hence its nature is doubtful and to be discussed.

This is the misinterpretation of shruti. For in shruti Jeeva is referred to as 'this' and this Jeeva is one with

limited knowledge and is the object of our experience; And this specified Jeeva and not pure chit is identified with Brahma.

Even conceding reference to the identity with pure chaitanya in shruti, we may just consider whether there is consistency in that statement. For pure chaitanya is not characterised with particularity but is one homogeneous consciousness. So it cannot be expressed in words. Therefore it cannot be referred to in (अयमात्मा ब्रह्म). Only indentity with particularised soul is expressed and that is ever the object of our experience.

Though a partial knowledge is possible, yet that does not conduce to Moksha. Hence Brahma need not be enquired into; And Guru need not be approached on that account. So this shasira need not be commenced.

But in some shruties even distinction (between Jeeva and Brahma) is marked out. Hence two contrary statements create doubt and offer a chance for the shastra to begin investigation into it.

This sort of Adhikarana Arrangement is not in conformity with the wording of the sutra. The sutra consists of certain reasons to settle the meaning of vedic statements. Then only such vedic statements whose meanings or imports can be settled by the canonical interpretation mentioned as reason in the sutra must be chosen for discussion as vishayavakya. Here परीक्ष्य लोकान् is not a vedic statement of this special type. So अयातो ब्रह्म जिज्ञासा can in no way help the interpretation of this shruti. When a shruti with the word जिज्ञासा is available why go in for a strained statement? Mere similarity in meaning will not authorise us to choose the vishaya vayka. It must be such as needs the settlement of import.

Besides the opponent in this Adhikarana arrangement, is not a full-fledged Advaitin, only a new-fangled type who does not admit perception like Advaitin, to be an instrument of erroneous knowledge. Besides though 'I' is experienced in our empirical knowledge yet it is doubtful whether it is different from this body. Hence there is scope for investigation.

Thus pricking the bubble of other arrangements sufficiently, now we turn to our own arrangement of the Adhikarana.

Bhashya :

Eligibility is explained in Bhagavatatantra :

The Eligible (seekers) are of three kinds-the dull, the middle the best. Among (these) the best among human class are considered the dull (the lowest) in the investigation of Brahman. The sages and Gandharvas (The manes and kings) constitute the middle group. And gods form the best group. This is a division based on class-property like देवत्व or on the claim of birth in those families. Another division is attempted based on 'merit' or 'गुण'.

He, with Devotion to the supreme Vishnu and application to the Vedas has the lowest eligibility. One having self control and others in addition to the above has the middle type of eligibility. He is the highly eligible man who is detached (from the world) realising the evanescent and worthless nature of all, right from the grassy life to Brahman the creator, and has been attached to Vishnu tak-

ing resort only to his feet, and surrendering the return of all his activities, (to Vishnu).

"Study of all the vedas (according to one's ability" (constitutes eligibility to the investigation of Brahman); "Even gods have eligibility not uniformly (but with distinction). So says sutrakara.

"Having fixed his mind in God, much advanced in self control, having developed aversion to sense objects, and enduring odds, he fixes his mind on Hari the Lord of Lakshmi, and sees Paramatma in the cavity of his heart, only.

"The Brahmana (eligible to know Brahma) having distinctly known worlds won by sacrificial acts, should cease to take interest in them. For genuine Moksha, (not the artificial one) is not won by karma."

"Therefore for a specialised knowledge of Brahman, holding holy sticks in his hands, he should approach a Guru only, who is well versed in the vedas, with unflinching loyalty to Brhman."

"This Paramatma is pleased with that seeker whom he chooses."

"Pleased with the seeker, this Paramatma presents His form before him."

"He has great devotion to God Vishnu, devotion to other gods in conformity (with their rank

in spiritual scale) and similarly has his devotion to Guru and other spiritual superiors. To that high souled man, the things instructed (by his Guru) are visualised". These are from shruties, In vyoma sanhita also :

"The last-born (of other than the three castes), with devotion have eligibility to (repeat and study) the lore of Names and their knowledge." "women, shudras, and Brahmanas in name, have eligibility to study Pancharatragama and to get that knowledge, limited to a portion of it only, and not the whole of it from cover to cover, and that too when meant to instruct others".

"Of those who belong to the upper three castes only those who are honestly devoted to Hari are eligible to know Brahman from the study of the vedas".

It is said that the superior women have eligibility to know Brahman from the study of the vedas."

"For instance, Urvashee, Yamee, Shachee and other wives of Rishies."

Bhavadeepa :

It is as good as now defined that eligibility to hear, think and meditate upon Brahma is eligibility to enjoy Mukti. Now the definition of a definition is that attribute which is invariably found in all things which come under

the category defined. The good natured shudras are eligible to get Mukti and yet they are not eligible to study the vedas through hearing, thinking and meditating. But some like Vidura, Dharma Vyadha and others are said to be also eligible to the study of the vedas. Hence this is not a clear cut good definition.

So this whole question is thrashed out in detail by Raghavendra. That is a good definition which is found in all things to be defined. Now eligibility to Mukti is the definition of eligibility to Jijnasa. But this definition is mostly found in the holy shudras, the incapable Vidura and others are who really eligible to the study of the vedas. But this definition is found among the ignorant which is not desirable. In the same manner a holy shudra will get eligibility to the study of the vedas in his coming birth. But that cannot serve as incentive to the study in this birth. So they must be excluded from the eligible group.

This is in conformity with the rule adopted in अपशुद्राधिकरण that only the three higher classes have eligibility to study the vedas. Hence the objection is that अयं need not be used in the sutra. For merely by the use of the word Brahman different from Jeeva, the shudra is excluded from the eligibility by the rule adopted in the अपशुद्राधिकरण.

But this is not a fair way of argumentation. For this sort of argumentation will set at naught the Bhashya statement that तथान्यो गुणपूर्वकः : And Jayateertha's comments also that the previous explanation was not satisfactory, prove abortive. This was how some had construed the whole passage.

But this is not well construed; For your way of construction will not debar some among the higher three castes, who are not really eligible; and yet they are not disqualified by the rule cited in अपशूद्रनय. But अध्ययनमात्रवतः no doubt enunciates the particularised eligibility which is decisive, and yet that eligibility only is specifically mentioned by तथान्यो गुणपूर्वकः and in order to afford sufficient encouragement to the hearers' activity, the introduction of अथ now wards off, what will be warded off in future. Thus both अथ and Bhasbya are equally justified. This is clearly indicated by the statement सच्छूद्रादीन् which excludes from eligibility those who are undevoted to Vishnu among three higher castes.

Shri Raghavendra clinches the topic by a regularised specification of the eligible divisions. Among those who are qualified with study of the vedas, moral qualities like attachment to God and self control, and complete surrender to God Vishnu, those that claim predominance in study and subordination in other qualifications are the lowest qualified; those that claim subordination only in surrender to Vishnu while predominance in study and moral qualities are the intermediate qualified. And those who claim predominance only in surrender to Vishnu and subordination in study and other moral qualities are the best qualified.

शम is explained as 'inclination towards consecration to (me) 'God' which means 'not swerving from vaishnava tenets'. In the shruti "ज्ञातो दातः पश्येत्" and shama and Dama are said to conduce to God-vision. But पश्येत् only means 'should see' and hence it does not prove that shama Dama constitute a necessary causal part of God-vision. Other evidences conclusively prove that these moral

qualities are essential to God vision. But these moral qualities are also said to constitute eligibility to Brahma Vidya or Brahma Jijnasa, and this meaning is expressed by पश्येत्. On the other hand पश्येत् is taken to mean पश्यति on the analogy of a quotation from another shakha, which means 'sees God directly'.

परीक्ष्य means विविच्य and विवेक or discrimination forms eligibility (to Brahma vidya) through the creation of detachment or वैराग्य. Now in the two shruties, आत्मन्येव and तद्विज्ञानार्थम् the intermediate and the best eligibility have discrimination and detachment as the adjectives respectively. But these are not adjectives qualifying the best and last eligibility in the first shruti and the intermediate and the last, in the second shruti. So the intermediate and the best eligibility are not qualified with study and others in both the shruties. This is an objection.

To this the rejoinder is that both the shruties have started to dictate that श्रमदमादिकं is an essential part of ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा and study and others, on the virtue of the statement in the previous smriti, are accepted as implied. A reference to श्रमादि and विवेकादि with the word स्व, shows that in both shruties the intermediate and the best eligible include in its attributes of study and others, both these attributes in a profuse manner respectively.

Raghavendra explains विकृणुते as 'makes his own form an object of enlightenment born of Jijnasa.

What is mentioned in Vyomasanhita regarding the eligibility of the out-caste to Brahmajijnasa is already implicit in the meaning of the word अय in the sutra.

Raghavendra offers a valuable recapitulation of what has been said before. Now Brahma jijnasa means, hear-

ing, thinking and meditating what is stated in the vedas and in the books that follow the vedas on the lines mentioned in सर्ववेदान्तनय, as made clear in the Bhashya on the sutra दर्शयतिच, to acquire the knowledge of Brahman according to one's eligibility.

यथा देवे तथा गुरौ-यथादेवे देवयोग्याः तथा गुरौ गुरुयोग्याः Just as (we must show) devotion to God as much as would befit Him, so also we must show devotion to Guru as much as would befit him.

Bhashya :

As there is no Moksha without the Grace of God Narayana, and as there is no Grace-par excellence without god vision, (therefore) one should take recourse to hearing, thinking and meditating Brahman.

"It is the rule of the wise that in a sub-sentence, if the absence of a word would hinder the construction from yielding a consistent meaning then that word is taken for imported in that sentence. If on the other hand without that word the sentence has the capacity to yield some other meaning, then that word is not at all taken for imported". (Brihat sanhita)

"Thus directly realising Him (as million-headed) in this world, (through indirect knowledge), man becomes immortal (Muktia). For God realisation there is no other path" (than this) (Tait. Ava).

"I have extremely endeared myself to one of God vision. He is also very dear to me." (Bha. Geeta).

"If God, in his mind, being pleased chooses one as his own. Then that one gets him easily." (Kathe).

"Because the self is to be relised, therefore He must be heard and thought about and meditated upon. (Briha). We know this from such other shruties, and surities:

"Grace, produced by karma, is of the inferior type; and that produced by hearing and meditating is of intermediate type; and that produced by the maturity of God vision is of the best type."

"From inferior tyde of grace of God vishnu, Heaven is secured. From the intermediate type JanaLoka is procured And the best type of grace alone yields Mukti".

"Hearing, Thinking, and meditating as well as devotion or Bhakti conduce to God realisation and nothing else is accepted (as important means to it)".

"Besides, by other than these means no one has been able to realise God from any source." Thus it is stated in Naradeeya.

Bhavadeepa :

Now filling up the gaps and construing syntactically, the statement of the sutra runs as follows:— (Now after अथ and before अतः in the sutra the whole sentence यतः नारायणप्रसादमृतेनमोक्षः न च ज्ञानं विना अत्यर्थं प्रसादः is understood. And 'Jnana creating grace which is the cause of Moksha is being produced' is the context; hence अतः is to be interpreted as अ or Vishnu, the stem, and (तस्) the termination showing 'cause' and can be construed with Jijnasa. So the sutra means that Jijnasa, which is produced by that kind of Jnana which is the cause of Prasada creating Moksha, should be undertaken (कर्तव्या).

Raghavendra uses his ingenuity and imagination in raising an objection which will be consistently and co-ordinatively replied by the coming statement in Bhashya. The objection runs thus:— "First we must have an eligible man aspiring for mukti in general. Then the word अथ is justified when it supplies, as specified adjectives eligibility to Mukti, study of the vedas, unflinching faith in God, and others, to qualify this aspirant. Similarly when Moksha is proved to be existing, the word अतः is justified in supplying the cause of Mukti to be Jijnasa through god-vision and Prasada. But these two are badly wanted. There is no other subject than the ego for Jijnasa and even when it is fully experienced, there is no Moksha at all. And hence Moksha cannot rise to the status of the purpose of Jijnasa. When there is no purpose there cannot be any eligible aspirant, All this culmination when traced back takes us to absence of subject of Jijnasa. So Brahman is introduced in the sutra to supply the subject matter of Jijnasa, But Brahman by its derivation means "Full of

perfectioners". Jeeva is not so. Hence Brahman is identical with Jeeva.

To all this the rejoinder is ओ अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा. The meaning of the whole sutra is- एतेन ब्रह्मजिज्ञासेत्यत्र ब्रह्मज्ञानाय वेदार्थविषयश्रवणमनननिदिध्यासनरूपा जिज्ञासा कार्यः. After eligibility is obtained, because there is the purpose of Moksha or as Moksha is secured only through the grace of Hari by God-vision realised by a course of hearing, thinking and meditating. Jijnasa of this kind should be undertaken (Jijnasa about the topics in the veda) for the direct vision of Brahma or Vishnu.

Raghavendra offers an explanation for this circumlocutory interpretation of the sutra on the strength of a statement in Nyaya sudha (जिज्ञास्येयं विधीयते). What is enjoined in the sutra is not the knowledge of Brahma. For then Brahman, being the subject of that knowledge, dwindles into secondary importance. So ब्रह्मज्ञानाय ब्रह्म विचारः कार्यः; for the sake of knowledge of Brahma, expatiation of Brahma should be undertaken. Even in this interpretation Brahman will be demoted to subordinate position, as Brahman is there the object of expatiation. But there also the investigation is undertaken in the field of vedic interpretation to arrive at a correct concept of Brahma or Hari. So what is enjoined is the investigation into the interpretation of vedic statements.

Prakasha:

It is essential to realise the proper mental set and the verbal arrangement of Adhikarana and others, to understand the significance of every sutra. For thought is interrelated and idea is complex. So Raghavendra justifies the discussion of Adhikarana Arrangement. Showing the disinge-

nuousness of other's arrangement, Jayateerth boldly pushes forward his own idea of the sutrakara's arrangement.

This is a metaphysical treatise and the first sutra introduces metaphysical discussion. And even when such an investigation is enjoined to be begun; Adhyaya-relatedness is essential. When the necessity of the commencement of Adhyaya is proved by stating that Brahman, the topic of discussion, being full of perfections, introduces samanvaya which is nothing but the basis of attributive perfection, Adhyaya-relatedness is automatically secured. So no special effort is needed, to secure it.

But this argument is far fetched and leads to absurdity. By the same line of reasoning we can also argue that the second Adhyaya has the seeds of cause for its beginning, in the present discussion, the 2nd Adhyaya can in no other way establish its relationship with the 1st Adhyaya and the four Adhyayas can procure their inter-relationship only through the four Padas and shastra has its potential relationship with them. But we must not admit a separate relationship of Adhyaya different from the relationship of metaphysical treatise of Brahma.

This is not desirable; hence sangati is used in a different meaning. The metaphysical discussion about Brahman (Brahma sutras) has the inclusive relationship with the larger field of metaphysics (shastra); but the Adhyaya and the padas have not this inclusive relationship.

There are two kinds of relationships-one is inclusive-ness, and another is sequence. Now Brahma Meemansa or Brahma sutras adduce reasons to interpret vedic statments like तद्विजिज्ञासस्व so as to laydown grounds for investigation and discussion of Brahma; And this Brahma vichara "is

rightly included in the larger shastra dedicated to discussion of Brahma or ultimate reality.

But Adhyayas and Padas are not thus related; For these are devoted to exegetical interpretation of vedic words and sentences through special derivation and convention to connote Brahma in general and in particular.

Now the general plan of the Adhikarana is discussed. The scheme of five must be implemented. The first is the subject matter or vishaya. In Teeka of Jayateerth the subject is said to be Jijnasa or co-ordinated meditation; and not shastra. Yet in Sudha shastra is accepted the subject as in "should sastra be commenced or not?" And just for the sake of shastra, if Jijnasa should be undertaken or not is discussed. So the first phase of doubt is affiliated to shastra and the second phase of doubt pertains to Jijnasa. Then in Purvapaksha and in sidhanta it is stated that as Jijnasa should not be undertaken, the shastra also cannot be commenced. In the Teeka Jijnasa is said to be the direct subject because it is so mentioned in the sutra, which follows shruti and Bhashya gives stress to the same topic.

This doubt does not arise in the mind of the author; for he is omniscient; nor does it belong to others. For it has not come into existence. Yet others, after the shastra has come into existence, might entertain a doubt of this type. So their doubt is represented here

This is the method of surmising the topic and the doubt. As for opposer's view, it may be presented as 'shastra should not be commenced. For Jijnasa which comprises ratiocination of Brahma-thought also need not be undertaken. For it has no subject matter, as shown before.

Briefly the discussion runs like this: The so called subject of Jijnasa, Brahma, is not different from the empirical soul or Jeeva. The Karma-kanda portion of veda treats only karma or vedic rituals and vedanta only points the existence of one integrated pure consciousness which is experienced as 'I', a self luminous entity. Hence it cannot be the subject of doubt. And there is no other insentient thing really existing to be known.

Though self-luminous the empirical 'I' does not require any desire to be known for its experience. For knowledge is born even without any desire to know. On the other hand desire to know a thing requires the knowledge of that thing. Here again 'I' is knowledge itself; If that is to be preceded by desire to know which again requires knowledge for the desire to be born and thus there is endless regress.

Entering into finer subtlety the opponent argues to avoid endless regress that knowledge is cognised by desire to know; but that desire does not cognise knowledge which will cause endless regress but cognises if I have knowledge or not; if the pot were known or not' so Jijnasa has for its subject Atma only. Here the subject of the desire is no doubt, not in the form of doubt (having two alternatives) but in the form of positive content like 'I desire to know self' 'I desire to know that Pot is known' yet it is expressed in the form of doubt to show that one desires to know only doubted things.

The opponent contends that such a desire is never entertained and hence there is no unknown topic to be investigated.

Another objection is raised against the opposed. If he contends that Vedanta propounds only non-changing

eternal consciousness, then the Vedanta expounding a thing already known will be rejected as invalid means of knowledge. There-by he will be grievously offending the sovereignty of authorless Vedanta. Therefore even reluctantly he shall have to admit a Brahma, other than Sudha Chaitanya. Therefore let there be investigation of this Brahman and thus shasra should be begun. And an instance from Veda is cited, to expiate the sin of repetition.

An instance of Meemausa is given. काम्यपशु कांडविधि and अर्थवाद are stated. Vidhi is an injunction वायव्यं स्वेतमालभेतभूतिकामः and अर्थवाद is an eulogistic statement recommending the विधि or injunction. वायुर्वै क्षेपितादेवता वायुमेवस्वेनभागधेयेन उपधावतिसर्वेन भूतिगमयति is the अर्थवाद recommending a sacrifice to vayu which is enjoined in the vidhi. Raghavendra explains this as 'Vayu of great speed, being pleased with his own share (in the sacrifice) bestows wealth on the votary'. This repeats the great speed of vayu which is already stated in some other part. Still this Artha Vada being part of authorless veda cannot be neglected. Yet technically this Artha Vada has no predicate ending in a word with verbal termination which alone connotes भावना or effort. This Arthavada, not contributing to that effort in any one of three official ways, cannot be technically called Pramana or valid. Yet this Arthavada can be, in meaning, incorporated in the injunction thus— "यतः क्षिप्रगामि स्वभावतया शीघ्रफलप्रदः वायुः अस्य-पशोः देवता अतः प्रशस्तं वायव्यं पशुमालभेत"। Because Vayu being a deity of high speed, bestows readily gifts on the votary and this beast is controlled by Vayu. Hence Vayu-controlled beast should be sacrificed. Thus the Arthavada becomes one in import with the injunction and claims validity.

What is after all proved by this? We must tolerate vedanta when it only reproduces what has been already stated. When it is thus the fate of vedanta, the authorless work, much more it is so with this shastra the work of purposeful effort. So Atma being self-luminous need not be subjected to critical scrutiny. Hence shastra need not be begun.

After a long discussion Raghavendra arrives at a decisive meaning about the statement of the Purvapakshee. According to the Advaita system vedanta expounds integrated internal self. And this internal self is self-luminous according to the view of shidhanti. Hence the shastra has no subject matter.

Nor is there any purpose to be served by this investigation or Jijnasa. There are two highest values in life. one is अश्वत्थ material prosperity and another is Moksha. Abhyudaya can be easily made available by human effort and work. As for Moksha, it is not the direct fruit of Jijnasa, but through knowledge. Now this knowledge is available and yet Moksha is not realised. Hence Jijnasa cannot promise any hope of fulfilment of purpose,

Thus as there is no subject matter there is also no aspirer. Then how to account for such vedic injunction as ओतव्यः? Besides this Adhikarana is devoted to adduce reasons for the settlement of the meaning of injunction-ary statement, expressing the necessity of thinking or discussion, Hence this difficulty cannot be set aside

The reply is that, as will be explained later on, Shravana is not investigatory discussion and the remaining संतव्यः सोऽवेष्टव्यः form the middle portion of statements about Brahman, and hence तव्य has its connotation of an injunct-

ion frustrated and means only eligibility or अर्हता. An instance is quoted.

This is an instance from Meemausa. In the context of दशपूर्णमास it is heard विष्णुरूपांशु यष्टव्योऽजामित्वाय In the same manner two other yagas in the name of Prajapati and Agnitshoma are enjoined. Then it is heard उपांशु याजमंतरा यजति Does this last one recapitulate Vishnurupansu yaga and other two or does this enjoin a new yaga ? Because no separate Devata is mentioned in the last; therefore it is contended that it is recapitulation of the previous three yagas. This is Purvapaksha.

But the sidhanta is that यजति in the intervening sentence connotes vidhi or injunction. While the three statements beginning with Vishnu are mere Arthavadas. And तव्य termination before यष्टव्य merely means अर्हता.

In the same manner the sentence beginning with श्रोतव्यो and others, is one sentence looking to the beginning and end and hence तव्य means अर्हता. and not विधि.

But in the Upanishad, it is stated तस्मात्ब्राह्मणः पांडित्य निविद्य बाल्येन तिष्ठति and it means that one should think (बाल्येन मननेन) having heard. Here also there is no injunction to think. For it is thinking about Brahman and that cannot be ordered. Desire and knowledge, are beyond the pale of 'must'.

In some cases though a thing cannot be directly ordained Yet to get that thing only a particular means should be used not the other. It is परिसंख्या (अन्य निवृत्ति) that is enjoined. But in the case of Brahman there is no possibility of knowing him besides by shabda or Veda.

Thus when there is no subject matter तद्विजिज्ञासस्व is not a valid means of knowledge.

To this objection of the opposer sidhanti says अथातो धर्मं विजिज्ञासां

Bhashya

The word Brahman (though having many meanings) has Vishnu as the main meaning.

For it is said (In Shruti)- "Whom the learned (find) to be seated in the heart of the ocean and know very little, to whom, eternal and great, many subjects are (subordinate), from whom is born the matrix of the universe, who produced various beings in the world from the water (with other elements), that is the truth, the incontrovertible reality and that is the great Brahman of the learned." (Mahan)

"May Vishnu actuate us (to what is good)" as it is stated there (clearly) Vishnu is meant.

But because other words are used (you should not suppose) that others are meant.

"For the cause of the usage of the other words of the whole world except Rita or Vishnu became manifest from him. Therefore all the words do not connote primarily Rudra and others".

"He in whom all words enter as their primary meaning is called Vishnu of unlimited cause of the usage of the word."

So is stated in Bhallaveya shruti.

"He alone, of the gods, is the bearer of all names. To that querry-maker all other worlds take recourse (in moksha or pralaya) As the word 'alone' is used sarvanamata or holding of all names does not belong to others.

"In the unborn's navel a thing is created in which all the (fourteen) worlds were situated." This is the unique sign of Vishnu (lotus-naveled)

It is not proper to elicit another meaning leaving the most popular meaning (Vishnu).

"From whose navel, the lotus, the support of all words had come out was known to us from the shruti.

"A bow to that Vishnu, the creator of the world, whose extra-ordinary powers were exhibited partly and wholly in the world".

Thus it is stated in skanda Purana.

Because in Viswakarma shruti it is stated that he is up and above the heaven (Lakshmi) and above this world. The same is stated in Ambhri-nee sukta.

"Whom so ever I like I make him Rudra, or Brahma or Rishi or sumedhas".

Thus saying, she added- 'My source is in water in the heart of the ocean.'

The God Ugra is Rudra and the God inside the ocean is Narayana. For both are popularly (even in kosha) known like that; and the name Narayana suggests the Smriti as its evidence. When there is no fear of contradiction popular meaning is not abandoned. According to the rationale expressed before, the shruties express Narayana only.

In veda and Ramayana and in Bharat Purana and in all works, in the beginning and in the middle and in the end, Vishnu is sung as the main import. "Thus is it said in the Harivanshas." and it is not confuted by other works.

"Oh Rudra ! I shall create tricks to deceive; and they will surely dupe the people".

"Oh Rudra ! Oh long armed one ! Create or write shastras to deceive, and make others write such shastras".

"The contents of the works must be propounded as unreal and existing else where."

"Bring yourself into great publicity and keep me away from publicity?"

It is said so in the Varaha purana.

In Skanda, devoted exclusively to Shiva:—

"Achyuta ! Gods like Brahma and Rudra are subjected to misery by the meanest (one who eats

dog's flesh) when you turn your face away from them."

In Brahmapurāṇa Purāṇa:— Brahma says— "Neither I nor Shiva, nor others share a part of his power. Just as a child plays with his toy, so also Achyuta plays with us, his tools".

But in Purāṇas dedicated to Vishnu you do not find other gods than Vishnu praised (The praises showered upon Shiva by Rama, Krishna and others form a part of deceitful trick played by him)" (Therefore they do not contradict this statement.)

Thus ends Jijnasadhikaranam.

Bhavadeepa

In the Bhashya Brahma is said to be used in the sense of Vishnu only. In evidence of this two sutras from Devameemansa are quoted. (सविष्णुराहृदि; तन्नोऽन्याचक्षते). Immediately after these two sutras begins अथातो ब्रह्ममीमांसा. In the second sutra, the pronoun त refers to Vishnu as there is no sutra in between them. In the same manner as there is no other sutra between तन्नोऽन्याचक्षते and अथातो ब्रह्मजीज्ञासा ब्रह्म in the second sutra also means Vishnu, as the chief sense of the word Brahma.

Indian semantics recognises popular seven modes of interpretation of words. Besides these, there is the eighth and ninth mode of interpretation known as महायोग and

विद्वद्रुद्धि (Higher Derivation and the convention of the wise). Here taking advantage of vidvad Rudhi, Brahma is interpreted as Vishnu. Rudhi is frequent usage प्रयोगमात्र बाहुल्यं रुद्धिरन्याभिधीयते. जगतः प्रसूति. जनित्री लक्ष्मीः the matrix of the universe. विष्णुलिङ्ग here लिङ्ग is the characteristic quality (असाधारणः धर्मः) peculiar or unique quality of Vishnu. In settling the meaning of a word श्रुति and लिङ्ग are consulted as the reliable indicators. श्रुति is Mentioning by name हरिवंशेषु It is used in the plural, because it refers to the three parts known as Khila, Akhila and Parijata. Raghavendra very finely define नटन as विद्यामानाकाराच्छादतेन अविद्यामानाकारप्रदर्शनम्. वचन is telling the untruth अतथ्य is क्वापि अविद्यमानं लिङ्गमूलान्वेषणादिकं 'investigating signs and characteristics that are never existing; वितथ्य is' ascribing the qualities like independence existing in Vishnu, to Rudra.

Raghavendra in his humble humility recognises the superior ability of vyasateertha and others in the field of elucidation of the import of teeka of jayateertha. While his merit is only to expose a very small part of their magnanimous commentary on the teeka.

Prakasha

Now begins the reply to the purva Paksha so long raised. The sutra ओ अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा is the fitting reply. First the Purva Paksha so long discussed is succinctly expressed in one sentence. There is no other Brahman than Jeeva who is self luminous. And from this self- (Jeeva) realisation we do not get Mukti. Hence investigation of that Brahma is futile.

This argument of the opposer is not tenable; for Brahma to be investigated verbally means one filled with perfections. Naturally this Brahman is different from Jeeva who is experienced as imperfect. Hence this Brahma is an object of doubt. In this respect along with this direct experience (sakshi) there is also inference dependent on irreconcilable qualities as water and fire.

So it cannot be doubted that these qualities may be merely empirical and illusory, and that Brahma and Jeeva are one and identical and is not fit to be investigated. For three evidences stand against identity. Besides, by derivation also Brahma means (बृहद्बुद्धौ) 'Unlimited in space and time; and in qualities, also.

Conceding unlimited nature to Brahman in his qualities, how is it possible to turn all the Vedanta from propounding Advaita. On the other hand these very qualities being the essential nature of Brahman would only prove three kinds of unlimitedness of Brahman. This is most desirable to Advaitin.

But this is not reasonable. All Vedas have an import not in contravention with the injunction to investigate Brahman, which carry great weight in settling the meaning of the sentence, as it is the subject of injunction. That the very word Brahman, means identity with other things is refuted in Nyayamrita. Besides wherever Brahma is enjoined to be investigated, words like Brahman Narayana and others of derivatory meaning are used in many places and many times in one and the same place. Hence Brahman is full of perfections and stands un-investigated and fit for investigation.

It was pleaded on the strength of Meemausa instances that त्व्य in the intermediary sentences has no force of injunction but only means अहेता. So also त्व्य in संतव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः is argued that it has no force of an injunction.

But the intermediary sentences, beginning with वृष्ण and ending with अग्नीषोमी are accompanied with जामितादौष which ends with its निहर्ण (warding off). The whole is considered one sentence which does not allow the intermediary त्व्याs to connote injunction. Hence अहेता was accepted as its meaning. But here in श्रोतव्योमतव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः there is no such objection. In another instance of Meemausa प्रयाजादि वाक्य is intermediary sentence and yet forms with दर्शपूर्णदिवाक्य one sentence though it (प्रयाजादिवाक्य) is an injunctionary sentence; and does not lose its strength of injunctionary force. In the same manner the subordinate sentences संतव्यो and others are one with ब्रह्मपरवाक्य and yet do not lose the force of injunction.

Raghavendra now explains the whole situation in very clear terms. 'The whole of vedanta has started to co-ordinate a comprehensive and systematic knowledge of Brahma, calculated to lead to Moksha; and hence depends upon a thorough discussion of these statements. These statments are in the form of injunctions to institute investigation into Brahma, to create such knowledge of Brahma. Hence this Brahma Vichara is helping aid to interpret Vedas so as to yield Brahma Jnana. Therefore it is enjoined to conduct this Brahma vichara. Hence the statement tha describes Brahma is one with vichara vakya. So there is no objection to this injunction. At the same time there cannot be any identity of Brahma of unlimited perfection with Jeeva of imperfections

A full fledged discussion about Omkara.

So long the thought or tenet expressed in the sutra was discussed. Now the five words that comprise the first sutra are taken up one by one for discussion of propriety. Of these Omkara is the first word; and its meaning and propriety and purpose are discussed first. Sudha, Anuvyakhyana and all works that refer to ओंकार appear before the bar of reason.

In sudha the ideas about Omkara are found scattered and they are all gathered together here. Omkara forms a syntactical part of the sutra and stands at its beginning. But it stands un-coalesced for the reason that it should be repeated along with every coming sutra.

Or if every sutra is not suffixed and prefixed with an Omkara then all the religious merit is dissipated. Hence before and after every sutra Omkara is surmised to be present. Because this is Brahnavidya This surmised part forms a portion of the sentence.

Here a doubt arises, usually in rituals in the place of "अग्नये जुष्टं निर्वपामि" सौर्यचंद्रनिर्वपेत् Agni, surya is guessed to be present. But if ओं is to be guessed, there is no substitute for which it is to be guessed. In Tantravartika ऊह् or guess is defined as- "For the things and gods in Prakriti yaga, the things and gods of vikriti yaga are substituted. They will have similar function to that of Prakriti yaga, For this purpose vikritiyaga will have a prayoga which will be called ऊह् or guess work. Because it is being guessed.

This sort of guessing is not अव्याहार or supplying an ellipse. Adhyahara is supplying an ellipse caused by the

use of a verb in the sentence. In the sutra here there is no verb which syntactically expects the filling up of the ellipse. Hence this supply of ओं both at the beginning and at the end is ऊह and not अघ्याहार.

Another objection was raised. Omkara means 'full of perfections' This cannot be syntactically connected with the meaning of the main body of the sutra. Because Brahman is the adjective of Jijnasa and the expression may be a compound ओं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा or a dissolved form like ओं ब्रह्मण जिज्ञासा. In both the cases ओं or ओतत्वं cannot be construed with Brahman. Besides for averting the evil of dissipation of religious merit, once before the sutra, Omkara is enough and there is no use of it at the end. Again Omkara used with the sutra naturally gets itself connected in meaning with the sutra. But Omkara cannot be construed with जन्माद्यस्ययत् in meaning.

All these objections of the purvapakshin are now refuted one by one. First of all ऊह presupposes an original in the place of which the substitute ओं is coming. There is no such original. But the word ऊह is not that technical word (one of Mantra, sama, Sanskara, and others). It is (अघ्याहारः तर्कः ऊहः) by abstract derivation अघ्याहारः. If Omkara is not repeated with every sutra, there is दोष cited and in order to avert that evil a guess is made of the injunction of the use of ओं before and after every sutra, though there is no syntactical expectation of it. Only on the strength of injunction this अघ्याहारः is accepted.

If it is so there is only अद्वयार्थ and no expression of meaning. But on the strength of shruti and its capacity ओंकार has both the purposes to serve.

But in the case of the first sutra ओंकार is [used for visible purposes (of expressing meaning) and from the second sutra it is used for purposes beyond senses (Punya). So this will lead to disparity of meaning of ओंकार

This objection is very hollow. If an expression means one thing in one place there is no binding that in another place also it should mean the same thing. When Mantras are recited they have the visible purpose of expressing meaning. When they are used for Japa they have only religious purpose of getting Punya.

As for the syntactical construing of ओतत्त्व with Brahman, when Brahman appears as adjective to Jijnasa, ओतत्त्व cannot be construed with it. But when Jijnasa becomes the adjective to Brahman ओतत्त्व can be construed with it. Of the two, ओं and Brahma, ओं is taken in derivative sense and the other in conventional sense. Then the sutra means "Full of perfections Brahman or Vishnu should be investigated.

But it may be objected that this sort of interpretation runs counter to the tradition that both are derivative in sense and both offer the object of investigation. To this the rejoinder is that both Omkara and Brahma mean Vishnu by the mode of yoga-cum-Rudhi. Join together one derivative and another Rudhi and get a coherent meaning from the statement.

In shruti it is Narayana that is stated to be the object of जिज्ञासा Why Omkara is substituted for that ?

Whenever any Mantra is to be recited then first om is used. And om becomes meaningful, only when om meaning 'full of perfections' gets construed with the meaning of the Mantra.

In sannyaya Ratnavali we shall be further enlightened about the constructional connection of Omkar. Omkar is separately pronounced. When Omkara is not syntactically connected with the sutra, how to construe it with Jijnasa ? Om is interpreted as 'full of perfections. But we must realise the place of Om in the exigency of Vedas. (Vyahriti is the elucidation of Om; and Gayatri enlarges upon Vyahriti. Purusha-sukta is an elucidating commentary on Gayatri. Till at last the whole of veda explains the gist of Purusha sukta. Ultimately Om is explained by the whole of the veda. Shri Narayana explains the sense of Om, and thus elucidates the whole of veda. Hence Om is the subject matter of Jijnasa. This is the view of Anuvyakhyana. This is the way of settling the subject matter of Jijnasa independent of sutrārtha.

But here we find some discrepancy between the works of Acharya, in Bhashya citing a smṛiti (अथातः सद्गुणाणि सूत्राणि निखिलान्यपि) and taking for granted that अय and अतः are to begin every sutra. Their meaning is discussed and in exclusion of ओं. अय and अतः are said to form the beginning of the sutra. This is really not in agreement with Anuvyakhyana.

This contradiction is only apparent and can be easily reconciled. By upakrama and others अय and अतः form the

beginning of the sutra not in exclusion of Omkara, which is an auspicious sign. Thus Omkara forms the beginning syllabal of the sutra. तावेवादी प्रयुजते does not exclude ओंकार but Brahma and others.

Yet another doubt still lurks behind unexplained. If ओंकार forms part of sutra why is it that Bhasayakara leaving aside ओंकार explains only अय and अतः? Bhashyakara has explained ओंकार by citing quotations from छांदोग्योपनिषत्.

Now begins the interpretation of अय.

अय as already stated means 'after due eligibility'. In order to confirm this meaning doubts are raised and discussions are instituted, critically reviewing the interpretations of others. अय is used in the following senses: मंगलानंतरारंभप्रश्नकात्स्नेषु Auspiciousness, sequence, commencement, Question, wholeness. Of these 'questioning' is out of question as no answer is expected in अथातोब्रह्मजिज्ञासा. In the same manner discussion of whole of Brahman is an impossibility. Hence 'wholeness' also is out of question. As for auspiciousness or मंगल it is not the word-meaning of अय. Hence अय may mean commencement which also means eligibility. But others contend that Jijnasa does not require any commencement at all. Jijnasa is desire to know; no desire can be begun. Jijnasa also means 'thought' and thought can be begun.

But अय means 'Sequence' or 'Afterwards'. And if no man of eligibility is recognised for the commencement of shastra or thought, then thought cannot be begun at

all. So 'thought' to have the proper prerequisites of 'purpose' and 'eligibility' requires अथ or 'afterwards'.

Raghavendra contends that this sort of imposition cannot be made by the others who adopt different view about Brahman (Advaitins). For 1) Moksha may be the purpose of thought and 'one desirous of Moksha is the eligible aspirant or 2) Knowledge of Brahma is the purpose and the eligible is 'one desirous of getting knowledge of Brahman, or 3) the eligible is 'one desirous of god-vision' and god-vision is the purpose or 4) 'unhindered or constant god-vision is the purpose and one desirous of such vision is the eligible man, or 5) with repulsion of other things and attraction towards Brahman is the purpose and a man having these is the eligible one.

All these five alternatives are not consistent with the doctrines of others (Vivaranakara and Bhamatikara). This is shown with admirable competence and, adroit skill. But going into the details of the refutation is forbidden to us for fear of exceeding the limit of space allotted to us. Yet Vivaranakara is rounded up by saying that he does not admit the desire of indirect knowledge or परोक्ष ज्ञान. The desire of Moksha is invariably preceded by the desire for knowledge. And as long as one is not engaged in thought, indirect knowledge is not determined and hence desire for direct knowledge or god-vision cannot be entertained. This causes a logical fallacy called mutual dependence, in this argument. For after one is engaged in thought, indirect knowledge is determined; and after determination one is actuated to entertain desire for god-vision. Therefore there is no one desirous of knowledge who may be called अङ्गीकारि, and no knowledge which may be called its purpose, in the Vivaranakara system. So अथ means even in Vivarana's system eligibility. In the same

manner in Bhamatikara system also अथ must mean अधिकार. For in his view Brahma-jijnasa, desire for knowledge of Brahma is justified in its birth when one tries to get certainty out of doubt. This certainty comes out of a course of thought. Hence the undertaking of the course of causes of thought becomes established indirectly through the entertaining of desire for knowledge of Brahman. In the same manner the undertaking of thought gets syntactically connected with the sutra-statement. And it is not a rule that such implied meaning should be construed only with expressed meaning. So just as 'thought should be undertaken' is the import so also 'thought is begun' is the implied meaning.

Kalpatarukara gives an instance from Meemansa; and Raghavendra explains it. It is said सौर्यं चरुं निर्वपेत् ब्रह्मवर्चसकामः that one wishing for the Brahma varchas (the lustre of Brahma) should throw as oblation सौर्यचरुं, in the sthali or pot, associated with Agni. Here the verb भवति which is expressed is being construed with याग which is implied by the word सौर्यं associated with deity and substance. So अथ means only eligibility. This is the view of kalpataru.

In the same manner "यदग्ने योष्ठा कपालो भवति" without the effort on the part of the doer, there cannot be any work of its own accord. But the verb भवति in this sentence presumes भावना or effort on the part of the impeller to action (प्रयोजककर्तृ) and this effort is construed with the termination of present tense (भवति) in the verb. So here also the presupposed भावना is construed with the expressed meaning of injunction or order (विधि.)

But this argument is rebutted and the two instances given are shown to be ill-chosen and hence it is argued that the presupposed cannot be construed with what is expressed. After this objection both instances are justified in their function and it is successfully shown that the presupposed is construed with the expressed meaning.

But this reply of kalpataru kara is found unsatisfactory and Vyasaraja himself offers a fitting reply to the objection raised. The verb has its stem and its termination. The meaning of termination is प्रयत्न or effort. An injunction is impossible without the effort being applied to some thing which is the meaning of rootstem. Therefore we must presume the meaning of that rootstem. Thus in the first instance निर्वण or offering is found to be the meaning presumed by the rootstem and it is construed with the meaning of the termination. But no deity can get connected with this meaning. In order that the word connoting deity should not prove futile, it is made to suggest यज्ञ or sacrifice intimately related with deity and substance. This यज्ञ becomes syntactically related with the root meaning as a distinguishing mark of it. Thus the meaning of the whole of the injunction is that the sacrifice related with effort (effort-for sacrifice) is enjoined expressively.

But Vyasaraja argues that अय does not mean आरंभ also. He concedes अय to mean आरंभ in Mahabhashya; but there is no other way than to take it to mean आरंभ. अय does not also mean मंगल. For it is neither the primary nor secondary meaning of अय. But अय only suggests auspiciousness or mangalam, which though cannot be syntactically amalgamated with the import of the sentence, yet it sup-

lies a reasonable cause for Jijnasa or investigation being undertaken.

अथ does not mean 'to introduce' alternatives as no other alternative is there before his Jijnasa (किंच नित्यः शब्दः अथ अनित्यः).

अथ means 'after wards', of these alternatives only that which is the cause of thoughtful investigation of Brahman is intended to be something after which this Jijnasa should begin, and not anything. But if after some thing Jijnasa should begin, that something need not be causally connected with Jijnasa. For we say चैत्रो गतोऽथ मैत्र आगतः (Immediately after Chaitra went, Maitra came). Here one is not the cause of the other; yet one is consequent on another. Hence it is not necessary that Jijnasa should begin after its cause.

Hence it is settled that अथ means 'afterwards'. But after what ? After eligibility. But what sort of eligibility ? Eligibility consists of, as Acharya has stated, Devotion to Lord Vishnu and other things; and not of the wealth of four kinds of means to Moksha, which is the stand point of the Advaitin. Who advocating his doctrine of Advait cannot defend this interpretation of अथ.

The argument goes on vehemently with all the acuteness of logic and wealth of references. Just to illustrate the truth of this statement, I shall quote some part of Raghavendra's Prakasha: Of the four qualities विवेक is one. It is discrimination between eternal and non-eternal things. This kind of discrimination is not possible in Advaita system. For if only the fruit of Brahma-vision is eternal or ever lasting and other fruit is evenescent and this kind of discrimination is erroneous knowledge, then the fruit

of Brahma-vision cannot be eternal; and no one will take to secure Brahma vision, through a course of meditative thought of Brahman. If on the other hand the discrimination between the eternal and evanescent is knowledge unsublated, then the subject of such knowledge is *ब्रह्म* and it will be real. Therefore this sort of discrimination does not agree with Advaita system.

Again the wealth of *शमदमादि* constitutes one of the four means of attaining, Mukti. This is based upon a shruti- 'ज्ञातो दांत उपरतः तितिक्षुः समाहितो भूत्वा आत्मन्येवात्मानं पश्येत्' As this shruti begins with (एवं वित्) which means he should have the knowledge from the study of the shastras. Thus, stating the study of the shastras, the qualities of shama and Dama are enjoined as subsidiary to meditation (पश्येत्), and they are not subsidiary to thinking as they should be: because it is shastra where thinking is predominant. This leads to logical self-dependence. For after entering into shastra he finds the injunction of the acquisition of shama and Dama, and thus he secures them. But for entering into shastra he requires the eligibility of shama and Dama. Thus there is mutual dependence.

But this objection is not sound. For Moksha is determined even, before thinking, to be the sumum bonum of life through previous history or through the words of the parents. Or through implicit and instinctive faith. He enters into thinking because first he enters into it with a sense of probability. After thinking he enters into it with certainty, which is the fruit of thinking. This also leads to the same fallacy. To avoid this the only course left is to take to our cour-

se of interpretation. According to our interpretation, the aspirant's eligibility consists of vairagya or detachment and others; and discrimination conduces to this detachment. Shama dama and others are but qualifications of those who are eligible to do the work of investigation of Brahman. Therefore restriction of four in respect of qualifications of the eligible is not proper.

Thus अथ means 'After one gets eligibility'. This interpretation is warranted by our system of thought and in the system of others is a square peg in a round hole. Therefore Bhasyakara says' अधिकारान्तर्पर्यश्च.

As regards the other meaning of अथ namely Mangalam it is not the word-meaning; but it serves the purpose of indicating Mangala. Therefore it is well said that अथ is मंगलफलक. But अथ is said to be मंगलोक्ति or its derived meaning is Mangala. Yet अथ is not used here in such derived meaning. मंगलोक्ति simply means 'using a word which by its pronunciation removes all impediments in the way of success. Pronunciation or Ukti only means using a word which brings Shri Vishnu to memory that gives us strength to fight against difficulties in the way of success.

Some one raises an objection against this sort of interpretation. अथ has primary meaning and another ultimate meaning, purpose. And these are dissimilar and so cannot be joined together by the conjunction 'च' or and, just as the word गो means 'a cow and water. and both are primary meanings.

To this objection the reply is that 'Mangala as the ultimate purpose and 'Afterward', as the primary mean-

ing'-both can be joined by the conjunction 'and' Or अय means by derivation Vishnu who is most auspicious.

Or we may construe as 'अय not only means 'Man-gala as the ultimate purpose; but it also means primarily 'After wards'. Interpretation of अतः Now we finally come to the interpretation of अतः which means 'For the reason'. Jijnasa is the cause of knowledge which generates devine grace, assuring Moksha. The question is how does अतः imply all this meaning of a chain of causes. For अतः is derived from एतद् and the ablative termination तसिर्. The pronoun एतद् refers to some noun that goes before it. No doubt before this there is Moksha occuring in the qualification of an eligible man (He desires Moksha); but the grace of Narayana as the cause of Moksha is not to be found any where; and in the same manner, knowledge as the cause of grace also cannot be traced here.

This objection has been replied in seven ways. The pronoun not only refers to nouns that have occurred before in the sentence. But they also refer to words that are in the mind of the man who uses the pronoun. Presence of these words in the mind is possible because these words occur in the Shruties which are relevently read in the context (यमै वैषवृणुते and others). Or those words might be taken as understood. Or taking for granted the shruties might serve as basis. Or some presumption might justify the taking for granted. A shruti-instance is quoted सुवेण अवद्यति in this, अवदान is of three things. The three things are liquid substance, meat, and flour and the three instruments are spoon, Swadbiti and hand. One is to be construed with the other with a sense of fitting

adjustment. (Spoon for liquid and others). So the gap in the shruti is to be filled with the fitting thing. Thus as the necessity of thinking is in no other way justified than by positing that knowledge produces prasada or grace which produces Moksha. Hence this positing is taken for granted.

Now Bhaskara says that अय introduces what has been said before as reason for विचार. Mere sequence is of no use. After eligibility one should take to Jijnasa because eligibility is the cause of Jijnasa. Hence अतः has no new thing to introduce. So it is redundant in the sastra. The use of अतः cannot be justified on the ground that reason is presumptive in अय while it is direct in अतः; For even if it is presumed it is incorporated in the import of a sentence as the sentence has syntactical relationship with the presumed reason. So अतः is redundant.

But in our interpretation of अय and अतः there is no scope for raising such an objection of redundancy. For the word repeats only the quality of an eligible man which gives rise to Jijnasa, in order to remove the doubt of non-eligibility. And the word अतः on other hand introduces a course of reasoning adduced by sutrakar himself to prove that there is purpose for Jijnasa. Now where is the scope for redundancy ?

Others have tried to explain away this redundancy in different ways. But they are not consistent with their tenets or they grievously offend the rules of logic. Let us choose for example how Ramanuja tackles this problem and then let us see how Vyasaraja exposes the defects in it,

Ramanuja interprets अतः to mean 'Hence' or 'After this time'. Now we are to prove, by the sutra, not only that Jijnasa should be undertaken; but that Jijnasha should come after धर्म विज्ञप्ता. This is the meaning of अतः. When this specified thought of Brahma coming after deliberate thinking of karma is to be undertaken we must ascertain the reason for it. This reason is supplied by अतः. The reason is the apparent knowledge that the investigation of Brahma brings a lasting and endless fruit while that of karma leads to only limited and temporary result. Therefore there is no repetition in the use of these two words in the sutra, says Ramanuja. This is the specified investigation of Brahman.

Here there are two alternatives 1) whether अतः means consequent on the specified reason connoted by the word अतः ; or 2) consequent on the speculation of Karma (For it is stated that investigation of Brahma should be instituted after investigation of karma).

Now in the first alternative of the Jijnasa of Brahma is consequent on the apparent knowledge of eternal fruit, this consequence must be based on the causality; for it is vain to suggest barren sequence between the two without one being the cause of another. Therefore the word अतः itself suggests that the apparent knowledge of eternal fruit which leads to Brahma Jijnasa is the Hetu for undertaking Brahma Jijnasa. Thus there is no necessity of अतः being used in the sutra.

Ramnnujeeyas contend that though the word अतः tells us that the apparent knowledge of eternal fruit is the Hetu-for under-taking Brahma Jijnasa, yet when one doubts the existence of Permanent fruit (Hetu) in Brah-

majijnasa, the word अतः removes such doubts. Hence it is not redundantly used. But this sort of waving the objection is already expected and answered. For अयं itself is credited with this power of dispelling the above mentioned doubt of आसिद्धिः.

Now the second alternative is equally untenable. For if अयं means sequence of some thing else, then अतः does not primarily mean the Hetu or reason in the form of apparent knowledge of the everlasting purpose of Brahma Jijnasa.

Even the contention that Brahma Vichara which is necessarily consequent on the investigation of अयं is, what is to be inferred, does not hold good. For according to Ramanuja's interpretation of the 1st sutra, it is a reply to the objection of the Purvapakshia that the import of the sentence is not a static thing like Brahman; but it is the dynamic and changing action. Hence there cannot be any investigation of Brahman'. To this objection the direct reply will be the establishment of simple Brahma-investigation and not qualified investigation as put forth before. Even if Ramanuja contends that the objection also is about qualified Brahma-Vichara and hence the qualified statement as reply is in the natural course of things.

This kind of amendment will not carry him far. For once the static Brahman is denied the right of being the import of a statement, then it cannot claim it even when it is qualified.

Thus it is finally settled that by अयं the sutrakara speaks of eligibility and by अतः he implies purpose. Brahman supplies the subject matter.

Now a long discussion ensues regarding the subject matter of investigation or Jijnasa. So long it was

stated that the word Brahman in the sutra supplied the subject matter and अतः supplied the purpose of investigation. But Bhamatikara says that both these (Vishaya and Phala) are supplied by the word Jijnasa. He contends that Jijnasa, being desiderative noun, means 'Desire to know'. When the object is well acquainted with, then there is no desire to know it. Here in the sutra the word 'Jijnasa' is used. So this object of Jijnasa is not well ascertained. Hence it is fit to be the subject. That which is desired is the end of our quest; Grammatically the termination (of the word Jijnasa) means desire. The object of this desire is knowledge which is the sense of the stem (ज्ञा) So this knowledge is the purpose of our quest. Thus we get both subject matter and purpose of our investigation from the word Jijnasa.

This contention of Bhamatikara is baseless. For he should realise what kind of objection is raised by the Purvapakshin; then he should see if the reply given by him is suitable or a fitting reply. The Purva Pakshin having accepted the desire of knowledge of Brahma, has not objected to the investigation of Brahma. But his contention is that there is no subject matter at all; hence there is no desire to know the subject. You should not run to prove the existence of desire; for where there is desire to know there is the subject matter and purposiveness; and when there is subject matter and purposiveness then there is desire to know. In the same manner Vivaranakara's contention also is not tenable. Thus in fine the Sidhanti says that the suggestion of the subject matter of investigation must be something other than the suggestion of a thing that is

undoubtedly known. That thing other than Jeeva which is undoubtedly known, is Iswara and that is connoted primarily by the word Brahman.

Here again a doubt is raised. By the very strength of the use of the word Jijnasa, doubt and other things that constitute the reason for it (Jijnasa) are easily guessed. Hence subject matter and other things are easily suggested to us. Otherwise Jijnasa is vainly used,

This objection is squarely answered. If the object or contends that by the strength of the use of the word Jijnasa, these things are suggested then in the same manner, leaving aside the first sutra begins with the second sutra suppose the shastra, जन्माद्यस्य यतः still there is no loss. For subject matter and other things supplied by the first sutra are supplied by the second sutra when we reason thus: Had there been no subject matter and other allied things then the intelligent sutrakara would not have begun the shastra with the second sutra. He begins with the second sutra. Hence there must be subject matter and allied things. Thus we guess on the strength of the very beginning of shastra, we may as well guess these things (and the first sutra would then be redundant.) Thus many other undesirable impositions or presumptions are shown to prove that on the mere strength of Jijnasa, Vishaya and Praojana cannot be presumed.

Thus ज्ञौ, and अय, and अतः are satisfactorily explained and now Brahman is being explained. This word Brahman as already explained means 'Full of Perfection' (गुणपूर्णं) as explained in the shruti. This 'full of perfections' implies also 'Pervasion in time and space'. For these two attributes are included in Guna.

But others explain Brahman as अखंड (नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्त, स्वभाव) The word Brahman, through its secondary meaning only implies the object of investigation and not through its primary meaning which has been completely discarded by them.

No doubt here Brahman should have been explained to refer to Vishnu to the exclusion of Shiva and others. But in the Bhashya, Acharya himself fully thrashes out that topic on the strength of sacred and secular evidences and hence it is left out here.

There is one sound reason why the meaning 'Full of perfections' is chosen here. By virtue of this reason, it can be easily proved that Brahman is different from Jeeva of imperfect attributes.

Others try to explain Brahman as 'Immense' (Mahat); and that immensity is characterised by 'not limited' by three kinds of conditions (Time, space and thing). This definition of Brahman necessitates Jeeva to be not different from Brahman. For otherwise if Brahman is not identical with Jeeva, Brahman will be to that extent suffering from loss of identity with Jeeva and then his immensity or unlimited all-ness will not be posited. Hence on the strength of the word Brahman, he is proved to be identical with Jeeva.

Here begins a very critical survey of the tenets of Advaita. This contention of Advaitin is not tenable. For if Brahman were different from Jeeva, he would be suffering in his unlimited immensity and hence Jeeva is identical with Brahman, on parallel lines of reasoning Brahma also would be identical with a 'pot' for his unlimited immensity.

having lost its desiderative character is used by convention in the sense of 'thinking or reasoning'. No doubt in the Teeka 'Shravana and others' has been used twice, and on that strength even shravana and Nidhidhyasana and Manana lend their colour to Vichara. Hence shravana and Nididhyasana according to the rule of छत्रिणो याति are found secondarily to refer to Vichara. Hence Teeka means to say that Vichara refers to this trinity of hearing, thinking and meditating. But though Jijnasa means this trinity and all three are meant to be the objects of enjoiment (कर्तव्यत्व) yet the enjoining of thinking alone proves the beginning of shastra; and not the enjoining of the other two. Or we may even quote the enjoiment of Nididhyasana as proof to prove the beginning of shastra. For if Nididhyasana is not enjoined then its subordinate thinking also will not be enjoined to be done. So indirectly at least the enjoiment of Nididhyasana is essential if shastra is to be begun. In the same manner if there is no knowledge born of personal instruction, we have no knowledge of the object itself, regarding which a doubt is to arise, no arguments to remove that doubt would be coming forth; and hence the shastra consisting such arguments need not be composed at all. Hence to get out of this absurdity reversing all these statements we reach back to the original statement "shravana need not be enjoined to be done". And this must be reversed so that its contrary is true "shravana must be enjoined to be done". This enjoiment of shravana is also useful in proving the beginning of shastra in an indirect manner.

But Sudha advocates only Manana or Vichara as Jijnasa and not shravana or Nididhyasana. For if

shravana and Nididhyasara are not enjoined as to be done, shastra is in no way stopped from beginning. While if Manana is not enjoined shastra cannot be begun at all. Hence Jijnasa means Manana only or Vichara only and not others. And the first sutra also enjoins Manana only,

But again it is objected that this Brahma Jijnasa need not be undertaken. For already in Purva Meemansa Dharma Jijnasa was undertaken and in that context, all Vedic texts were taken for consideration and 'actuation being Dharma' the gist of veda is Dharma only. And Brahma Jnana being of the nature of actuation, is also Dharma. Hence the scrutiny of all the vedas is already undertaken and it need not be repeated here in the Brahma Shastra.

Now this objection is rebutted by the Sidhantin in his own way. But others also have tried their hand at it. The reply of others is found to be not cogent. For veda was divided by them into two parts. One part was assigned to Karma and that was scrutinised in Karma Meemansa while the other part dedicated to the knowledge of Reality is discussed here in Brahma Meemansa. Hence there is no redundancy.

But the Sidhantin takes a different stand. The whole of the text of the Vedas is assigned to Brahma and hence the whole of the vedas is taken here for discussion. While Karmameemansa and Deva meemansa are dedicated to discuss the import of a part of the Vedas. That import too was only a secondary import of a part of the Vedas. One import was in respect of karma and the other was in respect of deities.

the shruti which undertakes to discuss that Brahman that was declared to be investigated in the former shruti, being other than Vi hnu deserves to be Jeeva by convention and is not fit to be investigated. Hence there is shruti sangati (relationship between the former and the present shruti).

Really speaking the two shruties instanced are one and the same. So there is, no doubt, no use of a relationship. But different parts of the same shruti are meant. In the former 'Adhikaran' तद्विज्ञासस्व "was" considered by quoting तद्ब्रह्मेति as the reason for Brahman being investigated. Here again the same तद्ब्रह्म is taken for consideration and in the Sidhanta यतोवा part is considered. Thus because the parts of one statement are different therefore the statement though one is said to be two. Brahman is going to be proved Vishnu in this Adhikarana. So the doubt if Brahman were Vishnu or Jeeva is consistent at the beginning of this sutra. For so long Brahman is not proved to be Vishnu. No doubt Acharya has said in his Bhashya that 'Brahman is chiefly used in the sense of Vishnu only'. But that is just to justify his own statement that with-out the grace of Narayana there is no Moksha"

But before Brahma sutra begins, at the end of देवी श्रीमांसा in the two sutras सविष्णु राहहि and तद्ब्रह्मेत्याचक्षते Brahman is said to be chiefly used in the sense of Vishnu alone. But for the present purpose, Brahman should be proved to be Vishnu by yoga; for that is the chief sense here. Besides the Purva Pakshin has taken objection to the yogic meaning of Brahman.

The usual course of argument that Brahman means Vishnu by the special mode of the convention of the learned, is not accepted here. Hence mere yogic sense

is required which Sidhanti is striving to achieve. For he wants to prove Brahman to be full of perfections. And that is achieved by yougica mode only. No improvisation of Yoga Rudhi a combined mode need be entertained. बृहंतो ह्यस्यिन् गुणा : is the way of deriving Brahman by yoga and it is warranted by shruti that the grammatical parts of Brahman inhere interpretational power. So there is no need of conceiving connotational power in the whole of the word, to facilitate the operation of Rudhi. Hence the Sidhanti is not going to accept Rudhi for the interpretation of Brahman. For Rudhi is defined as 'not depending upon interpretation of parts, when the connotational power of the whole of the word is under operation.'

Here Raghavendra mentions that some do not accept the reading of Tattva prakashika in respect of 'जात्यादेः मुख्यतः अजिज्ञास्यत्वात् देहात्म विवेकस्य अवश्यकत्वात्'. For it does not fit in with the coming sentence 'तस्यच स्वप्रकाशत्वात्' and runs counter to the statement in चंद्रिका. But the reading in न्याय विवरणटीका seems to be interpolated here as it is not found in many koshas.

Another discrepancy is shown here. In the sutra जन्मादि is in singular. While in Bhashya it is in plural सृष्टि स्थिति....बंधमोक्षायतः). But Bhashyakara has purposely used the plural, other-wise you will be easily led to believe that the sutra gives only one definition as others have already done so.

Thus the definition of Brahman is 'that which is the cause of creation, sustenance, destruction or dissolution, control, knowledge, ignorance, bondage and release of the world. Each one is a logical definition coherent and compact. From the point of view of the world, the first four

are common to all; while others should be accepted as they fit in with each one of them. These eight go to constitute the definition both individually and collectively. Now 'creation' and other words refer in its causal sense to Brahman; but in their secondary meaning as applying to the caused (world) they mean 'birth, death and other things'. Secondary meaning is always resorted to, with some special purpose. Here the purpose is to point out that Brahman is merely the agent cause and not the material cause.

Such a unique definition is found applicable only to Brahman and not to Jeeva and others. The opponent had pleaded that Brahman means Jeeva by convention. The fitting reply to this objection would have been that it means Vishnu by learned convention, by referring to the shruti (तदेवब्रह्म परमं कवीनां) and not by showing an objection to the popular convention. This argument of the Shidanti accepts that Brahman does not mean Vishnu by convention. But by derivation Brahman means Vishnu by showing that He is full of perfections, which serves the purpose of excluding Jeeva from the claim of being Brahman.

In the Interpretation of the present sutra, जन्माहि must be taken into consideration. It is a Bahuvrihi compound which is adjectival in form and sense; and hence qualifies some other substantive. This is of two kinds. 1) तद्गुण संविज्ञानं अतद्गुण संविज्ञानं; जन्मादि is of the first type. जन्म आदिः प्रथमं यस्मिन् स्थित्यादजाते The first type is that in which the determining attribute उपसर्जनं qualifies the other (substantive) as an adjective. Here it is the group of shtiti and others, which has Janma as its first member, so that the group is formed including Janma.

Now Janma shtiti and Laya form a circle and they are endlessly moving round. How can you fix your finger

on Janma as the first, or for the matter of that no sequence can be established in a constantly revolving whirl pool? But here taking into consideration one individual, we state that one that is sustained or perished comes into existence.

Raghavendra defines these terms: control is direction into activity (नियतिः व्यापारेषु प्रेरणम्). Bondage is with Prakriti (प्रकृतिः बन्ध) and Release is from bondage. Though Tattvasamkhyana mentions many more like सुख and दुःख yet only eight are meant to be the defining characteristics of Brahman and hence those eight are considered to be the dispensations of Brahman.

Nyaya Muktavali :

Sbri Raghavendra in Nyaya Muktavali gives us a concise and yet convincingly meaningful summary of what has been said, in two sentences. This first sentence gives us a closely knit-together argument of the Purvapakshin and second sentence quashes the opponent's argument exposing its hollowness. A sentence or two leads us to the opponent's arguments.

It was said before that a man of specialised eligibility, with the objective of attaining Mukti, undertakes investigation of reality full of perfections and distinctly different from Jeeva. The opponent raises objection to this. In Taittareeya a Brahman which is the source of all cosmic life is recommended to be investigated. Now is this Brahma the ordinary soul or Jeeva or the supreme God Vishnu ?.

The opponent proposes that on the strength of Kosha, Brahman is Jeeva by convention, the derivative mode being in-applicable; and convention does not warrant

the meaning of Vishnu the supreme God, to Brahman; besides convention does not yield the sense of abundance of perfections. In the world of interpretation convention yielding the sense overrides the claims of Derivation; Again through his destiny even the soul or Jeeva deserves to be the cause of creation. Other meanings given in the Kosha have no contextual propriety. The word आत्म used in the context of meditation is mostly used in the sense of Jeeva. For all these reasons Brahman recommended for investigation is Jeeva only.

Look ! how succinct is the statement and how pleasing is the presentation ! Here conciseness is compatible with comprehensiveness. Now follows the verdict of the Sidhanti on this objection raised by the opponent.

The vedic statement mentions that Brahman to be investigated is the source of all cosmic life and that source is no other than Vishnu; Indirect causality of Jeeva does not warrant the use of 'born of' (जात) with reference to the world born of Brahman. This phenomena (ईमानि भूतानि) cannot be restricted to 'man made things' and Jeeva cannot be a resort of the released. Besides Jeeva cannot claim independent agency in any activity. Rudhi or convention cannot operate here in respect of Jeeva; then because there is some obstructive hindrance which is 'the source of cosmic life'; The word Atma used as the object of visualisation or meditation is used in the sense of Vishnu. More than all these, according to the convention of the learned, Brahman means Vishnu and not Jeeva, which is the meaning of Brahma according to the convention of ignorant laymen. Thus equipped with both yoga and Rudhi, Brahman signifies Vishnu with abundance of perfections. Such a

Vishnu is still shrouded in doubt and hence needs investigation for clear visualisation.

Raghavendra is parrying the blows of the opponent with agility and attacking him with hits that cannot be parried by him. This bloodless fight with dialectical weapons is entertaining and enlightening.

There are other doubts raised and cleared within the frame work of the thought of Brahmasutra in this particular context. From a very practical point of view, Brahma need not signify some other meaning than Jeeva. For, you shall have to conceive newly that meaning, its connotation and its import—which is a very lengthy process. But in the case of Jeeva which is given as the meaning of Brahma in the kosha and the connotational power also is ready for use and as there is nothing to contradict it Rudhi delivers the goods. But this interpretation is untenable.

Raghavendra introduces Sidhanta in various ways. In a verse like this “यन्नदुः खेन संविन्नं न च यस्तु मन्तरं अनिलाषोप- नीतंच सुखं स्वर्गपदास्पदम्” (Heavenly bliss is not touched with grief; nor is it swallowed up afterwards; and is achieved at one's own will), what is swarga or heaven? Swarga does not mean popularly known ‘sandle wood etc. but means unknown and strange thing like. ‘heaven’ Is this Sidhanta? the opponent argues that the object (of enquiry), if unknown leads to prolixity, while if popularly known, it expedites the process, and hence limited perfect- ions found in Jeeva is the cause for the usage of Brahman and not the abundance of unlimited perfections as supposed by Sidhanta. So he concludes that Jeeva is the meaning of Brahman.

To this the Sidhanti counterargues that the same Brahman is said to be the source of cosmic life which is

not possible in Jeeva. Hence we shall have to run to some extraordinary thing to be the object of investigation. Therefore it will be an abode unlimited of perfections which is the cause for its usage. Hence Brahman means Vishnu.

Raghavendra, presents the argument of the sutra in another way. In the first sutra it was argued that Vishnu should be enquired, for Vishnu alone releases us through his grace which results from knowledge born of enquiry. If so, you shall have to accept that Vishnu should not be enquired because he is the source of bondage. You cannot deny that Vishnu is the cause of bondage; for Jeeva is neither free from bondage; nor is it self imposed. So you must admit that he is bound by some one other than himself. That other is either chetana or Achetana which both, are subordinate to God Vishnu, who cannot be a releaser if release is not under his control. Hence Vishnu cannot be enquired.

Sidhanta is that if pleased he is the releaser and if he is not pleased he subjects us to bondage. And in order to get his grace we must acquire knowledge through enquiry. Hence enquiry must be instituted.

But how to base this last alternative on the sutra जन्मादि अस्य यतः ? According to the previous interpretation the sutra ought to have been मुक्तिः अस्य यतः. But जन्म and other dispensations are mentioned only to prove the possibility of the capacity of Vishnu to release the souls from bondage.

Tantra-Deepika :

In Tantra deepika Raghavendra gives more attention to the interpretation of the sutra. In other glosses the precise meaning based on the wording of the sutra is lost in the marshalling of a gument and counter arguments.

But in Tantradeepika he restricts himself to the exact interpretation of the sutra.

He says—"In this treatise that definition of Brahman under enquiry is stated. Because यत् is used, therefore, its correlative तत् is supposed to be there.

The group consisting of sustenance, dissolution, control, enlightening, obscuration, bondage and release, which has जन्म or creation आदौ at the beginning. (जन्मादि). अस्य means प्रमितस्य चिदचिदात्मकस्य विश्वस्य of the universe, consisting of sentient and insentient entities, very well known to us. That (तत्) which is the primal cause of (यत्) the group beginning with creation of the well known universe, (individually or collectively as it suits the various constituents of the universe) is Brahman. Thus each one forms a definition totalling eight which redound to the richness (of attributes of Brahman.)

Besides these eight (creation etc) the sentient parts of the universe have joy and misery while insentient parts have growth and decay. Yet in all vedic texts enjoining enquiry only eight are mentioned as the definition of Brahman. And the aspirant for Moksha is enjoined to know Brahman as the cause of the eight only. अस्य refers to the known world, consisting of sentient and insentient entities and also properties like knowledge and others. Brahman is the cause of not only creation of चित् and अचित् but also of things like knowledge and others belonging to them. Therefore Brahman has control over knowledge and other things belonging to them.

Tattva Manjari :

Here the objection is the same. Brahman cannot be Vishnu. For the word Brahman is used in the sense of

Jeeva on the strength of the kosha. Brahman means Jeeva by convention. There is no reason why derived meaning Vishnu to be preferred to conventional meaning Jeeva. Even Vishnu Karanatva can be made to conform to Jeeva. For through his destiny he has a share in the creation of a thing. To refute this objection the sutra proceeds 'जन्माद्यस्य यतः' Vishnu alone is the doer of all. 'All' should be construed with 'doer' (doer of all), and again with विश्वस्य Eight dispensations of all universe. And Jeeva by Rudhi cannot be the doer of all. Now this Brahman is said to be the prime doer of all birth, sustenance and destruction. This forms a great objection to Jeeva being Brahman. So Brahman cannot mean Jeeva by Rudhi, but means Vishnu by yoga.

II Janmadhikaranam

Prakasha :

Brahma sutra is a closely knit thought process in which nothing disconnected can find a place. Hence at the beginning of every Adhikarana there is recapitulation of what has gone before, and reorganisation of it with what comes next is shown. So chandrika in a verse first shows the organic connection and the purpose of the present Adhikarana.

Here Raghavendra gives a connective interpretation of the verse in chandrika. Brahman occurring in the shruti, will have no sufficient ground to accept its derivative meaning in preference to its conventional meaning if no differentiating quality of Brahman from Jeeva is given. Without derivative interpretation abundance of perfections in Brahman cannot be proved. Hence investigation for that purpose is not justified. This is the contention of the opposer or Purva Pakshin. Hence this Adhikarana

gives a reply to an objection raised on the topic of the previous Adhikarana. And this is technically called objection (अक्षेपकी) connection. The purpose is to justify the onerous task of Brahma investigation.

Now the derived meaning of Brahman is abundance of perfections and it is by itself a differentiating distinction. Yet sutrakara intends that the Brahman, proved to have an all exclusive quality of being the creator of the cosmos, deserves this uncommon merit of plenty of perfection in Him. Therefore here Brahman is said to the creator etc, of the Cosmos. For this Viswakartutva easily proves the virtue of perfections.

Vyasaraja goes to show another connective link. Nyayasudha states that in the first sutra investigation of Brahma along with its means and purpose is enjoined. Means is the means of knowledge of Brahman and purpose is the fruit of the knowledge of Brahman. Hence both knowledge of means and of fruit entirely depend upon the knowledge of Brahman. But knowledge of Brahman is not depending upon the knowledge of means and fruit. So in Brahman we find some superiority of distinction; and hence it obtains priority of investigation over that of means and fruit and that investigation is through the process of definition and verification by evidences: Of these two logical processes verification is possible only after definition. Hence definition is preferred to and assigned priority of treatment. This is another way of presenting a connective link between the present and the preceding Adhikaranas.

Now the point at issue is that whether Brahman in the vedic statement 'तदिदं जिज्ञासस्व तद्वद्ब्रह्मेति' is Jeeva or Vishnu. Here Raghavendra adds a note. In sudha in some places the objection side is represented as not accepting Brahman

to mean Vishnu. But in Teeka in the above stated statement Brahman is accepted as Vishnu and the objector objects to this. Hence Brahman of this particular statement is chosen.

The two pointed-doubt whether Jeeva or Vishnu, is raised. But Brahman has (बृह्, जातिजीव कसलासन) so many senses, Now Jati is not taken for consideration because it does not suit the context. If Brahman is accepted to mean Jeeva then there is no reason to run to the derivative meaning of Vishnu. So Brahman by convention is accepted to mean Jeeva. This is the objection side. Purpose depends upon this Purva Pakshna, If Brahman is not accepted to mean Jeeva then the mode of convention is rejected and there is justification in accepting derivative meaning. Then Brahman means Vishnu and that is the purpose of investigation.

The objection is presented. Brahman is Jeeva because it is stated in kosha that Brahman means Jeeva, of course it is by the conventional mode of interpretation. It may mean Vishnu but that is by the mode of derivation. Convention has always priority over the mode of derivation. For Rudhi or convention does not need derived meaning of each (grammatical) part of the word; while yoga or derivation needs that. This may be illustrated by the instance of the word रथकार in Meemansa. In (VI-1-45-50) it is stated (वचनात् रथकारस्य आधानम्) that Rathakara should place Agni in the rainy season. Before this there are three statements for Brahmana, kshatriya and vaishya. Now the question whether this fourth statement is for one of these three, working as an artisan who prepares the chariot (रथकार) and enjoins Rainy season for him for invoking Agni. Or for a separate intermediate class the placing of Agni is laid down. The objection side contends that one of three easily learning that art becomes Rathakara and

for him only a separate season is enjoined and not a man of different class, who is ignorant is specially enjoined. To this objection, Sidhanti replies that Rathnakara shall have to be taken in derivative sense (रथ करोति) and hence the meaning depends upon the senses of the significant parts. This is a lengthy process when compared with the conventional meaning of an intermediate class which is the sense of the whole as such. Hence this is preferred to the first one. Even an ignorant man knowing the work of chariot making is enjoined to keep Agni in rainy season. In the same manner in the case of Brahman also the mode of convention and not the mode of derivation should be accepted.

But (1-4-8th Adh) प्रोक्षणीषु अर्थसंयोगात् shows that yoga or derivation is superior to Rudhi or convention. In this respect a doubt arises whether Prokshinee is called so on account of its purification or due to 'wateriness' in it or is it the derived meaning. The first alternative is based on the strength of the use in that sense by the learned. Or it is used in some context in the sense of unpurified water having wateriness. But derived meaning does not suit here. For the sense connoted by 'the whole' is comprehended earlier than the sense connoted by the parts.

This objection is ruled out by saying that convention or Rudhi is superior to yoga or derivation only when it gets scope. In अश्वकर्तृ in the sense of some 'tree' yoga does not get an access at all. Hence Rudhi is superior where yoga does not get an access at all. But where yoga gets scope the work is over and Rudhi does not arise at all. For conceiving of connotational power in the whole is a thing unimaginable. In the present context Prokshinee can be derived from the senses of parts (प्र and उक्षिणी)

(that with which we sprinkle profusely) as in grammar. As the question of Rudhi does not arise at all Prokshinee has derived sense.

The outcome of this discussion is that pre-established yoga is superior as a mode of interpretation to unestablished Rudhi. In Vishnu yoga is pre-established and does not give scope to unestablished Rudhi.

If the derivative mode is accepted in Jeeva is it in the sense of plenty of 'perfection' or is it some thing else; then that derived sense is not possible in Jeeva. Suppose for argument's sake Jeeva has Guna Purtitva it is not proved that this Jeeva is different from the one under investigation. (जिज्ञास्य).

If accordingly you also accept derivative meaning, is that Gunapurti or some thing else? Keeping these two alternatives before him the Sidhanti refutes this supposition of purvapakshin thus: The derived meaning of plenty of perfections does not conform to the nature of Jeeva. But some how if conformity is sought and Gunapurtitva is conceived in Jeeva (like "unconditioned by space" (देशापरिच्छिन्नत्व) then Rudhi is established. Therefore the case is not similar to Prokshinee. But there is nothing to prove that Jeeva is different from the one under investigation.

Now the second alternative; if the derived meaning is something other than Gunepurtitva, then Jijnasya also will not be proved as full of perfections. Why? Jijnasya Vishnu also gets its meaning not through yoga but through Rudhi only. If so Vishnu will not be proved as possessing plenty of perfections. Then Vishnu cannot be shown as different from Jeeva.

If mere Rudhi is not able to tackle the problem, let us run to a hybrid mode known as yoga Rudhi. But

yoga single handed is able to solve this problem. The derivation of Brahman is बृहन्तो ह्यस्मिन् गुणाः and the power of connotation is to be found in the fixed grammatical parts of the word. There is no need of conceiving another power of connotation in the group of parts.

If so there will be no yoga Rudhi even in Pankaja which the learned have accepted. But this objection requires some analysis. In the word pankaja the yougika meaning is extended to other things than the lotus. For the frog also is born in the mud, and hence Pankaja is not exclusively restricted to lotus only. Hence some convention which restricts the sense to lotus only is accepted. Hence the mode is called yoga Rudhi, a joint function.

Now the derived meaning in the case of Vishnu does not extend to undesirable limits. Hence in the case of Jijnasya, yoga alone is accepted, and not yoga Rudhi as in the case of Pankaja.

The opponent continues his argument. In तदेव ब्रह्म परमं कवीनाम् Brahman by Rudhi might have meant Jeeva, but there is one strong reason (mark) which contradicts this Rudhi. That Brahman is said to lie on the ocean and has other marks which are invariably found with Vishnu. Hence Brahman means Vishnu.

In तद्विजिज्ञासस्व तद्वद्वेति also recognising what has been said in a different shakha and reasserting the rule of Adhikarana we may say that Brahman is Vishnu. But this contention is proved to be abortive as there is no strong mark 'of lying on the ocean etc' which contradicted the Rudhi in 'तद्विजिज्ञासस्व तद्वद्वेति'.

But in this shruti also it is contended against the Purvapakshin that Jeeva cannot be the meaning of Brahma. For

still he is under investigation; that means there is some doubt about his nature. But Jeeva like broad day light is experienced by every one and there can be no doubt about him. Hence there cannot be investigation or enquiry about this well experienced self. Thus when Jinjasa is undertaken it cannot be Jeeva. But the opponent says that rather the other way might be proved. Because Jeeva is the topic therefore Jijnasa itself is not accepted.

But this contention of the opponent is subject to logical fallacy of mutual dependence. For if the topic is proved to be Jeeva then Jijnasatva is disproved. When Jijnasatva is disproved there is no contradictory reason and Rudhi becomes fit for operation. Brahman means Jeeva.

Why ! let Jeeva also be doubtful in respect of its being different from the body and hence fit for enquiry. In Teeka no doubt it is contended that Jeeva is not fit for enquiry from the point of the self being not so complex a topic as Brahma. Sudha upholds this view for it states Jeeva is not known as distinct from the body. Therefore the topic is fit for enquiry and Brahman may mean Jeeva, as there is nothing contradictory to it.

This argument cannot hold its own. For some how Jijnasa may be shown as consistent and Purvapakshi cannot say that Brahman is Jeeva.

But here arises an apparent conflict between Tattva Prakashika and Sudha regarding the presentation of the opposer's view. Though both belong to the same author, Jayatheerth, Teeka represents the opponents view that Brahman is Jeeva by convention and he is self-luminous and hence there cannot be any doubt about him. So he is not fit for enquiry.

But sudha represents the opponent who contends that Jeeva (the meaning of Brahman) in some respect can be shown to be doubtful for the self is not clearly and convincingly known to be distinct from the physical body as in daily transaction we indentify the body with the self. So in that respect a doubt is often entertained whether there is the self other than the body. Hence Jeeva can be the subject of enquiry.

How to reconcile this conflict ? The representation of Teeka to be kept in tact. While the representation of sudha should be properly interpreted and moulded. For sudha also means the same thing. For though Jeeva is doubtful in some respect and hence fit for enquiry yet Jeeva is not a subject of enquiry of the following type. The enquiry is undertaken by a specially qualified man; it is accepted as resulting in Moksha. Its topic is other than Jeeva and qualified by plenty of perfections. This is the sort of enquiry that is pressed in the first sutra. Jeeva cannot claim to be such a topic of this sort of enquiry, Now the methods of objection in both Teekas concur.

But this is further analysed and split into further subtleties which are met with subtler expositions. Yet Vyasaraaj for argument's sake seeks another way of reconciliation. The crux of the problem is this. In both the presentations when Jeeva is accepted as the meaning of Brahman, enquiry cannot be instituted. But in the first sutra and in shruti तद्विजिज्ञासस्व enquiry is enjoined by the termination of लोट्. That cannot be Transgressed, or when there is objection for enquiry if Jeeva is accepted as topic why not reject the meaning to be Jeeva. Therefore another way of explanation is offered.

As for the injunction of enquiry the Purvapakshin might not accept it to be a valid tool of knowledge. Or if it is valid still because the injunction is about Brahman which is not fit to be enjoined, it loses its power of injunction on account of the hindrance of Brahman and so enquiry is not enjoined, and that shruti will be consistent even if Brahman means Jeeva in that shruti. So non-enquiry will not contradict Jeeva-sense. In sudha not even doubt is raised regarding contradiction of enquiry. For it is accepted that Jeeva is fit to be enquired. But one that is a topic of enquiry is described to be the cause of creation in यतोवा. Even this causality is adjusted. For some how Jeeva through the destiny of man is considered to be the cause of creation (Because Jeeva is destined to enjoy certain things therefore they are created.) Or in the system where only one Jeeva is accepted, it is Jeeva who imagines the cosmos to exist and hence he is the cause of creation. Thus everything is made to adjust with Jeeva. The fact that Atma which is the well known synonym of Jeeva is said to be fit for envisioned (आत्मा द्रष्टव्यः). Besides because Atma is used therefore other meanings like बृहज्जाति are not the meanings of Brahma in this context.

Thus the opponent has collected evidences to uphold his contention and to remove all contradictions; and shows the hollowness of Shidhanti's arguments. Now he produces evidences to refute the contention of Shidhanti. Brahma in shruti is said to be निष्फलं निष्क्रियं. So a Brahman characterised by inactivity cannot rise to be an agent of action who is expected to be full of activity. Nor can he be material cause undergoing modification; because Brahman is immune to change of any kind. Hence if you accept

Brahman as the object of enquiry then you cannot attribute to him causality.

Again an objection is raised against the Purvapakshin-In Anandamayadhikarana Brahman is used in its main meaning of Vishnu. And many more such instances are given to confirm the view that Brahman is used in the sense of Vishnu and not Jeeva. But this is putting the cart before the horse. The instances quoted are from the further parts. How can coming instances affect the statement already made ? To this, the objector might reply that in other places by the mode of yoga, Brahman might mean Vishnu. But here by the mode of Rudhi, Brahma means Jeeva. Raghavendra adduces many more grounds to prove the authenticity of the interpretation of Brahman to be Jeeva in this context. Thus we find the opponent entrenched behind strong defensive machines.

To this the Sidhanti as a rejoinder adopts the line of argument that the opponent cannot take recourse to Rudhi or convention, as creatorship and other things are attributed to Brahma and these qualities are found consistent only with the meaning of Vishnu by yoga mode of interpretation.

Besides the topic of enquiry is Brahma and he is Vishnu. For Bhasya quotes shruties which state Vishnu alone is the cause in such shruties as य उन्निष्ठातु पृथिवीमुत्तया and others. And then यतोवाइमानि भूतानि जायन्ते tells us the subject of enquiry is stated to be such cause of creation. Jeeva cannot consistently claim to be such a cause. Here, Rudhi is stopped from operating. And if Jeeva is somehow shown to be the cause through its destiny then the words like 'born' (जात) shall have to forfeit their direct meaning. For जात means directly born of, or produced

from and not through any thing indirectly. Here the cause is the universal cause and not the particular cause of this or that thing. Thus though Jeeva can claim to be the cause of some, he is not the cause of all, nor is he the independent cause. So Brahman means Vishnu and even the word Atman that was claimed to signify Jeeva solely is found to denote Vishnu. For shruti like आत्मा नारायणः परः declares unequivocally that Atman is Vishnu. Then some more shruties state that Atma exclusively signifies Vishnu and is said to be eligible for enquiry. Though some of the attributes of Atman may some how be applied to things other than Vishnu yet the adjective सत्यकाम 'one entertaining invariably fruitful desires' (and not abortive) finds its meaning only in Vishnu and not in Jeeva who has unsuccessful career. Many more evidences are called forth to prove that Atman is applicable only to Vishnu and not to any other thing. Then certain objections were raised against Brahman being Jijnasya and cause of creation. For Brahman is stated in shruti. 'निष्कलं निष्क्रियं' 'to be inactive which runs counter to Brahman being the cause of creation. But this negation of activity in Brahman does not deny activity in general but it denies a particular type of activity; namely activity which becomes successful only through strenuous efforts. (प्रयास साध्य क्रियानिषेधः नसामान्य क्रियानिषेधः) The reason for this sort of limited negation is a strong statement in shruti which declares agency of activity of Brahman. Some times it is contended that a negative statement is stronger than a positive statement and hence 'non-activity' is stronger than statements of his agency of activity. This cannot be a general rule in shastra. For माहिष्यात् सर्वा भूतानि 'one should not kill any animal' is set aside by यागिय हिंसा कर्तव्या but 'sacrificial killing is condo-

ned; The negative is set aside by the positive. The topic is dealt with in greater detail in Nayamrita.

Here again it is objected that in shruti यतोवा इमानि भूतानि जायते or cause is stated and Jijnasa or subject of enquiry is predicated (The cause is the subject of enquiry). The cause that is stated is based on our experience and hence it is one that is warranted by our experience.

But in meemansa a certain rule- "शास्त्रस्था वा तन्निमित्तत्वात्". According to this, this is not the emperical cause warranted by experience but is some extraordinary cause which is treated in shruties quoted in Bhashya.

In meemansa in a certain context (I-3-5) यवमय चहः भवति is stated. Here yava means both दीर्घशूक and प्रियंगु. Are these two meanings equally applicable or is one stronger than another ? It is finally settled that one meaning is more powerful than another. It is दीर्घशूक that is meant by yava; for the remaining part of the statement agrees with this meaning and is thus used by the men authorised. But it is only the mlechas that use it in the sense of प्रियंगु. Hence nobody objects the over riding of दीर्घशूक over प्रियंगु. For only use by the authorised is accepted standard (Shastrasthas) in all standard works of shastra.

Here also in the same manner the causality that is expressed is not an ordinary causality commonly known to us but it is an extraordinary causality as described in the shastras. Because the topic belongs to shastra.

In Shabara Bhashya (a commentary on Jaimini sutras) the remaining part of sentence is shown which went a long way to decide the meaning of yava to be Deergha Shuka.

But when this is doubtful 'on account of the remaining part of the sentence' will be redundant. And in order to

get rid of this redundancy, we shall have to run to the usage of the Aryas that which is at its base and on its strength the usage of Anaryas is set aside and the meaning is decisively proved. In the same manner here in this context 'based on the strength of shruti' means 'based on the usage of the learned which again depends on shruti' and on this usage the meaning is decided, and the causality referred to, is the extraordinary causality described in shruti. This sort of construing is in conformity with the future statement that 'it is according to the convention among the learned'.

Another doubt is raised. Brahman is said to be the cause of creation in यतोवा इमानि भूतानि. But this Brahman can be a Jeeva like Hiranyagarbha. For this four-faced Brahman may dream and see in his dream the whole of this cosmic universe with the great oceans and the dreamer is the creator of the things seen in his dream. So this four faced Brahman, a Jeeva, can become the creator. And it is this creation that is referred to in the stated Shruti and not the highest Brahman.

This objection is quite hollow. For in that shruti the universe that is referred to, is the gross world which is experienced both by the hearer and the speaker. It is not the dreamy world seen in in the dream of some one. For the pronoun तत् refers not to a restricted world, but to the unlimited cosmos and hence the creator of such a vast universe cannot be a Jeeva of any high order. Besides the creatorship of even dreams is attributed to God. (संध्यै सृष्टिं राहृहि) and Jeeva does not claim any independent authorship, of the world. (इतरव्ययपदेशात्). So यतोवा only restates authorship, unrestricted, independent, and well known is shruti. Hence Brahman is Vishnu and not

Jeeva. Still another objection is that because Jeeva cannot be this universal cause, therefore it is alleged that Jeeva cannot be five sheaths or kosas like अन्नमय and others, and in Annamaya there is the form of Anirudha which is the form of Vishnu. Accordingly Annirudha also is not the meaning of Brahman. For it is stated in smrities that the original form of Vishnu is the source of all these Avatar forms. And only the original source is the cause of the worlds and not the Avatara forms.

Though there is intrinsic identity and difference by its assumed power, between the source and Avatara, yet each form is meant by its self-imposition to a particular work; so original source is said to be the cause and not Annirudha and others. It is only your gross misunderstanding that has caused you to understand things wrongly.

Now this objection is groundless. For the original and the Avatara forms are absolutely identical and each one whether original or assumed has the same qualities of the same intensity. But some are manifested while some are not manifested. This fact of special manifestation will explain the different assignments of work to each one of the forms. Bhagavan Krishna in Geeta tells us that he is the source of all creation; and actuation. The fact is that Jeeva, like Avatara forms, being identical with Brahman, should have a claim to be the cause of the world, is not reasonable because this assumption is opposed by many evidences scriptural and secular. Raghavendra says that this sort of discussion hence forth degenerates into a useless effort like winnowing chaff which contains no grain (अस्तकण बुसोत्पवना यासः).

Besides (तदेव ब्रह्म परमं कवीनां) the Brahman in the shruti according to the convention of the learned means Vishnu.

Otherwise Brahman cannot be the supreme. And this supremacy is in respect of Brahmatva only. But if to prove supremacy of Brahmatva you accept (Vidvad) Rudhi for the interpretation of Brahman and give up yoga altogether you cannot show that Brahman is full of perfections. (गुणपूर्णत्व). Yoga also is accepted and there is no harm for Rudhi to operate even when yoga is under operation and there is no extension of application of yogic meaning.

There is Rudhi because Brahman is used in the sense of Vishnu frequently in shruti. But if Rudhi is that where the cause of usage is to be found in the whole of the word and not in its parts, then this frequent usage itself proves the power of connotation to abide in the whole.

Raghvendra introduces us to the real nature of Rudhi. He tells us that Rudhi is not one having the power of connotation in the whole. For words of one syllable do not constitute a whole as they have no parts and still they mean by Rudhi. So Rudhi is defined as having integrated or indivisible power of connotations. In the process of the mode of Rudhi the word is interpreted on the basis of the indivisible power of connotation. So samudaya shakti does not hold good in the interpretation of a word, yet the opponent contends that some other characteristic of Rudhi than the frequent usage should be recognised.

Or Vidvad Rudhi is more powerful than the convention of the ignorant.

The instance of यव being used in the sense of दीर्घशूक is more powerful because it is used by the Aryas than the sense of त्रिंशु as it is used by the Anaryas. In the same manner ignorant people use the word 'Lion' with reference to a painted lion.

Often we find the meaning of the Anaryas is preferred to the meaning of the Aryas. But that is only when Arya meaning is not to be found. Even when Arya meaning is famously known, the Anarya meaning is accepted as more powerful than the Arya meaning. As an instance of the first type विक is given which is used by the Anaryas in the sense of कोकिल. While राज is given as an instance of the second type. According to Arya usage राज means 'one who rules' (one of three castes); But according to Anarya usage it means 'the Kshatriya' (by caste). The Anarya meaning कोकिल is accepted because there is no other Arya meaning contrary to this. While in राज there is the Arya meaning (one who rules).

Let us see its context.

Here Raja suya yago is enjoined on the king who wishes to get Swarajya. Rajasuya is a group of yagas. If the performer is a Brahmin he should offer oblations to Brahspati; if a Kshatriya to Indra and if Vaishya to Vishvedevas. The question arises who is this Raja. According to Arya usage राजा means one who rules and this ruler can be any one of the three varnas.

But there is the word राज्य used which is derived from राज (Panini says राज्ञः कर्म राज्यम् with the termination यक्). Before he gets राज्य he is Raja which means by Rudhi a Kashatriya. This Anarya usage is favoured by Panini the best among Aryas. And hence Anarya meaning is accepted.

The sum total of this discussion is that in the present context Brahman does not mean Jeeva by the convention of the ignorant. For there is no smriti to corroborate this interpretation of Brahman (as Jeeva). On the cont-

rary Brahman is used only in the sense of Vishnu in such shruties as 'तदेव ब्रह्म परमं कवीनाम्'.

Here Raghavendra adds a note. In Namadheya pada in Jaimini sutra this topic of the usage of Arya and Anarya is being discussed in more details. (बर्हि राज्ययो रसंस्कारे).

शद्वलाभादतच्छदः. Here two words, बर्हि and आज्य are selected for discussion. These two words in Arya circle are used only in the sense of purified (grass and ghee). But Anaryas set aside this purification and use in secular sense of grass and ghee in general (without any implication of sacred purity). For we find these two words are used in business parlour in the general sense of grass and ghee. Hence Anarya usages dominate over Arya usages and in the case of Brahma also the convention of Jeeva may predominate over the holy Vedic usage of this word in the sense of Vishnu.

But the Arya do recognise the general use or class use of the word Barhi and Ajya in their general sense even when they use them in the sense of holy or purified grass and ghee. Hence the Anarya usage is not in contravention of Arya usage. Therefore Chandrika has not mentioned this objection and its classification.

Even then one objection still remains unanswered. When convention is equally powerful in giving both the senses, how one is rejected and another is accepted? The answer to this objection is to be found in many distinctions made between two equal cases: When secondary and subordinate modes are equally unimportant modes and yet Prabhakara prefers subordinate (गौणी) while Naiyayika prefers लक्षणा secondary to the other.

Then a Meemansic instance is chose. उग्दात् चमसमेकस्य श्रुति संयोगात् Here in the Mantra it is stated that chamasa belongs to (प्रोन्दात्ताम्) उग्दात्. The question is whether udgatru alone eats it or all singers of saman except Subrahmanya or all the four including him eat it.

‘Udgata alone should eat it’ is the first opinion. For the stem or Pratipadika means Udgata alone and not its plurality which is the meaning of its termination. But the second meaning is that this chamasa belongs to all; as by Lakshana or secondary mode, it may mean all because the context allows all to share that chamasa. So by Lakshana it means the 16 Ritviks or priests engaged in the sacrifice; and all there share Chamasa. And third opinion is that Lakshana is taken recourse to, on the strength of shruti, the one concerned here is said ‘to sing loudly and hence those three who sing loudly except Subrahmanya are meant here.

In contravention of these three, the fourth and the final sidhanta rises up. Now between the modes Rudhi is accepted as more powerful than yoga. By Rudhi only one Udgatru is connoted; but in conformity with the plurality of the number with the aid of Lakshana both प्रस्तोतृ and प्रतिहृतृ are added to Udgata. As this is a group of Sama Vedins, Subrahmanya being equally well versed in sama Veda and having udgatrutva (loud singing of saman) he is also added to the three, all forming a group of four to share chamasa.

Here in preference to the outward characteristics of the sixteen priests, the inward characteristics of prastota, Prodgata Pratiharta and Subrahmanya are chose, as superior. In the same manner Vidvad Rudhi which offers Vishnu as the meaning of Brahman is considered weighty in preference

to the Ajna Rudhi which gives Jeeva as the meaning of Brahman.

Now Chandrikakar presents a corroborative evidence to prove that Brahman means Vishnu alone and not Jeeva. In the shruti नारायणो सौ परमो विचित्र्यः or नारायणं महाज्ञेयं Nārāyana has been enjoined one as to be enquired. In first sutra (Jijnasa), many sentences that ordain enquiry have been quoted. But those statements are ambiguous though they show that Vishnu is the universal and unique cause. So this sutra has been stated to prove unambiguously that the words like Atma and Brahman, used in these statements, as object of enquiry unequivocally mean Vishnu. Now these shruties quoted (नारायणी सौ परमो विचित्र्यः) inheriting fixed marks of interpretative strength and expression clear in meaning (Linga and shruti) directly connote as import Vishnu. So they stand to be corroborative evidences.

Rahavendra here clarifies the issues as purported to have been treated in Teeka or Tattva prakashika. At this stage this opponent concedes that in conformity with the object of enquiry being Brahman the former part of the shruti यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते need not restrict causality to things of perception and as such Brahman which is the cause is Vishnu only. But in the latter part by Rudhi Brahman is clearly Jeeva. And in order to maintain compatibility between these two parts, there is no other go but accept identity of Jeeva and Brahman. For in your system inspite of the fact that Jeeva and Brahman are contrary in nature, yet identity can be maintained because this empirical knowledge cannot assail the transcendental truth of identity. Besides merely by the very conception of God being one with inconceivable and unimaginable power, which is

beyond the range of dry logic, all contradictions may be reconciled.

The clear statement made before this objection would nullify it on very strong reasons. Because the latter part of shruti also has Brahman which by the convention of the learned and by the highest derivation means Vishnu and hence there will arise no inconsistency between the former and the latter part of the shruti. Besides identity between Jeeva and Brahman is contradicted by many evidences. If a certain thing is warranted by evidence then it must be reconciled by a concept of inconceivable power. On the other hand God seeking identity with Jeeva of little capacity shall have to surrender his unimaginable power.

Then there is adjustment of statements in sudha, Anuvyakhyana: and Nyaya Vivarana. In Anuvyakhyana it is stated that Brahman should be enquired because it is he who secures Moksha for us. A reason is stated in this Sutra for the above statement. The purport of the Anuvyakhyana statement may be made explicit thus :

If Vishnu is fit to be enquired for the reason of his being the cause of Moksha, then why should he not be unfit for enquiry for the reason of his being the cause of bondage? It is not easy to plead that Vishnu is not the cause of bondage. For no one can discern that Jeeva is bound(बद्ध) or that he is not bound by himself. So it is clear that bondage is extraneous and is caused by some one else. That some one whether sentient or insentient is subordinate to God. Hence ultimately the cause of his bondage can be traced to God or Brahman; and thus he is proved unfit for enquiry. If that cause

of bondage is not under the control of God, then God cannot be the cause of release from bondage which is not under his control. Hence also he need not be fit for enquiry.

If God is not pleased he becomes the cause of bondage. This fact pleads for the grace of God which is secured through assiduous efforts in enquiry. Hence enquiry of Brahman is enjoined.

If it is for Moksha that enquiry or Jijnasa is enjoined than the second sutra should have been 'मोक्षोऽस्य यतः'. To this the rejoinder is that in the sutra the statement that Brahman is the cause of creation strengthens the possibility of Brahman being the cause of release or Moksha.

Now Chandrikakara takes up for critical review the way in which Kalpatarukara raises objections and replies them. In the course of his review he takes up the position of Kalpataru when he begins to analyse the definition of Brahman.

Which is the definition of Brahma? It is the birth and other things that are found in the productions or effects or is it the 'Cause-ness' (कारणत्व) in the cause or Brahman? In the first alternative, it is clear Brahman, not being the resort of sristi is different from Jagat. Then there cannot be a doubt about this difference as raised in the sutra. Besides यतः (यतः अस्य सृष्टिः तद्ब्रह्म) is not justified in its use. For if Maitra is born of Chaitra, the birth of Maitra cannot be the characteristic quality of Chaitra. Only the cause-ness of chaitra can be the characteristic quality of chaitra. If the second alternative is accepted even then Brahman,

being the only resort of all the causes (of creation and others) there cannot be any doubt about difference

But how can Brahman become the resort of the causes of creation, sustenance, and destruction? This question is solved in Sidhanta by stating that he is the resort of those different causes at different periods of time. But this solution does not hold good in Adwait system. For in their Bhasya a Smrita is quoted which runs counter to this solution."

"Which clearly states that the powers of creation and others are identical with the nature of Brahman".

Here Raghavendra adds a long note on the question of reconciliation of various causes incompatible with each other taking resort to Brahman. Now it is proved that all these powers (of creation etc) as they are to be found at all times, are but the essence of Brahman,

If some one takes objection to this point of view whether "Creation etc mentioned in यतोदा इसानि, is the definition of Brahman or not is still doubtful. Besides it is a quality inhering in the world and is not related with Brahman. And in other shruties some other that is Ananda and Vijnana is said to be the cause of creation. Thus there is nothing to prove that it is thus and not otherwise by taking it by its forelocks. When the thing to be defined cannot be ascertained no definition can be given".

To this objection a hypothetical reply is given-even though creation etc are not its characteristics, yet they may aspire to be its definitions (temporary or accidental) just as the top of the branch is the hypothetical definition of the moon. (When the moon is at the top of a branch). The definition no doubt is said to be abiding in Brahman

everlastingly. But it is not absolute Brahman that is meant to be the permanent resort; It is some lower Brahman like Shiva which can be the permanent abode of these qualities (definitions).

This way of refuting the objection raised is discarded. For in the preceding sutra you have quoted one shruti and ought to have stuck to it. Then Brahman would have been defined according to it (परीक्ष्य लोकान्) as "that for whose knowledge you approach Guru" and not (जन्मोदस्य यतः). As here, in former sutra also the shruti should consist of words ब्रह्म जिज्ञास which form the body of the sutra. Then the present sutra naturally is following it. There in the shruti, it is heard that Brahman is the cause of creation and it is but natural that if Brahman were the cause of creation it should be the topic of discussion. In the shruti (यतोवा) Brahman is mentioned as the cause of creation. There, mere creation cannot be the topic of discussion.

You find no argument put forth in the sutra which would help to form the definition. Merely the definition 'the cause of creation etc; is mentioned in the sutra. Thus the Purvapaksha that creation etc is Brahman runs counter to the wording of the sutra. But according to our interpretation, Purvapaksha purports to show that definition is not existing in Brahman and this is concurrent with sutra. If the definition does not refer to the thing defined, the definition cannot be the chief definition and then the meaning of the sutra will be its subordinate sense. The hypothetical or the definition by accident will be refuted later on. Many such refutations may be guessed.

That words like 'eternal joy' to be found in all sentences describing 'the Cause' will be ultimately reduced

to connote Shiva, is found running counter to many evidences called forth in his Bhashya. Besides in पत्युरसा मंजस्यात् the [sutrakara himself refutes this shaiva system. These things are dealt with in Paratattva Prakashika and other works of Gurupada (Vijayendra).

Now comes the question of interpretation of जन्मादि for critical review Chandrika. The Advaitin contends that by जन्मादि only three things (creation sustenance, and dissolution) are meant according to the shruti quoted (यतोवा) But this shruti mentions the fourth (अप्ति संविशति) which is not Pralaya for it is already referred to by प्रयति, but which is Moksha. Any other interpretation would add the fourth and defeat the contention of three. Other four are mentioned singly or collectively in shruties which enjoin enquiry of Brahman. There for जन्मादि means a collection of eight with creation and others. Nor it is reasonable to subsume, 'control' under the first three. For control is distinctly experienced as different from the three.

Raghavendra defines these terms to remove ambiquity and to bestow exactness and clarity upon these terms. नियति स्वत्यापा रेषु प्रवृत्तिः) impelling everyone into one's own activity is 'control' or Niyati, ज्ञान and अज्ञान (enlightenment and obscuration) are clear and unequivocal in sense. बन्ध or bondage is experience of pain and pleasure. And Moksha is the experience of eternal bliss.

Raghavendra explains how Niyati is experienced distinctly from creation etc. Destruction has birth or coming into existence and continuity in existence. Still destruction is distinguished distinctly from those two.

So also (नियतिः) continuity in existence comes into existence (birth) and goes out of existence (नारा), Still it is different from (स्थिति) and (नारा). In the same manner नियतिः and others have these three and yet different from them.

(Here is an objection. In जन्मादि अस्य यतः, जन्मादि refers to only first three and not to the last five. Then अस्य refers to the world as well as to the five (नियमेन and others). Just as Brahman is the cause of the three things of the five. Thus Brahman is the cause of नियमन and others. Then they need not be included in जन्मादि).

This objection can be easily removed. For अस्य is the qualified. Substance and जन्मादि are qualities. And when these qualities are referred to the substance then only the three (creation etc) are proved as belonging to the world; and control also as belonging to the world. Yet the relation between the world and, control and others, is not specified. Therefore those five should be contrued with the substance जगत् which is mentioned as अस्य in the sutra, as qualities, along with जन्मादि which are qualities. Hence these are included in जन्मादि.

The same hit can be returned to the Advanitin who has raised this objection against the group of eight. Of the three included in जन्मादि, भंग लय may be referred to अस्य and its creation etc are mentioned by जन्मादि and then Brahman is proved to be the cause of भंग or destruction. Then why should it be included in जन्मादि? In the same manner the inclusion of स्थिति also in जन्मादि might be challenged. Chandrikakara has

challenged only वग्न because some word like स्थिति must be placed after जन्म to justify the use of आदि in the sutra according to the order of sequence. (जन्म, स्थिति, and वग्न).

Really speaking the sutra should be only जन्म अस्य यतः for it is shorter by one word; and yet yields the desired meaning. But the use of the word आदि indicates that अस्य refers to only the substance or धर्मो and it does not refer to the qualities like Niyati and others. So sutrakara has this very intention as dilated upon before.

Again it is objected that only three, (creation etc) consistantly and fully referring to the whole of the world, as its qualities should have been mentioned. But not Jnana and others: Because they are the characteristic qualities only of sentient beings. For even in the system of sidhanti the eternal line of demarcation between Brahma and Jeeva is not created. If it refers to creation alone then Brahman is not proved to be the cause of the sustenance of the whole world. Besides unnecessarily the reference of the pronoun अस्य is rendered narrow.

Even then some doubt still lurks behind. When these eight are accepted as dispensations of God, it is easily proved that knowledge and others, that inhere in the sentient beings, are caused by Brahman. But Jijnasa and others forming a part of Jagat also have Niyamana and others referring to Jijnasa and others are not necessarily understood as being related to Janma and others.

But this objection too is easily ruled out. For the quality or property of a thing is found resorting to the

thing. Now rupa or form is a substance with reference to the property, Rapatva or formness; but it is a property with reference to a pot, for form inheres in the pot. So also Jijnasa and others, when they constitute a group of eight are properties and are counted with Janma and others. But when they (Jijnasa and others) are brought under control, they constitute the world and are referred to by अस्य. If the Advaitin does not accept this flexible adjustment he too cannot explain how Brahma is the cause of जन्मादि or destruction.

In spite of all these adjustments it must be admitted that there is a uniform Causality when only three (जन्म स्थिति and नाश), are meant by जन्मादि, Brahman being the cause of the three of the world. Otherwise Brahman is the cause or in some place, and in others he is cause of ज्ञानादि and thus causality is varied, and dissimilar.

This defect in causality is of little importance. For inspite of this diversity you can have a limited uniformity like the following. Of these eight those that are found applicable to the different constituents of the world, will have Brahman as their cause. This sort of limited uniformity is also recommended by meemansa. Raghavendra quotes the sixth Adhyaya and third pada of 'Jaimini sutra' सर्वशक्ती प्रवृत्तिः स्यात् तथा भूतीपदेशात्; in this Adhikarana it is enjoined 'यावज्जीवं अग्निहोत्रं जुहोति. These are subordinate acts of rites and there is the chief. Here the doubt is whether one is eligible for the fruit by performing the chief rite after the successful completion of all the subordinate rites A to Z or by performing the chief ceremony having finished as many of the subordinate rites as are possible for him. The objection side contends that one is enjoined to perform Agnihotra. All subordinate acts

forming an aggregate are required to be performed in aggregate. Thus the chief rite strengthened by the performance of all subordinate acts will be eligible for the final fruit. A defective performance will affect the final eligibility.

But the Sidhanta is different. Here जीवनं is prefixed with यावत्. जीवं is the णमुल् gerund and as there is no other relation, it is causally related with the effort of performing yaga. When the cause is there the effect must happen. So the effort insist on performing the chief rite. But when some of the subordinate rites are not performed, if the chief ceremony is not attended to, you are going against the statement of the performance. Hence the chief rite must be performed even though some of the subordinate rites are not attended to. In the same manner as many as are possible of the subordinate rites should be performed to get eligibility. So of the eight some are not possible with things in the world. Brahman is the cause of as many of these eight as are possible with things in the world. Causality in this form is uniform though with each thing it varies. (सृष्टयष्टके यावत् संभवति तावदेव हेतुता ब्रह्मणि अनुगता.)

If this be so, just as Brahman's causality for eight is adjusted and explained, he can be shown to be the cause of many more properties (like pleasure and pain in the case of sentient and growth and measurements in the case of insentient) which can be added to the list of eight. For causality can be adjusted and explained in the above mentioned form.

Vyasaraaja removes this objection in three ways
1) Conceding those properties in sentient and insentient only eight are chosen on the virtue that in all state-

ments that enjoin enquiry and in Skanda, Sutrakara himself states, that Brahman is the cause of eight. 2) The second reason is that for Moksha the aspirant should know Brahman to be the cause of eight and he is not enjoined to know more. 3) No doubt it is true that the causality of the first three is enough to prove innumerable and unlimited perfections in Brahman and to prove the categorical difference between Jeeva and Brahman but in order to realise Moksha the purpose of our enquiry, we must know him to be the dispenser of Moksha. This is not possible unless he is the author of our bondage which both are possible only through knowledge and ignorance. Hence Brahman should be known to be the cause of these four. Now remains the property of 'control'. It may be doubted that ignorance and knowledge work out automatically bondage and release like light and darkness, and hence no necessity of God. But the very nature of things like light and darkness is fully under the control of God Hari. Hence (the first three, next four and the present fifth) eight dispensations are ascribed to Brahman.

Now props up the question of many definitions of Brahman for consideration and justification. Acharya in his Anuvyakhyana presents the eight dispensations, in an uncompounded expression (सृष्टिः स्थितिश्च संहारो नियतिः ज्ञानमावृतिः). This suggests that Acharya has taken recourse to this dissolved expression in order to suggest that of these eight, each one forms a logically sound definition of Brahman.

But others argue that यतोवा does not mention तद्ब्रह्म after each statement, that many definitions have got special purpose to serve in the course of knowledge.

Besides sutrakara has used singular in जन्मादि in his sutra. So these dispensations form a single definition collectively.

This argument is not sound. Because such a collective definition has nothing to exclude from the field of definition. There is some purpose why तद्द्वा is not repeated after each expression. Had it been repeated it would have created an illusion that each Brahman is mutually exclusive and different, according to their own interpretation. If they do not accept this principle then they prove सत्त्वं ज्ञान अनन्तं as forming each one a definition of Brahma. For here also after each word there is no Brahman.

As for the singular of जन्मादि creating a notion of one definition comprising all dispensations, it is found that the rule is violated both positively and negatively. Negatively the rule is violated in यत्र सास्नादयः सागीः ; For in this definition there is no singular (but plural): Yet there is a collective definition. There is positive violation in 'यस्य छत्रादिकंसराजा'. For though there is singular yet there is each one a separate definition and no collective definition.

Thus as there is nothing to be excluded from the definition, let there be separate definitions. But again it is objected that in the sentence गर्गाः शतं दंड्यताम् (let the Gargas be fined a hundred golden coins) though there is plural yet the fine is imposed collectively on the whole group of Gargas. To this as a counter instance विप्रा भोज्यताम् may be quoted in which the result of the use of the sentence being भोजन, the fulfilment of sentence is sought with the satisfaction of each individual.

Therefore each one of the eight, constitutes a separate and independent definition of Brahman as 'the cause of creation' etc, then this 'cause of creation' forms the essential nature of Brahman and hence it is not a definition comprising some accidental property of Brahman; but an essential definition constituting Brahman's very essential nature.

Here Raghavendra comes to our help and introduces the subject systematically. Advaitin contends that it is only an extrinsic definition (तदस्यलक्षणा) and not an intrinsic definition (स्वरूप लक्षणा) Now Tatastha comprises only an extraneous or accidental property associated with the thing defined. " Being at the top of 'tree' " is the extraneous quality of the moon and the definition referring to this is only Tatastha Lakshana, while 'excellent splendour' is essential nature of the moon. And the definition constituted by the essential nature is swarupa Lakshana.

Advaitin contends that 'Being the cause of creation etc', is Tatastha Lakshana and Styam, Jnanam, Anandam—each constitutes swarup Lakshana. Now what is the difference between these two kinds of definitions? Eight alternates of distinctions are offered. 1) One is found in the thing defined while the second is not; 2) One has real property, while the other has unreal; 3) Lasting concurrently with a thing excluded by its knowledge or not lasting; 4) Lasting concurrently with the thing defined or not; 5) Subsumed under the thing defined and not subsumed; 6) Unconditioned by or unrelated to some other thing or related to, or conditioned by. 7) Having power of exclusion by its own merit or raising some other thing having power of exclusion. 8) A real or essential property or accidental attribute.

In the first alternative the Tatastha Lakshana is also easily claimed to be swarupa Lakshana; for the accidental attributes like crow and others are in the house and causality in Brahman. And illusion being born of three causes (blemish, mental impression, and perceptual contact) this causality is in the illusion. Therefore these Tatastha Lakshana being in the things defined rise to the status of swarup Lakshana. Again the definition of Tatastha that it is not found in the thing defined extends to swarupa Lakshana also. Ananda and others being essentially one with Brahman cannot reside in Brahman.

Thus Vyasaraja exhaustively examines all the eight alternatives and exposes the hollowness of the Tatastha Lakshana of Brahman. It is very interesting to follow the intellectual maze running but space and time being very limited, cannot but leave many such philosophical brawlings. At last Vyasaraja summarises his arguments in three verses. In the system in which Brahman is accepted as colourless and attributeless, the beginning of a sutra which offers the characteristic nature of Brahman cannot be justified. For a definition is defined as the essential characteristic of a thing. How can this fit in with an attributeless Brahman? 2) Besides a definition whether स्वरूप or तटस्थ is admitted to be a distinction which distinguishes the thing defined from similar and dissimilar things. How can this be compatible with the Advaita System. 3) It does not become a serious and dignified shastra to offer, for the establishment of an unreal distinction, a false definition, to one aspiring for Moksha.

Bhashya :

By reasoning 'others' should not be inferred. (Because) only shastra or Vedas and others of that kind are the sources of knowing (Brahman).

"For no one who does not know the vedas knows that perfect and all-knowing and all-creating, for the sake of Moksha."

"This Purusha (the creator of the world) is to be known only through upanishads." From such and other Struties (Brahman is known only through Vedas.)

Inference or Anumana is not an independent instrument of knowledge (when unaided). For no where Anumana unaided by shruti proves any thing with certainty, nor any other instrument like Pratyksha can do also.

Any other good instrument with the aid of shruti & smriti will rise to the status of Valid means (of knowledge). There is no doubt about it. Tarka or Ratification is inferring the import of a sentence taking into consideration the beginning and end of a composition. Unaided reasoning should be avoided. All this is found in Maha Kaurma.

An unaided inference can operate any where to prove any thing. There it is not able to

cognise any thing without the help of Agama or Veda--thus it is said in Varaha.

(But things beyond five senses are not existing at all. This atheistic tenet is refuted in Moksha thus)-Semen, humour, banyan seed, ghee, screening with smoke, revival of past life a magnet, the sun-stone, drinking of water absorption of the dead body in the five elements, beseeching gods, in activity coming after death. These are evidences sure. It is seen that austerities bear fruit. Rig, yajus, sama and Atharva, Bharat and Pancharatraka, and Mula Ramayana constitute Shastra. Even that which follows this, is counted as shastra. But that which is different from this is mere meaningless composition and it is not shastra but a bad path--thus in Skanda.

In Mokshadharma he begins with Sankhya, yoga, veda and Aranya and then identifying Pancharatra with veda asserts the validity of pancharatras only, and shows that others represent different sense.

The compound शस्त्रयोनिः is to be dissolved as Bahu Vrihi and not शस्त्रयोनिः as Tatpurusha.

Bhavadeepa

Here the contextual connection is 'inclusiveness. Brahman under enquiry is defined to prove that he is Vishnu. That definition is shown to be affected by the logical

flaw like undesirable extension. Hence this is included in shastra. Or the link is objectionary. Because here in the Purvapaksha an objection is raised against the Contents of the previous Adhikarana.

'Others' in Bhashya means 'Other than Vishnu. Sutra mentions 'shastra' to be the source of knowledge which excludes as sources both inference and Pashupata Agama and others. For both of them are condemned as 'ill assorted sources'. And Pratyaksha is uncalled for in this context.

Anumana or inference that is referred to is:- The disputed is having a change; because it is a product, like a pot. Thus when the creator is proved, popular fame fixes him to be some god, like Rudra. The two shruties quoted 'नावेदवित्' and, 'नैषातर्केण' prove the inference to be invalid. But the inference does not prove conclusively Vishnu to be the creator. This shows that the termination तसिल् (अनुमानतः) is used in the sense of 'instrumental'. Therefore it is stated in Nyaya Vivarana- रुद्रादौ सममे तल्लक्षणम् that this definition of Brahman is (समं) common to Rudra and others. This समं is also interpreted as मया अनुमानेन सहितं समम्. This causality can easily be proved to be even in Rudra and others.

The sutra affords a syllogism which when fully developed assumes this form: The authorship of creation is not within the reach of inference; for it is known only through shastra as Dharma and Adharma. So Dharma is an instance in which both sadhya and sadhana must be found. चोदना लक्षणोऽर्थः धर्मः; This definition of Dharma itself proves that for Dharma the

only source of knowledge is shastra. Hetu is proved to be found there. As for sadhya अनुमान अयोग्यत्व, it is proved by the very definition of Dharma. चोदनालक्षणः अर्थः धर्मः. Dharma in an entity warranted by an injunctory sentence, (चोदनेति सविधिकं वाक्यं उच्यते) and लक्षण means प्रमाण. The proof is the injunction and not an inference.

Shastra comprises the four vedas and Smrities also that follow them. They all purport to mean Vishnu in the highest primary sense though in the lowest primary sense they connote Dharma and other things. So you should not doubt the absence of शास्त्रक समधिगम्यत्व in Dharma the chosen instance.

Raghavendra derives the word सांपराय. Now this word is used in the, अयन् सांपरायः thus सम्यक् परस्मिन् locative to show purpose of getting Moksha. Even if Brahman were to be known through upanishad still inference with the help of Vedas stretches its hand to grasp the highest reality: yet it is not an independent and reliable instrument of knowledge to apprehend Brahman.

In Bhasya 'any other good instrument' is explained as the Pratyaksha of Yashoda—Her vision of the whole universe in the mouth of shri Krishna. When aided by shruti this Pratyaksha rises to the status of highest proof.

Now in the Bhasya begins the refutation of atheistic theory. But it is objected that this topic has not contextual connection with sutra. This wild diversion is not tolerated in sutra-literature.

This objection is waved by stating that there is vital connection between the refutation of atheism and the sutra text. In the Sutra shastra is said to be the means of

knowing imperceptible things. The atheistic positivist recognises only perception as instrument of knowledge to the exclusion of inference and verbal testimony. So the Bhashya Kara proves the existence of things beyond senses and incidentally the necessity of accepting inference and word as means of knowledge. Thus the validity of shastra that had been questioned is proved by this refutation. This refutation is not a disconnected diversion.

Raghavendra pertinently puts a note here that this quotation is of no use to the atheist himself. But the followers will find some light and hence it is quoted.

When Anumnn has no reliable validity, when shastra alone is the reliable source of knowledge, of things beyond senses. Shastra may mean Pashupata and other shastras which declare Rudra and others as the cause of creation. So Rudra and others at least share this status of being the cause with Vishnu, which may be adjusted by difference of time or place. Hence Vishnu is not the sole cause of creation.

But shastra is stated to comprise Vedas and Smrities and puranas that are faithful to the original sources, so Pashupata and other Agamas running contrary to these cannot claim the status of shastras. So Vishnu remains to be the undisputed cause of creation warranted by the defined shastras.

Here Bhashyakar quotes Mahabharat to corroborate the definition of shastra. Raghavendra gives the context to make the meaning clear. Janamejaya asks whether Sankhya and yoga Pashuapata and Aranyaka propound the same system of thought or different systems. To this Vaishampayana replies that the systems are different without doubt. Then he names the different sys-

tematisers among whom he mentions Narayana who personally recited the whole of Pancharatragama. Among all these systems of thought, the one propounded in this Agama stands supreme. Here 'Among these systems' means either with reference to one group consisting of sankhya, yoga, and Pashupata or to the group of Veda and Aranyaka. Otherwise 'supreme among these' does not fit in as it is superiority with reference to some. Again this Pancharatra is not mentioned before. But in the conclusion it is said to be the best among these instruments of knowledge. So Pancharatra must have been included and implied in the first group or in the second group. If in the first, then Pancharatra will be pitted against Veda which is not reasonable. For a system standing against Veda loses all validity and claim of an instrument; and hence cannot rise superior to the veda. So Pancharatra must have been included in the second group.

This is a very subtle argument of interpretation. Suppose at the end only the validity of the veda had been asserted. Then there need be no necessity of the Panchahatra being valid. For Pancharatra might have been based on some thing other than veda, or though based on veda it might be invalid. Hence the validity of Pancharatra is asserted and then automatically the validity of veda is proved as it is the basis of Pancharatra.

Raghavendra never stops till all the hidden implications are brought out. In the sutra शास्त्र योनित्वात् is used and it is explained in the Bhashya as शास्त्रं योनिः प्रमाणं अस्मि and Jayateertha makes it still more clear by explaining योनिः as ज्ञप्तिकारणम्. Now Raghavendra reveals the

meaningful significance and logical propriety of each of the constituents of the expression. योनि means only 'cause' and not 'cause of knowledge'; but ज्ञप्ति is added as it is syntactically compatible with 'cause'.

शास्त्रं योनि cannot be dissolved as Tatpurusha as Brahman cannot be the cause of shastra. Besides in second sutra Brahman was stated to be 'the cause of creation'; and now naturally an evidence in this respect is expected and not its birth.

Here ज्ञान is used as 'means' and not in abstract. ज्ञानकारण therefore will mislead us: hence ज्ञप्ति is used. Thus Raghavendra continues this elucidation till the full significance is revealed in all its richness.

SHASTRAYONITWADHIKARANA

Tattva Manjari :

Vishnu alone cannot be proved to be the cause of creation. For Rudra and others also can be proved to be the cause of creation. In Anubhashya Acharya paraphrases शास्त्रयोनित्वात् by आगमोदितः Vishnu is declared to be the cause in Agama. Which is derived as आ सम्यक् गम्यते अर्थाः एभिः वेद वेदानुसारिग्रन्थाः Agamas consist of vedas and works following vedas.

In Sudha it is derived differently. One declared by Agama is Vishnu as all-doer and he is not to be inferred by reasoning. Rudra and others referred to by Pashupata are not asserted by Agama as derived before. Nor can Anumana prove it as it is beyond sense.

Tantra Deepika :

Really speaking it ought to be वेदयोनित्वात् (But शास्त्र is substituted in the place of वेद only to show that this

expression (शास्त्रयोनित्वात् takes into cognisance the smṛiti () which uses the word शास्त्र which excludes both Pashupata and Anuman or inference. As shastra refers to Veda which is free from any defect, it does not give any scope to अज्ञ or wrong knowledge.

Nya-Muktavali :

Raghavendra shows his superb skill in the art of presentation in Nyaya Muktavali. This Adhikarana removes the doubt of over extension of the definition in the previous sutra. Hence it is in the natural sequence of the thought of the previous sutra. That the cause of creation is whether Vishnu or some one else is the doubt. That this causality may be extended to even others is Purva paksha. For by inference even Shiva can be proved to be the cause of creation. Looking at a piece of product you can generally infer the producer. Then the shruti (नावेदं विष्मनुते) denies the validity of inference in such matters and establishes Vishnu as the cause of creation. Or on the strength of Pashupatagama Shiva is inferred as the cause of creation, he being Omniscient. His omniscience is proved by Agama. Or by unaided Anuman one of everlasting knowledge, desire or will and effort might be inferred as the agent cause of creation. This agent is not accepted as Vishnu. Therefore Shiva, who is accepted as destroyer, can also be the agent cause. Shrutics being contradicted by the said inferences warrant Vishnu also to be the cause.

The second Purvapaksba is that Shiva is the agent cause on the strength of Pashupatashastra of undeseccrated validity. Authorless Veda might prove Vishnu to be the cause which does not deprive Shiva of his

claim to be the cause as both at different times and place might enjoy that privilege.

The result of these two kinds of objection proves that the sole doership of all is never to be found. If it is limited doership of some then definition is over-extended to some undesirable things.

Now the sidhanta is that the first Purvapaksha is not valid because just as taste and smell are beyond the reach of the eye, so also inferences of this type not based on vedas, cannot be valid in matters of world cause. Such baseless inferences can also prove a hare to be horned. So they are disqualified to prove any thing conclusively. Now in the second, the Shruti of undisputed validity which upholds the inference disproves the Validity of the Shivagama and inference based on this Agama is disqualified to prove any thing and hence Vishnu alone is the agent cause, of the world. Of these two Purva Pakshas one is based on Bhashya and another on Anu Vyakkyana.

Praksha.

Chandrika also takes up the question of 'thought-link' between the previous Adhikarana and this Adhikarana. Here the question is more comprehensively and exhaustively treated. A co-ordinated statement referring to main works on this topic has been formed.

Raghavendra suggests three types of links : 1) This Adhikarana has been started based on the previous. So the basis and the based is the link. 2) When the present is there the previous one stands proved: cause and effect is the link. 3) The previous statement is objected as over extensive and then the objection is wayed. The link is objectionary. The result is the removal of over

extension. In Sudha and Tattvapraakashika there is the reference to this over extension. In Nyaya vivaranam Tika it is said- "over extension is apparent. Really speaking world-causality might be possible even in a specially qualified Jeeva and hence it is not necessary to conceive an extraordinary Being." Here Purvapaksha is formed by denying the uncommon entity called Vishnu. This may be considered as another alternative in framing Purvapaksha.

It is argued in this Adhikarana that Sadagamas called Shashtra is the means of knowledge and not Anumana nor Duragamas. If so there is Tautology, For as here, there in Smrityadhikarana also the Duragamas like sankhya Pashupata and others are condemned. Many attempts to remove this tautology by mentioning difference in the contexts etc, have been shown to be futile.

Chandrikakara tries to explain away this tautology in four ways. First he bases the explanation on the sutra. In Smrityadhikarana, Purva Paksha is raised depending upon Pashupata, Baudha and Jaina. Sidhanta is given depending upon pancharatra and Bharata. Here in this sutra Purvapaksha is raised depending on inference and smriti and Sidhantra is stated depending upon shastra or shruti and smriti. This is clearly indicated by the word अव्यसृति in that sutra and शास्त्र in this sutra.

Or in this sutra purvapaksha is based on inference and sidhanta is declared by proving its incapacity. But there in that sutra purvapaksha is raised depending upon the shaivagamas and sidhanta is declared by proving their invalidity.

While thus discussing one of these alternatives, chandrikakara says that here in this sutra purva paksha

consists of the possibility of others also sharing the causality of the world with Vishnu; while sidhanta limits it to Vishnu only. There purvapaksha declares impossibility of Vishnu being the cause of the world and Sidhanti asserts that Vishnu is the cause of the world.

In this context Vishnu is referred to as the creator of the whole world. But to enable Shiva to share it 'whole of the world' is the world to be-created only' or Vishnu has the capacity to create (the world.) Thus in Shruti Shiva is denied that right and in Agama, Vishnu is denied that right. This is explained by accepting Meemansic rule of interpretation :- At the end of the second Adhyaya. Tautology in the form of repetition does not create a distinction between two acts, they only create difference in the performance of holy acts. Thus in different branches the holy rites with different names, forms etc, are not counted as different acts.

So also their deprecation of others amounts to the praise of the thing enjoined: Here also in the first sutra अग्रे refers to only that world which is to be created by Vishnu. Hence Vishnu is the creator of a few of the things and this limited definition is enqually applicable to Shiva. Therefore there is overextension of the definition. But Vishnu is the creator of the unrestricted world, then that definition is not applicable to any one. This is the Sidhanta. But there Vishnu is not the cause of creation. Definition is not found applicable to anything and hence it is affected with the defect of impossibility. But Sidhanti shows it is the exclusive definition of Vishnu.

Thus whenever a question of tautology arises, this is the method of removing it. Now we shall discuss

the question of causality, whether it belongs to others also or only to Vishnu. Incidentally whether this causality is within the reach of inference or not is also taken up for discussion.

Depending upon inference Purvapaksha was raised and Ativyapti or over extension was shown. Many objections were raised against inference, but all of them were over ridden. Or inference based on Agama would enable him to raise the Purvapaksha. At the end of a long discussion Purvapakshakara arrives at a conclusion that if the definition of Brahma is made to comprise the agency of the whole of creation, the definition finds no such object to be defined. If it comprises only the agency of creation of a few things, then it is extended to apply to Shiva and others.

Or a production leads us to the inference that there is an agent of eternal resources of only, knowledge, will and effort. But this agent is not Vishnu; for Vishnu is accepted as one of infinite resources and perfections. Hence Shiva is already known as a destroyer and he becomes fit as an agent of creation. So there is over extension of the definition of Brahman. This Purvapaksha is based only on inference.

Shidhanta bases its conclusion on the incapacity of Anumana in apprehending things beyond senses like Brahman and Dharma. Hence there is no over extension and the definition of Brahman as the agent cause of creation is logically sound.

Here Raghavendra adds a long note to introduce to the reader the relative values of (inference or) Reasoning and Revelation in ascertaining the nature of the highest reality. Some one argues that it is not

proper on the part of Shidhanti to brush aside the claim of reasoning in apprehending reality. For no doubt in his system Anumana or reasoning cannot infer the agent of creation; yet it is the indicator of the import. There is no certainty that Shruti has only one import. Just as Anumana infers many agents in the stupendous work of creation, so also shruties yielding different meanings connote different agents in the work of creation. Therefore refutation of logic is unwarranted and useless. Generally speaking verbal statements have one decisive meaning, but exceptions like the desire of the speaker, no doubt, entertain many meanings of the sentences. Shidhanti sets all these rules of linguistics in order to prove the manifold meanings he has hit upon, capriciously admits many meanings on the strength of yoga and Rudhi. Therefore he cannot avoid many meanings to shruti, by adopting different stops and splits in sentences. Therefore all causal statements in shruti have different imports implying different agents of creation.

The Shidhanti rejoins that inferences not based on either perception or shruti cannot prove anything about insensible things and hence they cannot provide any clue regarding the import of shruti. Dry and baseless inferences cannot aspire to be the indicators of the import of shruti which has irrevocably invalidated the inferences of this type. In Tattvaparakashika Jayateerth has clearly stated that reasoning has a place in deciding the meaning of statements in Upanishads, only when they are aided by shruti. But independently inferences have no invariable validity when operating in the field of things beyond senses.

Shruties by nature are unequivocal in meaning; and they signify different meanings only when warranted by other shruties. There is nothing capricious in vedic expressions, and they conform to certain rules of interpretations. New splits and stops too are warranted by Vedas.

No evidence can be produced in favour of the concept of many agents in the creation of the world. On the other hand Vedas in and out of place cry out at the top of their voice that there is one creator of the world. These agents if there are, whether dependent or independent co-operate for the creation of this huge, unwieldy and stupendous universe.

All except Hari are affected with defects like lack of freedom which are incompatible with independent creatorship and other extraordinary attributes. Yet some one objects that, the Shruti propounding unity of agency has been affected adversely by the shruti expressing 'assumption of many forms' proves clearly that unity here is not incompatible with diversity. Therefore Sidhanti also who finds pleasure in repudiating the concept of absolute Brahman without the touch of empirical existence, finds difficulty in explaining नेहानास्ति किंचन and so twists it into removing doubt regarding difference of parts, attributes, deeds, and forms of Vishnu. Hence he too has to accept diversity which does not affect unity.

But this objection also is not sound. Because such statements as 'Brahman is only one without the second' categorically deny the existence of the second cause of creation, and therefore runs counter to the statement of the second cause. This statement of exclusive agency does not tolerate any existence of a different cause from it. Hence there is no possibility of many causes existing for

creation at one and the same time. Nor is there the possibility of one becoming many. Just as in the shruti नेह नानास्ति किञ्चन there is the support of the context as the difference on account of attributes and deeds is introduced there-in, there is no contextual support for one becoming many in the shruti एको दाद्यार भुवनैक विश्वम्.

But one Karta or agent assuming many forms in the shruti यदेकमध्यक्त मन्तरूपः is not contradicted, second agent in न ब्रह्मा न च शंकरः is denied taking the particular names. Therefore the other objection also hereby is proved hollow. In the shruti आत्मेत्येकोपासीत it is enjoined that each aspirant according to eligibility, should select different attributes in Brahman for his upasana or meditation. So also in the causal statements the Shaiva aspirant may assume shiva to be the cause while the Vaishnava may assume Vishnu to be the cause. But in Atma reside those attributes which are assumed by the aspirant. While difference of agency is not a fact referred to in shruti.

After all, Shiva your cause of creation only a product of beginningless Nescience of the respective aspirants and though perceived is only illusory as it is contradicted by many evidences. Suppose you go and preach and persuade every one that Shiva alone is the creator and no one else,. Then even if different persons follow your advice still there will not be any difference in the object of meditative worship. Hence no one finds difference of agencies in the vedic statements of cosmological creations.

Again there is an objection. Sidhanti in his system finds difference of Avatars of Rama and Krishna stated in the Puranas, and reconciles them with oneness stating that it is merely the prototype of empirical difference

based on popular ignorance. In the same manner the shruti stating one creator might be reconciled with manifold creators propounded by systems that have been long existing, each one pushing the claim of either Shiva or Vishnu. There is nothing unreal as before.

There cannot be a counter-objection like the following (The Sidhanti in his system propounds that words like *सुमा* and *ब्रह्मन्* connote bliss par excellence which is unlimited in nature. But this unlimited nature of bliss is compatible with limited nature. In the objection raised there is unreal appearing as real and hence in the shruti expressing oneness of agency also there is unreal appearing as real which is undesirable. For, the objector contends that the Sidhanti in his system propounds that words like *सुमा* and *ब्रह्मन्* connote bliss par excellence which is unlimited in nature. Yet the same unlimited bliss means to every one only as much of bliss as he can apprehend and feel (limited). So also the shruti expressing oneness of agency may mean to Vaishnavas and Shaivas different agents of creation.

To all this objection Raghavendra rejoins that the objection only had presumed non-existing statements calculated to invalidate the evidences presented, extracting them out of contextual associations. For *Bhuma* and other words do not signify limited bliss as unlimited in nature. He winds up the subject by stating that other ill adduced reasons are proved fallacious in *Kamta Kodhara* by his most respectable *Gurupada*.

Raghavendra adds a note on the interpretation of the sutra *शास्त्रयोर्नित्वात्* as given by Advaitin, who offers a different thought link (*संगति*) of this sutra to the previous

one. He contends that in the previous sutra we find a restatement (in यतोवा इमानि) of a cause (of creation) adduced by inference. Hence it is not a valid evidence. On this conclusion the present sutra makes a remark that the cause of world creation as Brahma is based on the validity of shastras and not on the validity of inference.

Hence the meaning of the sutra runs as follows :- Advaiti admits that yoni means 'the means of Knowledge.' But शास्त्रयोनि is a Tatpurusha compound and not a Bahuvrevi compound as understood by Shidhanti. For Tatpurusha is a more powerful compound (as one of its members is pradhana or is main while Bahuvreehi has no members of its compound as main) than Bahuvrevi (शास्त्रस्य योनित्वं शास्त्रयोनित्वम् तस्मात्). For shastra is the source of knowledge and that shastra is valid. Therefore the definition of Brahman is that he is the cause of world. This interpretation also implies another interpretation that Brahman being the yoni (Karta or agent) of shastra or the vedas is omniscient or all knowing.

Now this argument is specious as it is not warranted by the text of the sutra. For the word Shastra in the sutra does not only exclude inference but also Duragamas (evil intentioned shastras). Besides Tatpurusha does not help us to prove that Brahman is the author of the vedas. Hence to conclude omniscience of Brahman on the basis of this being the author of the vedas is as ridiculous as proving that the mansion is white for the crow is black. Therefore shidhanti runs to Bahuvrevi.

Beside (the sutra) शास्त्रयोनित्वात् may be construed as "ब्रह्म जगत् कारणं" so that जगत्कारत्वं is sadhya and शास्त्रयोनित्वं is Hetu; Thus it is not necessary to make जन्मादि कारणं (ब्रह्म) sadhya as is understood in the second sutra.

Again the inference is as expressed in यतो वा भूतानि or is it some other statement? In the former case there is no question of contradiction between inference and shastra or veda. For inference only supports vedic statement and adds to the strength of its validity. In the latter case, there is no repetition and hence no question of invalidity of shruti. Hence there is the defect of over extension of the definition and then what the Purvapakshin says stands valid.

Besides many shruties and smrities (आत्मैकस्तु जनार्दनः and others) clearly prove that आत्मा connotes Vishnu unequivocally. And the shruti नावेद विन्मनुते is composed of Atma meaning Vishnu. Thus there are no instances to prove that Shiva is the only import of shastras. Hence the opponent cannot draw the conclusion in favour of Shiva. Acharya in his Anuvyakhyana also corroborates this view. No doubt some shruties like ईशानः सर्वं विद्यान्म् have ambiguous words like which mean Shiva. Yet all such words ultimately mean Narayana according to the principle of sarva samanyaya. Because they are used with expressions which invariably support the meaning of Vishnu (like पद्मनाभ or its synonyms)

As for the other interpretation of Advaitin (Because Brahman is the author of veda therefore he is all-knowing) it is infested with many defects and hence it is condemned outright.

TATTU SAMANVAYADHIKARANA

“ तत्तुसमन्वयात् ”

Sutra : (The import of all the shastras) is only that (Vishnu); because it is supported by all signs like 'beginning' and end & which invariably signify the import.

Bhashya :

Though apparently it is interpreted otherwise by the ignorant, others do not constitute the purport of the shastras, for अन्वय in the Sutra means exegetical marks which determine the purport of the Shastra.

It is said in Brahat samhita:—(उपक्रम) commencement (उपसंहार) conclusion (अभ्यास) repetition (अपूर्वता) novelty (फल) fulfilment (अर्थवाद) laudatory or deprecatory words or phrases and (उपपत्ति) logical justification. These are the marks which determine the import of the shastra "

(Now the meaning of the whole sutra is) When the whole of the 'shastra' is properly explained according to all marks of interpretation like Shruti ling etc, we get at the purport of all shastra which is Vishnu only and not Rudra. "Shruti ordains all actions to be consecrated to me and ascribes all rich attributes to me. I am declared to have many forms; Drinking wine and other things are prohibited because they are disliked by me. This secret meaning I alone know and no one else knows it" it is stated in Bhagavata.

Bhavadeepa :

The thought link of this Adhikarana is of the type of objection raised on the conclusion of the previous Adhikarana. For the Purvapakasha is raised on that. 'Of others' in Bhashya suggests that others (than Vishnu)

claim causality of the universe. And here अन्यस्य only one belonging to the opposite camp is suggested. So Raghavendra suggests that though many are there claiming causality of the universe against Vishnu; still they are to be refuted one by one. For (एकदा न बहुभिः विवादः कितुप्रत्येकं प्रत्येकं) at a time you cannot engage yourself with many in discussion. But you can meet one objection at a time ;-- 'causality of Vishnu alone or of Shiva also, of Vishnu alone or of Hiranya garbh also' Purvapaksha also should be framed accordingly. Therefore अन्यस्य is singular in Teeka. Though there are many to be controverted, yet they need not face them in a single bout.

Here the topic to be discussed is "The cause of world creation to be ascertained by the shastras only". Is the cause Vishnu or some one else ? This is the doubt. The cause for doubt is the support of statements upholding, both sides. (उत्पत्त्यपत्तिः). The word 'Samanyaya' in the Sutra means in its instrumental derivation, commencement and other things which determine the syntactical meaning or purport of a sentence. This process must set aside not only shastras like Pashupata and others, but also the apparent interpretation of the vedas. For in Nyayavivarana it is stated that to be called 'propounded in shastras' it must have been propounded in Pashupata shastra and others. 'And others include Saura, Hairanya garbha and Shakteya as well as apparent meaning of the vedas also. Accordingly in Bhashya, Acharya states 'By the ignorant' which includes Pashupata and others which imply apparent interpretations. Or the word अपि in Bhashya in its conjunctionary capacity includes apparent meanings. Thus purvapaksha is based on both the sources. This is Raghavendra's contribution

which brings about consensus of opinion among different works of the same author (Bhashya and Nyayavivarana of Acharya). He delves deep into the interpretations of words used in the words of Bhashya. But Raghavendra is a great lover of Brevity and fears prolixity (विस्तरौ पीडयस्मान् तस्मान्नात्र यतामहे). Therefore he throws the whole burden on Chandrika.

Now here is raised an objection. What is the reason of discarding the claims of others like Rudra, as the cause of creation propounded in the shastras, by simply stating that they are the interpretations of the ignorant laymen ?

The answer to this question is given by the word समन्वय in the sutra. That is proved to be the cause of creation which is warranted by the shastras, supported by the canons of interpretations like commencement and conclusion and others.

But shastras, being Rig, Yajus, and Athurva, propound only Karma and they are not expected to deal with Brahman. Hence the shastras cannot have the purport of Brahman.

Therefore Acharya in his Bhashya quotes a verse which means that though propounding Karma, shastras consecrates it to Hari. Hence they all eulogise Hari's attributes only, when they enjoin certain Karma to do. Why they prohibit certain others ? the prohibition is there because those are disliked by Him. This is explained more clearly thus. Surapana is prohibited because Suras are the rich attributes of Hari and their Pana is ascribing them to oneself. Thus ascribing to one self the rich attributes of Hari is a grievous offense to Hari and this is prohibited. Thus all vedic statements in the form of ordaining and prohibiting really purport to refer to Hari.

Shri Raghavendra winds up the whole discussion thus: Brahman, who is to be investigated, is defined as one having innumerable attributes in the first instance. In order to prove it Brahman is then defined as the cause of creation and other things. But to prove him, the sole cause of creation he should be shown to be the main purport of all the shastras only by accepting the theory that Brahman is the chief primary sense of every word. Acharya in his Anuvyakhyana corroborates the same fact.

Still granting that all canons of interpretations warrant that Brahman is the primary meaning. Yet it may be in some parts of vedas and not in all parts. So Brahman cannot be claimed to be the chief import of the whole of the vedas. This objection is not sound. For it is the nature of the vedas to be uniform in its import and significance. Self contradiction has not entered into the vedic composition (गतिसामान्यात्). For Vedic Composition is uniform in meaning.

Nyaya Muktavali :

Raghavendra puts the whole of the discussion in a compact, succinct and consistent form of formal logic. The sangati or connective link is logical sequence. For in the previous Adhikarana it was proved that the cause of creation could be gathered only from the import of all the shastras. Now that cause of creation is Vishnu or some one else. The purvapaksha is that shastras, as their general import, declare that Rudra and others can claim to be that cause. For Shaiva and other Agamas being commentaries of the vedas, show that the vedas purport to have Rudra as the cause of creation; because their commentary Shiva-gama unequivocally declares Shiva to be the cause of creation. For the purport of the original is made more clear by its commentary on it. But the Shaivagamas are proved

invalid as the instruments of knowledge. This objection cannot stand long; for it is agreed on all hands that originals or vedas are valid and commentaries on such valid originals, not running contrary to other evidences do not require other reasons to confirm their validity. Absence of contradictions from other sources is implied by the statement that- "Apprehension of Brahman cannot be reached by reasoning".

But still Pancharatragama and others show Vishnu also to be the cause. Thus the import of the vedas cannot be ascertained. This objection can be waved by allotment of different world to each god. But even then Vishnu alone cannot be proved to be the cause of the world. He will be one of the many that are the causes of creation. For it is so very difficult to ascertain priority and strength of each canon of interpretation like उपक्रम over others. Hence the exact import of the vedas cannot be ascertained. This is the purvapaksha raised according to Nyaya Vivarana.

But there is another purvapaksha also, as raised in Bhashya. Veda and other shastras propound Rudra and others as the cause of creation. As there are not contradictions coming from contrary statements Rudra is the import of the shastras. Statements connoting Vishnu cannot invalidate shaivas statements as the reverse also is possible. For both statements are of equal strength. Both the statements remain valid as different gods may become causes of creation at different periods of time. This is the purvapaksha raised on the strength of apparent meaning of the vedas.

Or still there is another variety of purvapaksha. It cannot be contended that the vedas cannot have a settled

import as the shaivagamas are considered invalid. For even in veda, Rudra is stated to be the cause of creation. Depending upon the apparent meaning of the vedas there is only one purvapaksha. This is the opinion of Jayateertha as expressed in Tattvaparakashika. But the first alternative is for two Purva Pakshas as expressed in Sudha.

Raghavendra thus combines all shades of opinion for the review of the readers. But these are not contradictory of each other. They are only complementary of each other. Yet they are all arraigned before the bar of judgement for the assessment of valuation. They only constitute different angles of vision while interpreting the Brahmasutras. When thus understood they unfold richness of meaning and Raghavendra brings them together with this view in mind.

Now sidhanta reveals the real meaning of the sutras. There are two Purva pakshas; one is based on the Agamas and another is based upon the (apparent) meaning. And both these are proved to be unreasonable. Hence the third also does not stand the test. Hence the definition that Brahman is the cause of creation etc., is not over extensive. For in veda there are apparently contrary statements which must be reconciled into a consistent statement for a coherent purport. Now the shaiva Agamas which claim to be the faithful commentaries on veda are proved to be invalid. They cannot be accepted even as authorised commentaries on vedas, though they may not be contradicted directly by other evidences. Yet they offend the canons of interpretation; and under such circumstances apparent meaning does not yield the comprehensive purport of the whole of the work. Such commentaries which do not express the gist or purport of the whole of the work cannot be an elucidation of it. Mere uncritical apparent meaning

is only the product of ignorance, and hence not competent to lead to exact decision.

Besides a commentary can arrive at the central purport of the original only through the application of the canons of interpretation, through which alone the purport of veda is to be ascertained. Instead of this round about way, why not approach veda directly with the aid of canons of interpretation and arrive at the purport ?.

When pressed thus one approaches the vedas and comes to know that Vishnu alone is the source of all dispensations of the world. Thus all shastras in their highest primary sense declare that Vishnu alone is the primary cause of creation of the world. Hence all the objections raised as purvapaksha are untenable.

Tattva Manjari :

Raghavendra here has paid more attention to the Interpretation of the sutra तत्समन्वयात्. Now the Purvapaksha is, just as Vishnu is acclaimed as the sole cause of creation as being warranted by the Agamas or shastras as interpreted by Pancharatra; So also Rudra is proclaimed to be the sole cause of creation as being warranted by the Agamas as interpreted by the Pashupatas. This conflict can be reconciled by stating that both are causes at different period of times. Or a part of the Agamas declare Vishnu to be the cause and another part declares Rudra to be the sole cause of creation. Anyhow Vishnu cannot be the undisputed agent of creation; Rudra as well, can share his sovereignty over the cosmos through creation and other dispensations of the world.

Now the sutra refutes this objection. The sutra is construed as समन्वयात् विष्णुरेवागमोदितः अन्वयः means the

canons of interpretations like उपक्रम and उपसंहार. सम् means 'these should be applied critically examining their relative strength or signifying of the meaning.' That which is the meaning in its primary connotation and which is the subject or import of the whole sentence after the application of these canons of interpretation observing the rule of priority based on the relative strength of signification, is the incontrovertible and irrefutable purport of the Agama. Such a purport, critically examined and verified is Vishnu alone and not any one else. Now सम् is construed with आगम also and means that which is the subject of the whole of shastra or Agama, conveyed by the highest primary process of connotation. The Pashupata way of interpretation or the apparent meaning does not stand. This severe test as it has not come through this critical process While Pancharatra follows the same marks of interpretation as are shown in the vedas while Pashupatas run counter to vedic marks of interpretation. Thus this critical sense of the vedas in their entirety through the process of primary connotation, results in showing that Vishnu alone is the cause of creation of the world, and wards off the possibility of over extension of the definition of Brahman as the main source of all dispensations of the world.

Tantra deepika :

There is nothing new to be added to what has been already said about this sutra. But the way of saying is different here. "In this Adhikarana, in order to ward off over extension of the definition of Brahman, it is going to be proved that Vishnu alone is the cause of world creation as known from the shastras. "Properly speaking the cause of world creation as known from the shastras". Properly speaking the plural (समन्वयेः) must be used. In its place

(समन्वयात्) singular is used with reference to many canons of interpretations. For all those marks of meaning, without any conflict conjointly convey Vishnu as the one import of the shastras.

Another new point is raised here. The word तत् is implied in the sutra जन्माद्यस्ययतः (तद्ब्रह्म) and takes a long jump like the leap of the frog and lands in this sutra. So there would have been no necessity for expressing तत् here (तन्नुसमन्वयात्). But there is some purpose to serve. तत् must be construed with तु and hence the necessity of new expression. Suppose there is no तत् expressed, Then तु would be construed with समन्वयात् and then it would be समन्वयात्तु or समन्वयादेव Brahman is शास्त्रयोनि. In this construction the possibility of Rudra also being the cause warranted by the apparent meaning is not denied. So तु must be used with तत् or तदेव. And Vishnu will be the exclusive cause of creation. No doubt there is अन्वयः; But its purpose of use is exhausted immediately it connotes उपक्रम and other canons of interpretation.

Prakasha :

Chandrikakara lays out the plan of discussion in this Adhikarana. The following are the points at issue raised on the decisions arrived at in the previous Adhikarana.

- 1) Whether others also are known to be the cause of creation from the source of shastras or Vishnu alone is known to be the cause of creation from the shastras.
- 2) For this purpose whether the purport of the vedas is to be arrived at by the aid of Shaiva and other Agamas or by the aid of the canons of interpretation like

उपक्रम and others. 3) And for this purpose whether it is possible to settle the scale of relative strength of the canons of interpretation or not.

Raghavendra adds an explanatory note to this plan of discussion. Shastra means all the vedas and the works that follow the purport of the vedas. But here the works that follow the vedas are to be shown separately. Hence the word वेद is used in the sense of वेदतात्पर्य. If Shaiva and other such Agamas decide the purport of the vedas, then 'others only' would be determined as the cause of creation and not 'even others'. Then what is the use of 'even' in the first alternative? Hence Shaivadi means Shaiva, Hairanya Garbha, Sankhya, Saura and Pancharatra, which includes Vishnu also among the claimants.

In the third issue if the scale of relative strength of the canons of interpretation cannot be established, then the import of the veda cannot be decided by their application, then Shaiva and Pancharatra Agamas would run to decide the import of the vedas, and 'even others' would be the claimants as the result of Purvapaksha. When such scale of relative strength of the canons of interpretation can be established, then they alone can decide the import which is Vishnu alone is the cause of creation.

This discussion is based on the method of Purva Paksha as represented in Nyaya Vivarana. But the discussion based on the method of Purvapaksha as represented in Bhashya is like the following. After the first issue, for that purpose whether the apparent meaning of the vedas should be accepted or the resultant decision coming after a consideration of what has come before and what has come after it should be accepted. This is the second issue. The third issue is that whether where the apparent meaning

is given up, the real and uncontradicted meaning of the vedas is revealed or not.

If then two different sets of objections are to be refuted in this Adhikarana, it will have two subjects. But this is not a sound objection. For the Sidhanata while setting aside these objections, sticks to one view point, that decision of the ultimate meaning of the vedas is arrived at by the application of canons of interpretation like उपक्रम and उपसंहार. But this will not create any division in Adhikarana. That is how the topic has been discussed in Sudha. But According to Tika (Tattva prakashika) Agama along with apparant meaning is to be taken as one alternative. Hence there is only one refutation and there is no scope even for doubt of the Adhikarana being divided into two subjects.

This is the way Raghavendra analyses, and explains, what has been said in the original. He brings all the references to bear upon the text to prepare an enlightening back ground against which the subject matter is made to stand in clear demarkations. What a vast world of meaning is hidden behind the statements in the original, he shows in his gloss on the text. His explanations are not dead verbose, but living sparks of truth that are thrown out, from the dark pits.

We shall choose another spot where Raghavendra shows his skill of exposition. Purvapakshakara tries to make holes in the fortifications of the sidhanti. The canons of interpretations are not, he contends, infallible instruments of fishing out purport from the vedas. The purvapakshin explains his position thus,

“Prajapati took a horse to varuna — he gave that horse to varuna and took the disease of dropsy from him.” At

the beginning as it is said सप्रजापतिः पर्यदीर्यत, there is इच्छि for दातुः or donor. यावतः अश्वान् प्रतिगृहीयात् —. At the end there is इच्छि for the receiver. Thus we find one source like उपक्रम is found set against an other source उपसंहार. One cannot contradict the other as both are of equal strength, when no other evidence goes to the side of one of these two and upsets the balance. No doubt 'the commencement has no contradictor yet born to him and hence naturally is superior in strength to 'conclusion' yet in certain other contexts the conclusion' is dubbed with superior strength. When अपच्छेद or interruption comes it is the last that is stronger than the first. This discussed in Meemansa sutras in the VI Adhyaya 5th pada and 18th Adhikarana, पूर्वापर्यं पूर्वदीर्घत्वं प्रकृतिवत्.

Raghavendra supplies all ellipses and explains the sutra. Thus, the context is, first there is अपच्छेद or interruption from उद्गाता and then from प्रतिहर्ता. Then the doubt arises: should there be atonement to expiate the first fault of Udgata or that of Pratiharta? Raghavendra explains the implications of this doubt and its removal. The sacrificial priests would move in Pratassavana out of the sacrificial mandap. There they must move in file one behind the other like the row of ants. While moving thus in file, one behind, should hold the end of the dhoti of the one in front which is tucked in the waist-band behind, of the one going before. While thus going if by illuck the Pratiharta allows the end tucked in the waist band of the one in front then in that very sacrifice he must part with all. If Udgata commits this fault he must finish the sacrifice begun, without giving Daxina and perform a new one, as expiation for this fault, and finish it by paying the same Daxina.

When these two faults follow in succession in the same performance should the atonement be equal to the first fault or to the last fault or should it be optional? Then Sidhanta follows that the former is not so powerful as to set aside the latter. Apachada (lapse) is and atonement is नैमित्तिक. Now the knowledge of the first atonement is not able to hinder the origination of the knowledge of the last atonement. Because shastra recognises its origination and is endorsed by experience. But the knowledge of the last atonement is being originated by contradicting the knowledge of the first atonement. Therefore it is proved that the knowledge of the first atonement is false. But the knowledge of the last atonement stands uncontradicted. We should not go to the length of saying that the knowledge of the last atonement is being contradicted by the contrary knowledge of the first atonement. For had it been so the knowledge of the last atonement would not have risen. Therefore the knowledge of the first (or upakrama) is proved weak and is contradicted by the knowledge of the last atonement (upasamhara). Hence it is proved that atonement for the last lapse should be undertaken, in preference to the first lapse.

It is the Purvapakshakara who has adduced these arguments to prove the incapacity of upakrama and others to settle the import of a passage. Now he proved Upsamhara to be more powerful than upakrama. Next he shows that in certain other contexts upakrama is held more powerful than upasamhara. Hence they are not reliable guides to reach the import of a passage.

He shows that context in which upakrama is found more powerful. It is heard in ज्योतिष्मि प्रकरण that "उच्चैः ऋचाक्रियये उच्चैः साम्ना उपांशु यजुषेति". Now does this उच्चैः

or 'loudness' belong to the hymns or to the veda? In the enjoining statements like 'उच्चं ऋचाक्रियते ऋच्' and others which mean Mantra or hymns, are used; and hence loudness belong to Mantras. Then Adhvaryus recite hymns from yajurveda; these also being Richas or hymns must be recited loudly; and not as enjoined उपाशु or 'in a low voice.' But this objection is not sound. For अग्नेः ऋग्वेदः is upakrama and उपाशु यजुषा is upasamhara. Upakrama is more powerful because it has no contradicting agent yet born for it. So upasamhara is to be led by Upakrama and to be adjusted to the needs of upakrama. Now in Upakrama the word veda is used and therefore loudness, etc belongs to the veda and not to Mantra. So Richa in the injunction means, Veda and not Mantra. Hence Richas born of yajurveda must be recited in low tone. Thus upakrama supersedes upasamhara. Purvapakshi thus contends that there is no settled scale of strength among the canons of interpretation. Therefore they cannot lead us to a precise purport of a passage.

So the Purvapakshee contends that it is only the Agama that can help us find out the import.

Or Purvapaksha is raised on the apparent meaning of the vedas as is done in Bhashya. Rudra and others seem to be the cause of creation from the uncontradicted apparent meaning of the shastras. Other sources than shastra cannot dabble in this supersensuous subject. Any other instrument than shastra can neither prove nor disprove transcendental topics. But shastra itself denying the claim of Rudra or promoting the claim of Vishnu, cannot contradict the claim of Rudra. For these are shastras that promote the claim of Rudra and deny the claim of Vishnu. And this goes against the cult of Vishnu being the sole cause. But

even from the Purva Pakshi point of view, he has established only Rudra's claim; and Vishnu's claim has remained undisputed.

Purvapakshi contends that his intention was to break the monopoly of Vishnu's claim and that is achieved. Both can share this honour of being the cause of creation at different periods of time each, without affecting the claims of the other. For when one is the cause the other is not the cause. Thus when partial contradiction will meet the situation why go in for out right contradiction ? Meemasaka favours this reconciliatory spirit.

In both cases of Purvapuksha the result is that if Vishnu alone is argued to be the sole cause of creation, then there is अशिद्धि in inference. For it is argued that Vishnu alone is the cause because the shastras declare him to be so. As those shastras which declare Rudra to be the cause, a part of hetu is not to be found in the Paksha Vishnu. Hence there is partial Ashidhi. If on the other hand, the hetu is 'some shastras declare him to be the cause', this is found in Rudra and others while they are not the sole cause. Hence there is अविचार or violation of the rule of concomitance-Where there is Hetu there is Sadhya.

It is already stated that the first Purvapaksha is mentioned in Nyaya Vivarana. While the second is advocated as Purvapaksha in Bhasya. Therefore we read in Sudha-
 "In apprehending the import of shastra neither the apparent meaning nor the commentator's elucidation (Agama) is (the ling) helpful aid'. While in Teeka or Tattva Prakashika it is argued that in Nyaya Vivarana' (Pashupata shastra and others.) And others include 'apparent meening' also; While in Bhashya 'Apparent

meaning also includes Agama. Thus only one combined and co-ordinated Purvapaksha that Agama aided with apparent meaning is accepted as the source of the import of the shastras which declare Rudra and others to be the cause.

When thus the Purvapakshin is entrenched behind logical fortifications, Sidhanti proceeds with steady steps to demolish those fortifications, with logical missiles.

The sidhanti plumbs the depth of the problem and tells us that it is the canons of interpretation which semantically and syntactically join the sentence to its purport. These canons are the main instruments or aids (उपजीव्य) to convey the purport of a sentence which is hence उपजीवक. A passage must pass through this process of interpretation by the application of these canons or aids to convey its precise purport. Mere surface meaning will be beset with contradictions which vitiates the attempt to get at the purport. When doubts, denials, inconsistencies, are removed by the application of these aids, then the sentence blooms into a consistent and meaningful purport. Hence उपक्रम and उपसंहार are the real aids to the interpretation of the passage. Sidhanti contends that these should help him to interpret shastras. This interpretation would surely lead him to the conclusion that Vishnu alone is the cause of creation.

Now sidhanti critically reviews the opposition of the Purva Pakshin to these canons of interpretation. He had criticised that these aids have no settled course of operation; hence he had adduced that they cannot be relied upon in the interpretation of the passage. Sutrakara has given a hint (साम्बन्ध) by which he means that these aids unscrutinised and unverified cannot help us in the correct interpretation of the passage. But scrutinised and applied

properly these would not cause misconception, and misconstruction (भ्रम). We must take into consideration each one's natural strength and natural weakness. Suppose one aid like उपक्रम runs counter to उपसंहार, then think of their scale of relative strength. Then think if each one has an opportunity of fulfilling itself in another way. So when one is set against another, this consideration of having opportunity (सावकाश) or of having no opportunity (निरवकाश) takes place; and one having opportunity will be refuted by one superior in strength, having no opportunity. Thus the import rises up from this conflict as a way out if it is properly directed by rules like these.

Of these seven aids to comprehension one or the other will do, to ascertain the import and if all the seven are there, not that no import is recognised; all together aid the interpretation. Now each one is examined in its operation of interpretation. Much has been said about upakrama and upsamhara. So Now Abhyasa is taken up for consideration. Abhyasa is tautology or repetition. It plays an important part in bringing out the import of the passage. When the meaning becomes difficult to comprehend and is tainted with a sense of impossibility, easily one is led to believe that the passage is purportless; to remove this doubt there is repetition, with purpose. But Tautology is considered a compositional defect. Yes, when it has no purpose to serve as the following- to express solemnly some sworn oath, to conclude again what has been begun and interrupted by some useful diversion, and to say some thing more or with greater stress - really Repetition falls low to the level of a flaw in composition, for repetition lets us know only what is already known. This Abhyasa has been defined as 'एकप्रकार असकृदुक्तिः अभ्यासः Repeating the same thing in the same form.' -

Now begins the discussion of Apurvata (Novelty or something extra-ordinary) in the passage which determines the purport of the passage. Apurvata was considered by the Purva Pakshi to be something which is not apprehended by any other instrument of knowledge. But such new novelty is not to be found in veda or shruti. Hence veda cannot be an aid to understand Ominiscience of God. Because, the subject matter of veda, is apprehended, by Smriti depending upon shruti, by inference which by the reason of all doership (सर्वकर्तृत्व) concludes all-knowership, and by Perception which perceives the reality of the world and the difference between God and Jeeva. Hence veda is not Apurva and not an instrument of purport.

Therefore the definition of Apurva is modified so as to avoid the difficulties of this type. We want to define the अपूर्वता of a sentence which settles the purport of a passage. अपूर्वतातु स्वबोधनीय पुरुषगत अज्ञानादि विरोधिना स्व अनुपजीवमानंतरेण अग्राह्यार्थत्वम् Apurvata is that something which cannot be apprehended, by any other instrument of knowledge which is not dependent on this something and, which is calculated to remove the ignorance of a man to whom this something is addressed. This amended definition of Apurvata does not land us into logical fallacies. Now veda still retains its Apurvata. For veda is an exclusive instrument of knowledge to apprehend such things as Dharma and Adharma the all-knowing nature of God. The opponent had objected that this holy instrument loses its Apurvata because धर्म and अधर्म are known by smriti and all-knowing nature of God can be inferred by inference. But according to the new qualification, that instrument by which we know these should not be dependent upon veda. But both smriti and inference depend upon veda. Hence veda is still Apurva.

Yet God perceives these things (Dharma and Adharma) independent of veda. Still veda is not addressed to God to remove his ignorance, and God's knowledge in no way affects the ignorance of man. Hence vedas retain their Apurvata intact.

Again a question arises, Vedic statement runs- "Fire is a specific remedy against cold " It is accepted as a mere repetition of our own experience (Pratyaksha); and is not an Apurva or new instrument of knowledge. Still it should be accepted as Apurva. But before it is experienced if one reads from veda that cold is removed from fire and as it is known by actual experience this vedic statement is not Apurva. Because though not yet experienced it is fit to be experienced; and can be apprehended. Hence such vedic statements which only state what we can know and understand from experience cannot be considered as apurva or exclusive instrument of knowledge. Therefore in the definition there is अग्राह्य and not अग्रहीत.

The Shidhanti quotes the consent of Meemansa. In the fourth Adhyaya II pada in the 26th sutra (11th Adbhikarana) (संस्कारेण तत्प्रधानत्वात्) we read such statements as त्रिहीनावहति (They pound the paddy). Here the question is whether this statement is an injunction or is it merely a repetition of what has been stated? The objection side puts the case thus :- Purodasha is to be made out of this corn. Then naturally removing of the husk by pounding is implied. This implication is simply repeated in this statement. But this objection side is set aside by stating that removing of the husk can be achieved even by the use of human nails. Hence the implication of husklessness cannot limit it to pounding only. Therefore in order to limit it to the process of pounding a rule of pounding is thereby enjoined. This is the final judgement of the discussion.

When there is Vidhana, it must be either अपूर्वता विधि or नियमविधि or परिसंख्याविधि. This pounding अवहनन is not Apurva; For it is fit to be apprehended by Pratyaksha aided by positive and negative concomitance, not dependent upon this part of veda. So the injunction ends in an exclusive rule that you should husk the paddy by pounding alone and not by any means. This is परिसंख्याविधि.

Thus in the body of the definition of अपूर्वता it is essential to change मानांतर अग्रहीतत्वं to मानांतर अग्राह्यत्वं (from, 'that which is not apprehended by another instrument', to 'that which is not fit to be apprehended'). For this, one instance is given. Now another instance is given.

In the Mantra Adhikarana a Mantra is quoted in the context of परिसंख्यासूत्र, 'इमा अगृह्णन् रशनां कृतस्य'. This Mantra, by the reason of रशना or rein (Linga) tells us that a horse is meant here. Therefore here in this mantra there is neither अपूर्वताविधि nor नियमविधि. But 'rein' also suggests 'an ass' as it is equally applicable to it. Hence the Mantra enjoins exclusiveness. परिसंख्या, discards an ass and accepts only a horse. This is परिसंख्या विधान. The Ling being very slow in process does not apprehend because Ling only operates through shruti. Even before apprehension, the Brahmana begins to operate.

Still there is an objection to the present formation of the definition of Apurvata. For the Brahmana which enjoins a religious ceremony along with its presiding deity might not be an Apurva injunction.

For the statement in Brahmana is addressed to persons like us who are infected with ignorance and Brahmana is meant to remove that ignorance. And Devata or deity of the Karma is mentioned in another Brahmana of a different

shakha which is not dependent upon the first Brahmana Mantra. So the devata is fit to be understood by this second Brahmana mantra. Hence this second Brahmana mantra will not be counted as an Apurva instrument of knowledge.

To this objection the reply is that in the context of दर्शपूर्णमास it is stated 'यदाग्नेयाः अष्टाकपालः—अच्युतः भवति'. Here the word आग्नेय should be studied. The doubt is whether this word means some Karma or some quality. It is found that it is neither the enjoining of Karma nor Guna; If it enjoins many Gunas like substance and deity, then the unity of the sentence is disintegrated. Then it means that merely a religious rite with the substance of अष्टाकपाल and named Agneyaka is enjoined. But in this there is no mention of a deity. So Agneya alone enjoins deity also. So the statement enjoins a qualified Karma. Subject to this many qualities are enjoined as an implication of it. Thus there is no disintegration of statement. So this statement enjoins qualities. Now in order to make the second Brahmana mantra dependent on the first the karma that is enjoined is supplied with a deity from this mantra. Hence this Mantra also is Apurva.

Now in the statement अष्टाकपालो भवति (eight pots are necessary) there is no mention of human effort. Hence no Mantra is essential for its operation. Even if it is necessary, the operation is limited to only Purodasha, which is not connected with any Mantra mentioning Deity. Then in order to achieve connection with Devata Mantra enjoins Karma as associated with substance and deity. This mantra meaning Devata is connected with the other Mantra afterwards. Now this mantra is dependent on the first Brahmana and hence it is Apurva. But Mantra

itself in respect of Brahmana is not a source of the knowledge and Brahmana is not dependent on it while conveying deity and other things. Hence Mantra in respect of deity etc; is not Apurva. It is Apurva when it conveys the supremacy and other qualities of the deity which are not conveyed by Brahmana, not dependent on the Mantra.

This subtle discussion continues establishing Apurvata to vedic statements in conformity with the definition of Apurvata and refusing it when the context does not satisfy the definition. Till at last chandrikakara comes to discuss Apurvata in a very critical context. विश्वं सत्यं is a hymnal statement which declares the reality of the world. But this hymn or Rich has no purport in the statement of this reality. For this विश्वं सत्यं has no अपूर्वता at all. This vedic statement is addressed to men like us with a view to remove our ignorance of the world— reality and our perception not dependent on this hymn can perceive world reality. Therefore the hymn loses its Apurvata.

But this objection is easily waved. For, as Ragharvendra says, our Pratyaksha cognises the reality of the pot and pan, yet it cannot cognise the reality of Swarga and Naraka (which form a part of the universe) as they are beyond the reach of the senses. And in that respect man's ignorance remains unaffected. Even in respect of perceptible pot and pan the apprehension hindered by the difference of views of the opposer is spoiled by throttling doubts and suspected of invalidity, loses all power of enlightening determination. So perception cannot comprehend the whole of the reality. Hence विश्वंसत्यं is not a repetition of what the perception has

apprehended. So the hymn is Apurva or retains the quality of a brand new instrument of knowledge of reality of the world. (विश्वसत्यं).

To special aspirants, Raghavendra's contention is that even when Apurvata is not admitted regarding the hymn (विश्वसत्यं) it conveys some purport because it has another sign-or mark of purport namely phala or purposefulness. Then phala and other marks of purport are explained.

Then Chandrikakara comes back to discuss the relative strength of upakrama and upasamhara. The point has already been thrashed. Recapitulating what has already been said, Upakrama or beginning is strong, because no rival compeer contesting, the Validity has not yet appeared. Yet in the context of Apacheda it is the end that is more important than the upakrama in deciding the import. Hence how to settle their relative strength or importance, is a question.

Chandrikakara now settles the point at issue. First there must be one context, And upakrama has already impressed its meaning upon the mind. Then the last end, if it treats the same subject, is as it were an elucidation of the beginning. There might be some difference in the mode or tendency yet they cannot be categorically different and opposite in meaning. Then the end is the elucidation of the beginning. This is found in daily business. At the beginning one is asked to bring the goat and at the end the she goat is asked to be brought. So the end is an explanation of the beginning.

In vedic parlance also this same rule holds good. As an instance here the first use of the word 'cloth'

is explained by the end where the general word 'cloth' is specified into 'Silken'. But Raghavendra gives the very background of this specification of a general statement.

In the first Adhyaya, fourth pada and penultimate sutra (सदिग्धेषु वाक्येषात्) it is stated that in doubtful cases, it is the ultimate part of the sentence that settles the meaning. The mud mixed particles (सर्कराः) are to be anointed. Ghee and oil and many other things are the means of anointment. Now should we anoint them with any one of these or particularly with ghee? The enjoinder is to anoint it in general. But execution of the enjoinder always needs specification of the general statement. A whimsical hitting of one of the many is not an intelligent course and hence it is not followed by the wise. Hence the wise do not discard the hints near at hand. At the end ghee is made most off (तेजो वै धृतं) and hence guided by this specific hint we land upon ghee and choose it as the specific means of anointment.

Thus it is the upasamhara that settles the import of a passage, it being the exposition of the upakrama. But this concession lands us on a very treacherous ground. For the vedas then might have to be interpreted in the light of Shaivagamas which is the least desirable thing in the eyes of the Sidhanti.

Hence this must be seriously taken into consideration and critically examined. Let us see where this rule of elucidated being interpreted according to elucidation is observed. Before that it must be clearly understood by that elucidation (व्याख्यानं). When it is only proved to be valid it is able to help us to interpret the eluci-

dated (व्याख्येय). To illustrate this vedic examples are cited. In one Mantra there occurs- उग्रवचोपावधीम् and we want to know what is उग्रवचः. There is a Brahmana statement 'अशनापिपासेह उग्रवचः' and Brahmana statement is an exposition of the Mantra of ascertained validity. So we conclude that उग्रवचः is nothing but 'अशनापिपासा' (Eating and drinking). In the same manner the word सत्य explained by its elucidation' साहिति प्राणः तीत्यन्न यमित्यासावादित्यः 'in which the word is split into सत् + त् + य and सत् is प्राण or vayu and त् is अन्न or Brahma and य is आदित्य or the sun. Thus the word is explained as a Trinity of gods, no doubt in Bhashya 'स एषभगवान् विष्णुः सत्यामित्यत्र धीयते' sattya is said to be Vishnu, yet on the strength of another statement 'देवतात्रयमन्यच्च पृथक् सत्यमितीर्यते' it is interpreted as 'trinity of gods'. Thus when we know that Upsamharva cannot thrive when its rival having different meaning is in an operative state. Hence though reluctant the Apacheda Naya declares the semantic death of upakrama when bitten by the deadly upasambara. Hence when there is opposition between the two, upasamhara is more powerful than upakarma.

But this rule does not seem to be universally accepted. For this rule runs counter to 'वेदोपक्रमाधिकरण' in which upakarma is given more importance than upasamahara. In upakarma 'three vedas' are referred to, while in upasamhara उज्ज्वैः ऋचा क्रियते' only Rigveda is mentioned. There 'Rigveda' in upasamhara is made to imply 'All the three vedas' in accordance with upakrama.

This objection is not sound. For here 'Rik' means veda; not because upasamhava follows upakrama; but because the word veda is repeated (Abhyasa) in अग्नेः ऋग्वेदः वायो यजुर्वेदः

आदित्यात् सामवेदः in upakrama. This decided by Jaimini in his sutra वेदोवाप्रायदर्शनात् (III-3-2). In Jyotistoma, it is begun अग्नेः ऋग्वेदः वायुनायजुर्वेदः आदित्यात् सामवेदः This is Upakrama and the end is उच्चैः ऋचाक्रियते उपांशुयजुषा. The Purvapaksha contends that in a good composition the subject matter and the import must be the same in the upakrama and upasamhara. Here the word veda in upakrama means only hymns or Mantra. Now in Upasamhara loudness belongs to Mantras like Ric. Thus Rig or Mantras whether recited in Rigveda or yajurveda should be recited loudly. While recited in Yejurveda the same Mantras are recited in an under tone. But the Sidhanta is altogether different. Rich in the enjoinder is veda and not a mere Mantra. So the sutra says 'Rich is veda.' वा is used to refute Purva Paksha. Why so? प्रायदर्शनात् because upakrama is found to be so. Thus when both upakrama and upasamhara agree together and decide the import, which is 'Rich, recited in yejurveda, is recited slowly in an under tone and not loudly as the Purvapakshakara thinks.

From this we come to know that the commentary of shasira on Jaimini sutras is not in agreement with the cult of vyasa. Therefore it is not a faithful commentary.

Thus the word Rich in Upasamhara is veda by implication, not because there is the word veda in upakrama, but because the word veda is repeated thrice. Because Abhyasa or repetition is stronger in operation than upasamhara.

Many more instances are given in which it was misunderstood that upakrama had dragged upasamhara to its own trend in shaping the final purport; And it was clearly shown that upasamhar had yielded not to upakrama but to some other element of superior strength in signifying

the import of the sentence. Superiority in strength of Abhyasa or Repetition to both these two is agreed to. For repetition of statement carries more weight in deciding the meaning than a single statement. And again, to discard Abhyasa is to court the denial of many declarations.

This is illustrated with an example from Brahma-sutra. In आनन्दमयोऽभ्यासात्. In Taittareeya it is stated 'अन्योतर आत्मा आनन्दमयः' Is Anandamaya that is referred to here, the human soul or Brahman? First as Purvapaksha it is supposed to be Jeeva or soul only. For the suffix मयट् coming after आनन्द (in आनन्दमय) signifies change or transformation. And Jeeva is liable to transformation. But मयट् also means 'Plenty and Profusion'. Yet this Anandamaya is associated with the relationship of 'body and embodied' which is the distinguishing mark of Jeeva only, as mentioned in the upasamhara (तस्यैव शारीर आत्मा). In this context it is decided that Anandamaya is Brahman only and not Jeeva as the word Brahman is repeated (Abhyasa). This Abhyasa by its natural strength overrides the claims of upasamhara even when it is aided by another mark of interpretation, Linga.

Some used to contend that the suffix मयट् alone argue that Anandamaya is Jeeva and that मयट् means 'Plenty' (and not change) as the word Brahman is repeated. So there is no contradiction of upasamhara. But by the previous argument we see clearly how upasamhara is set aside by Abhyasa by its superior strength. Meemansaka agrees with this contention as this course saves us from many twistings and turnings of the original passage.

Now of these canons of interpretation, Apurvata (अपूर्वता) newness or unprecedentedness in meaning is more

powerful in leading us to the import than mere repetition. When a word or a sentence allows many senses, if a meaning already expressed is accepted there is redundancy or superfluity of expression. To avoid this we shall have to set aside the claim of a very beautiful sense only on the ground that it is already expressed and some new meaning, so far unexpressed, shall have to be accepted. Hence Apurvata is stronger than Abyasa.

In this context an instance from Brahmasutra is quoted. There is the sutra इतरव्यपदेशात् हिताकरणादि दोष प्रसक्तिः a doubt is expressed whether Jeeva is a free-doer (has freedom of will or not) or not स्वतंत्र कर्ता). In support of his freedom a shruti is quoted. (जीवाज्ञ वंति भूतानि) "जीवे तिष्ठन्त्य चंचलाः जीवेतु लयं ऋच्छन्ति". And we see a man shaping a pot out of the earth and this direct experience is corroborated by an inference that man is an agent of action because he is a sentient being, as god is (as accepted by sidhanti) Thus Jeeva's agency of action is proved. While god is fit or unfit to be perceived. If unfit he should never be visible. If fit, he should be visible everywhere and at all times. Hence we cannot attribute to him any agency in the production of anything.

When matters stand thus, to get out of the fix, is not difficult. For mere statement of facts and a right perspective of the situation will solve the problem. The soul has an agency of action; but he is not a free agent. Because had he been so, he would have realised his good and would have been able to avoid evil-which is not possible in the case of man. Hence man has no free initiative and by himself cannot achieve what he wants. So God is the free agent and though invisible he has the power of manifestation at will like many unearthly beings. It is only our

ignorance to think that we are free agents and architects in moulding things as we like-shruti proves God to be the prime mover and free agent. As for reasoning it has no capacity to move in super human sphere independently. Thus in the shruti that is quoted though Jeeva is repeated yet Brahman has Apurvata. And Apurvata is stronger than Abhyasa. This is accepted by Meemansaka also.

Now in the course of review of the relative strength of the various marks of import the last is Phala or objective of our attempt. It is the strongest mark in settling the import; and stronger than Apurvata. For all strive to realise their objective. Even in secular world, when there is no positive success there will be no import in a statement of futile attempt. Take for instance a statement like 'A crow has eight teeth ! which is not true. Hence a futile statement carries no import. But a statement which conveys the news of the arrival of a son carries a fruitful purport. Hence a statement which is fruitful carrying fruit (Phala) is more powerful than a statement which merely expresses some-thing new (Apuva).

To illustrate the truth of this statement a Brahma sutra (II Adhyaya and 3rd Pada) is quoted. असंभवस्तु सतोत्पत्तेः In that sutra the shruti सदेव सौम्येदमग्र आसीत् is taken for consideration. The question is whether this shruti is a Pramana to prove that Brahman is the cause of the world, or not. असद्वा इदमग्र आसीत् opposes this shruti which describes the creation of the world. For this shruti is not able to express the idea of the cause of the world being human soul tarnished with the defects of birth and death. This objection is refuted by sidhanti thus. A really independent entity cannot assume the rôle of being a cause. The word Asat can mean Brahman. (असदः सदजायत) From Brahman is born vayu. Now सदेव सौम्येदमग्र आसीत्

is no longer contradicted by. Hence it is an evidence to prove that Brahman is the cause of creation. This new interpretation of असद्वा or असदः सदजायत is no doubt Apurva. Yet the interpretation gets strength really by its fruitfulness, which consists in Brahman being full of perfections (being tainted with defects is fruitlessness). As shruti strives to please Paramatman with a view to get Moksha for man, it has no intention of villification of Brahman. Had it been so, men would have derived from vedas hints to villify Brahman. Hence they would have incurred the displeasure of Brahman. Then Vedas would not have been sources of Moksha to men. Therefore the vedas purport to eulogise Brahman for his perfections par excellence. And through the knowledge of these unsurpassed merits men would surely win the saving grace of Paramatman paving the way to the final release. The above quoted sutra intends to Convey these two ideas.

A quotation from Vishnu Tattva Viniirnyaya confirms this interpretation. In worldly life we find kings punishing those who illegally claim the throne and declare that they are the kings. This implies that statements of identity unauthorised and unwarranted by other evidences do not bear fruits and result in punishment. On the other hand eulogy of real merits call forth appreciation and fruitful approbation from the king.

Here again of the two statements of identity and difference the statements of identity between soul and Brahman) is new and unexpected and hence they colour the import of the vedas. But such unexpectedly new statements when only warranted and corroborated by other evidences, rise to the status of the purport. So these statements of identity strongly refuted by other evidences forfeit all claim to declare the purport. Then there is not one

topic common to all statements. Hence there cannot be one subject matter binding together all vedic statements into an organised composition. To this objection the reply is that supremacy of Vishnu is the one topic prevalent prominently which makes vedas a unified composition. Hence this knowledge of the unrivalled supremacy of Vishnu wins the gracious love of this benign God who thus leads us to the final release. Then it is reasonable to suppose that the chief import of the vedas is the supremacy of Vishnu. The import is settled in this manner and not by the fruitful statements of difference, which rise superior to statements of identity, still we must understand that in order to arrive at the purport through the reasoning, we have adopted, we must first determine that the statements of difference and identity are fruitful and fruitless respectively and the said reasoning is based on this supposition.

The Meemansakas also agree with this view. With some instances from their shastra it is shown that Phala is more important in determining the import than Apurvata.

Arthavada is a statement which tells something good or bad about your doing or non-doing. Hence it is stronger than mere statement of fruit. Arthavada also adds the strength of precedent on the basis of the traditional practice by the ancients, when Phala is restricted to the acquisition of a sacrificial beast and such others.

An instance is offered from Brahma sutra. In the first Adhyaya in the 4th pada there is the sutra समकषत्. In the previous Adhikarana all words are shown to apply to Brahman and at the same time denote various objects in the chief mode of primary connotation. A doubt arises if words apply with equal strength of connotation to Brahman and to other wordly objects of strength, then

there is disparity of application. But to maintain the propriety of the chief mode of application in connoting various objects so as not to affect the popularity of the usage you shall have to agree to application of the words with equal strength of connotation in the case of Brahman and other objects. This is a very strong objection in the field of semantics; yet a thorough study of that science throws light on this knotty problem. In secondary connotation a nice distinction is made between Gauni (subordinate) and Lakshana (implied). In the same manner a nice distinction is made between the chief modes of convention and derivation (Rudhi and yoga). So in primary connotation also a distinction can be created : 1) Ordinary primary denotation and 2) the primary connotation of the wise. The wise use the word so as to apply to Brahman alone through derivation of the wise and then the same word at the sufferance of the wise usage, may be drawn from it to apply to ordinary objects to conduct daily business through the convention of the ignorant. Hence application to Brahman is strongly grounded while to secular objects, it is weakly based on the convention of the ignorant. Sidhanti thus maintains disparity of applications

Now again there is an objection. For the division is on the principle of dichotomy into Brahman and non-Brahman. And non-Brahman includes also karma devatas. And if words are to be applied to these deities, forcibly drawing them from legally married union with Brahman, with the spent-up force, words will not be able to yield that virile knowledge which will be of use in securing moksha. But the virile knowledge of karma and Karma devata plays an important part in purifying the mind and preparing the ground for God realisation.

Thus the conclusion is that though shruties declare the sacrificial beast and heaven to be the fruit of karmas, yet it is heard that karmas lead to knowledge. This is Arthavada praising to the skies the merits of karma. For karma through Jnana secures Moksha. Thus you find how Arthavada is more powerful than mere fruit.

In Arthavada there is both praise and condemnation. Now how Karma is praised is shown; it is also blamed. Karmas not intended to win the grace of Brahma is called a damaged boat to cross the ocean of life. So Karmas should be undertaken not for mean purposes of winning heaven but for securing Moksha or eternal peace.

In the same manner upapatti or reason is the same in the scale of canons of interpretation. For though Arthavada recommends an import which is inconsistent and not warranted by reason, then the import is not accepted. Consistency and reasonableness is the key stone of the arch of purport.

The instance is drawn from Brahma sutras. In the sutra पृथगुपदे शात् the question of essential distinction between Jeeva and Brahman is raised. 'That by which the unheard becomes heard' is the shruti which ends in 'Thou art that', with the help of six canons of interpretation including Arthavada. Identity is established. Then there is Bheda Shruti which proves the distinction between Brahman who is Purna and Jeeva who is Apurna, on reasonable grounds: This upapatti or reasonableness is stronger than all other marks of import. The shruti that seems to propound identity when confronted with Bheda shruti ends in subdued and subordinate identity or similarity as in 'Chaitra is shinnha'. Like Brahma

Jeeva also, in its own way, is (sat, chit and Ananda) a conscious being blissful in nature.

But this is crediting Reason with undue importance even after it is completely discomfited in the field of Brahman who is declared to be beyond senses and reason. Shidhanti admits discomfiture of Reason when it is unaided and alone. But when it is aided by shruti and in the dispute between two shruties, Reason with the help of one of the shruties can decide which is stronger of the two.

Thus discussing the relative strength of the marks of the import (तात्पर्यं लिंग) (which are उपक्रमोपसंहाराभ्यासोऽपूर्वता फलम् अर्थवादोपपत्तीच लिंगेतात्पर्येर्निर्णये) when they are in conflict with each other, whatever succeeds in order is stronger than whatever precedes. (परबलीयस्त्वम्). There is another series of marks of Purport known as Shruti, Linga, Vakya, Prakarana, Sthana and Samakhya, which are six in number. When they are in conflict with each other, that which precedes, is stronger than whater succeeds. (पूर्वबलीयस्त्वम्)

If one meaning is warranted by one mark like upakrama or upasamhara, then either upakrama or upasamhara has that as its import. If on the other hand both upakrama and upasamhara have both the same meaning then both share together 'an import of the same form' (एकरूपता) which is defined as uncontradicted meaning uniformly signified by both or many. This uniformity of purport without contradiction is held as a separate mark of import along with upakrama and upasamhara ; because it decides the import on its own merit or virtue. And when upakrama and upasamhara have each their own import it is their individual concern. When they both jointly share the

import it is uniformity of import (collectively held).
(समुदाय विवक्षया तदैकरूप्यम्).

Then the discussion enters into niceties and subtleties of thought about upakrama and upasamhara in both their joint and individual concern. It hinges round the topic that uniformity of import when commonly held by both the marks is not recognised in some works of Acharya. There is an attempt to reconcile these contradictions. At last we come to the point, that upakrama and upasamhara equally balanced in strength of connotation still conflicting in meaning cannot come down to one import. Under such dead-lock one that has scope to connote another meaning should yield to the other that is tied down to one meaning only, to be contradicted by the latter. Raghavendra quotes a number of instances from Brahmasutra where this type of decision is undertaken.

Raghavendra suggests another type of deadlock. Suppose the series of marks like upakrama and upasamhara meet with another series of marks like shruti and ling in balanced strength and in irreconcilable conflict, each to each as the case may be. Then the only way of escape is to consider this Savakashattva and Niravakashattva (having scope or no scope to connote another meaning) and the one that is savakasha should yield to be contradicted by the Niravakasha. Thus a humane and humanly way of reconciliation is sought in different ways under different circumstances, following the dictates of reasoning and commonsense, in both the series of marks (upakrama and others and shruti and others).

Now we come to the construction of the sutra 'Tattusamanvayat.' The whole of the discussion so long under-

taken is not a random display of vanity of learning but a well thought out plan of interpretation of the sutra.

Chandrikakara interprets the sutra thus-तत्तु means Brahma alone (Tu means, only or alone). This Brahma is शास्त्रयोनि, is the object of the purport of shastras by the chief mode of interpretation.

ब्रह्म is borrowed from the previous sutra to complete the sentence). Because Brahma or Vishnu is the main purport and the purport of all shastras, when we apply the main canons of interpretations taking into consideration their relative strength of signification and also assessing their value on the basis of having scope and no scope of another meaning.

Then he takes for critical review the interpretation of Advaita vadin as expressed by Bhamatikara. Quoting verbally a part of Bhamati which contains his purva-paksha and sidhanta chandrikakara shows how sidhanta does not refute the objection side at all, in his interpretation. He at last comes to the conclusion that the secondary meaning of Brahma cannot be the purport of all shastras, where, interpreted by the main mode of interpretation (Primary). For only primary meaning can be the purport based upon samanvaya, and not the secondary.

Now Ramanuja's interpretation of sutra is criticised. It is objected that if vedantas connote a ready made accomplished object like Brahma, then there is no fruit or purpose for such an investigation. This objection is refuted by showing that statements like 'A son is born to you' refer to accomplished objects like 'the son' and yet there is joy coming from hearing the news of the birth of a son. Hence there need be no objection for the vedas to state an accomplished or finished object Brahma. Thus

Brahman is the purport of the shastras, for the vedas purport to show that there is the fruit when such canons of interpretation are applied. This is the meaning of the sutra according to Ramanuja. But this is not consistent with the arrangement of the sutras. For in the first sutra it is posited that investigation of a finished object should be undertaken. If it is objected that an investigation of a finished object bears no fruit it is replied that all statements after the canons of interpretation are applied can be shown to bear fruit in this sutra. If so it would have been better if this fourth sutra had immediately been after the first sutra.

Raghavendra points out many more inconsistencies in the construction of the sutra according to Ramanuja. Chandrikakara concedes that the word शास्त्रयोनि from the previous sutra should fill the gap in the present sutra (तत्तुशास्त्रयोनि समन्वयात्) according to his interpretation. And Ramanuja need not. Yet he shall have to take for granted many more words. Raghavendra places before us the whole argument of the four sutras, from the objection side as mentioned by Ramanuja. In the first Adhikarana, as finished things cannot become the objects of the purport of a sentence, vedic statements cannot be cited as evidences to prove Brahma and hence there need be no investigation of Brahman in the second Adhikarana. Is it 'the cause of creation' and essential attribute of Brahman or is it an accidental attribute? In both ways you cannot explain Brahma being the source of all dispensations. Therefore there need be no critical study of vedic statements expressing Brahman as the cause of creation. And in the third it is stated that the cause being inferred the vedic statements merely repeat the inferences and hence need not be studied. In the last vedic

statements expressing fixed and finished thing like Brahma bear no fruit and hence need not be studied. These objections when refuted form the basis for the beginning of the shastras.

But even this hope is not fulfilled. For Brahma vichara comprises the study of his nature of essence, meant to it and the purpose of it and its investigation. Only definition and Pramanas constitute the means of achieving it. The definition in the 2nd sutra and Pramana in the 3rd sutra are supplied. Hence the discussion about Brahman has already begun and it cannot form an introduction to the coming discussion.

ईक्षत्यधिकरणम्

Bhashya.

"From whom words return along with thought, not having attained It" (. 2-4-1).

"Inexpressible in words, (not within the reach of words); not within the reach of touch, having no (physical) form; and hence not perceptible, not having the quality of Rasa or flavour, eternal (bodily and essentially) and having no smell or distinctly different from Earth, (is that)." (katha).

"(The preceptor) preached (to the student Brahma) not in the primary mode (of expression) or through secondary mode".

(Baskala Shruti)

"That which is not expressed in word, yet by which the speech is expressed, which is not heard (by man) with his ears, yet by which This ear is heard, (That only is Brahma)." (Kena).

By such other shruties we come to know that Brahman is not expressible in words, (according to the opposer).

This is not so.

Sutra

That is not inexpressible in word, because it is knowable.

Bhashya

"He (that soul who has meditated through Pranava) sees (knows) Purusha immanent in the whole of the body and superior to the superior (the perfect Vasudeva) through the preaching of Brahma (the four faced) who is superior to the highest soul.

"He should find the supreme soul in the heart "

"Knowing indirectly (through the preceptor), he should seek direct vision"

By such verbal evidences (we know that he is) knowable and hence surely expressible.

As he is known only through Upanishads, he is not known through any other means than words.

"Whose essential form is expounded (in the primary mode with import) by all vedas".

"All vedas declare that (for His sake all penances are performed)". (katha).

"I alone is propounded chiefly by all the vedas; I am the composer of Brahma sutra. I am

the one who fully knows the meaning of the vedas " (Bhagavat Geeta).

From these Shruties and Smrities also we know that (Brahma is expressible in word).

The Shruties that declare Brahman to be inexpressible mean only that he is fully unknowable

"The learned, though they see (the majestic) the form of the mountain Meru, yet they do not see it fully. Therefore that huge immensity is not perceivable, nor is it expressible in word, nor can it be guessed " (Just like this).

"It is inexpressible because it is not fully comprehended. It is expressible because it is stated in all Agamas. Thus the supreme one is both impossible to be inferred and possible to be inferred; he is both knowable and unknowable. Thus declares Smrities.

(Others say that) the cause of the world is not the primordial Prakriti; for it is not stated in the vedas thus. For the cause is attributed with power of perceiving (while the insentient Pradhana cannot claim this power of perceiving. But Sankhyas who propound this system do not agree with the idea that pradhana is not stated in the vedas. (For they accept veda and Pradhana as propounded in veda.

Bhavadeepa:-

Raghavendra shows inclusion of this sutra in the shastra. The topic of the sutra is that Brahma referred to in shruties like ' ' show that Brahma is knowable and on account of his knowableless he is proved by inference that he is expressible in words. This shastra is a series of inferential argumentation. So this sutra providing a syllogistic argument to prove expressibility of Brahman by its knowability can be easily proved to be included in this shastra.

No doubt in the previous sutra (samanvayat) the prefix sam meaning 'in the primary sense' and 'as the import of all shastras had stressed both these points (वाच्यत्व and कृत्स्न शास्त्रविषयत्व). yet here only one वाच्यत्व is stressed as important.

Raghavendra as usual explains certain words in shruti अरूपम् is explained as न विद्यते शब्दायस्यसः 'one that does not possess a word (to express it). अरूपं is explained as रूपादि राहित्यम् bereft of any form; and not perceivable to the eye which perceives only things having some form. Thus this attributes both inexpressibleness and unknowableness to Brahman. This explanation is in accordance with the sutra.

It is objected that गोचरम् is used though it is used in masculine gender (गोचराः इन्द्रियार्थाः). To this the rejoinder is used in feminine also त्रयीन श्रुतिगोचरा. Now Raghavendra: explains शब्द गोचरम् as शब्दानां गवां ज्ञानानां चरः चरणं वृत्तिः यस्मिन् तद् शब्दगोचरम् This is व्यधिकरण बहुव्रीहिः. But in Manjari it is stated गोचर is a Rudha word and should be explained according to the context.

Raghavendra explains why Bhashya kara said 'नतत् शङ्खोच्चरम्. For in the sutra we must import from the previous sutra, the word तद् and then it runs as तद् अशङ्खम्.

अवाच्यत्व is said to be श्रुतिप्राप्तम् as propounded in shruti. But really it means श्रुतितात्पर्यं अज्ञानप्राप्तम्, apparently meant by shruti through ignorance of the real import of shruti. Hence Naya Vivarana states 'नचतस्य अवाच्यत्वं श्रुत्य. मिप्रायः' inexpressibleness is not what is stated in shruti. This implies that through ignorance one interprets shruti as stating 'inexpressibleness'. Thus in the sutra in the place of अवाच्यं न, अशङ्खम् is used in order to show that shruti does not state by अशङ्खम् अरूपम् inexpressibleness as it is wrongly interpreted.

In the shruti quoted in the Bhashya ओं इत्यक्षरेण परंपुरुषं अभिध्वायीत, the soul, being free from Prarabdha Karma as the snake is free from the old slough, being blessed by the highest soul Brahma (four faced) visualises Purusha immanent in the body. So this Ikshana is direct vision of Purusha or Brahma; and this direct vision does not require any expressibleness in words. But this is true no doubt. Yet this direct vision is the result of the upadesha of Brahman (four faced) in words. Hence Brahman is expressible. Here पश्यति merely means जनाति only-indirect knowing and not direct visualisation.

Now Raghavendra explains how Ikshati came to mean Iksha neeya. ईक्षते: by Lakshana means ईक्षण which not being related with Brahma cannot get the status of a Hetu or reason. ईक्षण meaning kriya is changed into its karma or object to suit the shruti. (पुरुषं ईक्षते) so ईक्षण is changed into ईक्षणीय an object of preceiving.

अशङ्कन contains two negatives which mean one asserted affirmative; hence it is explained in Bhashya as वाच्यमेव. So in Bhashya it is argued that Brahman is expressible because he is knowable and this reasoning when questioned is replied through अर्थपत्ति or Presumption. For Brahman is presumed to be known only through upanishads (औपनिषद्) and that cannot be accepted if he is not expressible in word.

Or this expressibleness may be proved by the rule of elimination (परिशोध) thus. Shruties declare Brahman to be knowable (ईक्षणीय). If to be known, he must be known through instruments of knowledge. Of the instruments that are now taken for consideration (प्रसक्त), his knowability cannot be proved through any other instrument than verbal Testimony (वचन). For Brahman is known only through upanishads. And this knowableness is proved by elimination only through expressibility. Hence knowableness proves expressibility.

Thus elimination is sought through the process of denial (प्रतिषेध) of the things applicable (प्रसक्त). Presumption and the principle of elimination are both types of inference yet their method of inference is different and hence they are shown here separately.

On this another objection is raised. A thing already known may be connoted by a word through the secondary mode. The knowledge of a thing warranted by upanishad is only known through words. If there also the thing is known through words by the process of Lakshana then, this goes on in an endless chain and ends in an infinite regress. The protagonist of Lakshana argues that a thing that is self luminous is always implied by word through

secondary mode of interpretation and this argument is as silly as bringing a dingy lamp to see the resplendant sun.

But after all this fuss what is it that we have done. A tottering inference has challenged the truth of invincible Agama. For among the three instruments of knowledge Agama claims incontrovertable validity as its birth right. There a shruti is quoted and a smriti is produced to prove the expressible nature of Brahman. So it is not dry inference but inference aided by shruti that has made itself bold to challenge the apparent truth of an Agama.

But in the sutra no shruti is cited; only the reason of knowability is adduced. (ईक्षते : नाशद्वम्). For the opposer has quoted Agama to support him; so a shruti quoted will be null and void by the shruti which is already requisitioned. Hence reasoning is summoned to support the Agama that is spent up.

A small sentence in Bhashya has given great scope for the great and ingenious gloss-writer. नच अशद्वत् इतर सिद्धम्. After the elucidation of the sutra, by his commentary, Madhva adds this sentence to refute the Bhashya of others. He chooses Shankara's Bhashya in which the Purvapakshee is the sankhya. The simple meaning to the above sentence is "nor unpropounded by shabda or shruti (in the case of creation) is acceptable to others." (4) Shankara, by this sutra condemns Pradhana as the cause of creation. He adduces that Pradhana or Pra-riti being insentient has no power to think. So Pradhana is not propounded in the veda (अशद्व). But Madhva says that (the other) sankhya does not accept this. For sankhya is a vaidika and his Pradhana is propounded in veda.

Again Mayi (Advaitee) and sankhya are plaintiff and respondent in this dispute. So each one is 'the other' to

each other. So Mayi also is other to the sankhya and Mayi also does not accept Pradhana to be अशब्द. For he accepts veda to propound pradhana. (अज्ञां एकां) on the other hand even Brahman cannot be propounded by shruti. For Brahman is accepted as inexpressible, by the mayi. Nor Brahman can claim the agency of seeing or thinking in his system. For he is pure knowledge in essence. But the agency of thinking is attributed to Brahman affected by maya.

But we must remember that the cause of creation is the one that is the object of investigation. Now Brahma that is affected by Maya cannot be the object of investigation. For this object of investigation or Jijnasya ensues us Moksha. And Maya affected Brahma cannot secure us Moksha. So Maya affected Brahma cannot be treated in the veda. Shudha Brahma is treated in the veda

“The agency of thinking or kshitrutva does not belong to affected Brahma; it belongs to pure Brahma when he comes under the influence of Mayi”. Thus Mayi may argue. But the question is whether thinking or seeing is produced there or is it formally attributed to it. If it is produced there, then visibility or knowability also may be produced in Brahman and Brahman also may prove to be illusionary (according to his dictum-whatever is visible or knowable is illusionary यद् दृश्यं तन्मिथ्या.).

Raghavendra draws out from this some subtle meaning as implied by Bhashya. The agency of thinking or seeing is not born in Sudha Brahma ?. It is born. Then knowability or visibility ईक्षितृत्व which is other than दृश्यत्व is also born. If on the other hand is (ईक्षितृत्व) formally attributed to it, then it may also be attributed to the insentient of the sankhya. Then Pradhana also may claim to be the cause of creation,

Tantra deepika :

A clearer explanation of अशद्वम् is offered here. नविद्यतेऽशद्वः वाचकः यस्यतत् अशद्वम्). That which has no word to express it; hence 'inexpressible'. The word ईक्षते : also is explained grammatically. ईक्षति is the root itself and its meaning is seeing or thinking (by secondary mode). Now this is offered as reason for not being 'inexpressible'; when offered as a reason it must be related to Brahman. For an unrelated thing cannot serve as a 'reason' in any argument. Relation can either be agency or object of the activity. But the agency or objectivity of Brahman is not in conformity with shruti. If this is not accepted it will land us in the confusion of contradiction; so Brahman is found as object of the activity of seeing or thinking. So the sutra means—"on account of its being the object of seeing" or knowing or on account of its knowability (ईक्षते: ईक्षणीयत्वात्). Brahman is not inexpressible means expressible. The shruti states पुरिषाय पुरषमीक्षते (He sees Purush lying in the body). We need not doubt that this quotation has no bearing. For Brahman is inaccessible to the perception and inference. His Ikshana is possible only through primary mode. Hence through primary connotation of a word in shruti one knows Brahman. But this unsyllogistic form is of no use in proving the expressible nature of Brahman. For Shruti is not uniform in declaring Brahman to be expressible. Some times shruti is declaring Brahman's inexpressibility. Thus in order to add strength of inference to the shruti of expressibility, the whole thing is stated in syllogistic form—"Brahman is expressible as he is knowable". In order to affirm with assertion in the place of one affirmative two new negatives are used. "Brahman is not inexpressible as he is knowable".

Tattva manjari :

ईक्षत्यधिकरण consists of eight sutras in all. Anubhashyakara expressess the gist of the Adhikarana in one word ईक्षतेश्च. And this Adhakarana follows समन्वयात्.

So samanvaya gives rise to some doubt. When it is posited that Vishnu alone is the purport of all shastras by the primary mode of interpretation, aided by the canons of interpretation like upakrama and upasamahara. But this is a sweeping assertion; For Vishnu is declared to be inexpressible and inconceivable in nature. When Vishnu is not conceivable, and expre sible in any words, how can he be the chief purport of all shastras ?.

To this objection the reply is direct and clear. Vishnu is the chief purport of all shastras. For (ईक्षते: means ईक्षणीयत्वात्) he is rightly the object of Conception and is apprehended, through the Vedas by the mode of primary interpretation.

Raghavendra helps us to construe अनुभाष्य which runs like this विष्णुरेव आगमोदितः समन्वात् ईक्षतेश्च. सम् and आगमोदित should be repeated with. So the construction is ईक्षतेः समेव आगमोदितोविष्णुः. Vishnu is expressed in veda through the primary mode of interpretation only as he is an object of vedic knowledge only.

Now in Anubhashya two strong reasons are given to prove Vishnu to be the only purport of vedas. Compulative च joins those two reasons. Vishnu's expressiveness is proved by the reason of his being the object of knowledge. When Vishnu is eligible thus to be expressed in veda, then by the application of the canons of interpretation to Agamas, Vishnu alone stands the one undisputed monarch of meaning of vedic Agams.

This is giving undue importance to reasoning over Revelation. So the previous statement is a little amended into—"Veda states that Vishnu is expressible and this vedic statement is made still more stronger when aided by reasoning. Hence the services of reasoning were requisitioned to strengthen the meaning of Vedas.

The conjunction च also joins some more reasons not explicitly expressed, like 'coherence and consistency of all vedas known and unknown.' Now vedic statement like inexpressibility of Vishnu cannot be set aside by an upstart like reasoning. Hence the reason like the uniformity and coherence in meaning of all the Agamas is cited here. Mere reasoning like ईक्षणीयत्वा unaided by the strength of the uniformity of purport of all Agamas would not be able to assist vedic statement like मनोवचो निवर्तते putting forth the inexpressibility and inconceivability of Vishnu.

Thus hundred and one shruties and smrities openly and unequivocally declare Vishnu to be the sole purport of all the Agamas. All vedas are uniform in their purport. And Vishnu is apprehended only through vedas. Vishnu is the chief purport through the mode of primary interpretation. Hence the sole agent of action and abode of 'perfections' is the fit object of enquiry.

Prakasha :

In the previous Adhikarana it was shown that there was no consistent and coherent continuity of thought in the four Adhikaranas, as interpreted by other commentators. So Chandrikakara shows how consistency is their creed by presenting the closely knit thought-link of the four Adhikaranas.

In the first sutra the word Brahman suggests its own possession of perfections to distinguish itself from Jeeva

And in the second to prove Brahman's possession of perfections that it should not apply to Jeeva. Brahman which is to be investigated is defined as 'the source of all dispensations of the world'. In the third Brahman's possession of perfections and being the cause of creation is feared to apply to other entities by over extension; and the aid of all shastras is requisitioned, as evidence to limit Purnata and Karanata to Brahman alone. In the fourth, shastra is qualified with 'all and in the primary mode of interpretation' in order to prove Brahman's exclusive possession of infinite perfections and his monopoly of being the source of creation and other dispensations of the world.

As this sutra raises an objection on the interpretations of (सम्) in samanvaya as "All shastras, in the high primary sense" and rejoins it; the relation between the previous sutra and the present one is that of succession. Raghavendra brings the statement of sudha to bear upon this subject. For sudha states that all the shastras treat Brahman as their subject in the most direct and primary manner. Shuda further adds that an objection is raised against it and refuted, in this Adhikarana. So the relationship is that of objection and rejoinder. But if two objections and rejoinders divide the Adhikarana between themselves, then there cannot be any unity of subject in the Adhikarana. But both the topics are the meanings signified by the word-sum-in the previous Adhikarana; And there is one supreme purpose of vindicating the use of that सम्, ruling supreme in the Adhikarana. Therefore गतिसामान्यात् is included in this Adhikarana because it also justifies the meaning of the word सम्, and agrees with the chief trend of this Adhikarana. Otherwise the sutra गतिसा मान्यात् would constitute a different Adhikarana all together. For this sutra contends that in the

known branches of vedic study, the causality of Vishnu is a foregone conclusion. On the analogy of the known shruties the unknown shruties also propogate Vishnu to be sole cause and other allied things. Thus there is uniformity of purport in the whole body of shastras. While this is the topic of discussion in गतिसामान्यात्, in other sutras it is propounded that Brahman is सम् expressible. Hence there is a split in this Adhikarana of seven sutras, which treat of different subjects.

But in spite of this diversity of subject matter there is found unity of treatment in the whole of this Adhikarana of seven sutras. Raghavendra shows beautifully how there is unity of purpose and subject matter in the seven sutras of this Adhikarana whose main purpose is to establish the expressibleness of Brahman. Other purposes are there as subordinate to, and as by product of this thesis of expressibleness of Brahman. The sutras नीणश्चेन्नात्म शब्दात् and others prove conceivability of Brahman. Which automatically leads to expressibleness. Hence this is included in this Adhikarana. So also the sutra गतिसामान्यात् presents uniformity of import in all vedas which supplies reason to the use of the word आत्मा. Hence indirectly it proves expressibleness of Brahman. And hence its inclusion in this Adhikarana is justified which is devoted to prove expressiveness of Brahman without which there will be no samanvaya of words in Brahman.

Now it is considered whether samanvaya tersely and yet lucidly. वचनवृत्त्या शास्त्र तात्पर्य रूपः समन्वयः (Samanvaya is the topic of the purport of the shastras throughout the primary mode of interpretation. This consideration is suggested by the avowal of Brahman jijnasa in the first sutra.

Chandrika raises a recondite series of alternatives based on expressibleness of Brahman. These alternatives when accepted pins down a man to a particular opinion about the subject on hand; and ultimately an exact concept precise in connotation is formed and one is wedded to, such an exact concept throughout the discussion, so that he cannot mince the matter, nor can he leap in the dark. There is no scope for one in the dialectical discussion to change the meaning of a word as he likes.

Look to these series of alternatives; 1) Whether samanvaya is justified or not. 2) For that purpose the absolute Brahman is expressible in words or not. 3) For that purpose shruti stating inexpressibleness of Brahma expresses absence of expressibleness or unknowness. 4) If absence of expressibleness is meant, for that purpose whether it is either fit to be known or not fit to be known. 5) For that purpose whether Atma that has been stated in shruti fit to be known. Or as endowed with attributes or as attributeless. 6) For that purpose whether the word Atma mainly denotes figurative Atma or the attributeless Atma. 7) Moksha is prescribed to one who is devoted to Atma as stated in shruti: Whether Atma in this context is secondary or not.

We must begin from the end and traverse the path up towards the beginning. But the path is very clear. If for the sake of Moksha a Gauna Atma or Atma, bound by the three gunas sattva, rajas and tamas is prescribed by veda, then there is no contrary proof to contradict this gauna Atma. So Gauna alone is denied expressibleness and not the attributeless and absolute Atma. So we have not been able to prove that absolute and attributeless Atma or Brahman is inexpressible. This is the result of objection side's discussion.

If on the other hand you accept the other alternative then Gauna Atma is not prescribed for Moksha. For how a soul bound himself with Gunas can free us from the bondage of Gunas ? So Gauna Atma is not connoted in the high primary sense, for there is contrary evidence to refute this commitment. So shruti declares Nirguna Atma to be knowable or conceivable which directly disproves its inexpressibleness. This is the argument of the Sidhanti side or Judgement side; and its fruit is that attributeless and absolute Atma is fit to be expressible in words.

Chandrikakar delves deeper into the problem and Raghavendra follows him with a torch to throw light on the path he traverses so that the pilgrims may follow his path without hesitation and apprehension. In the sutra the sidhanta side is well represented and Raghavendra introduces it with a note which summarises the whole of the judgement very briefly and yet to the point. Brahman is the subject of knowledge and hence he is also expressible in words. Therefore this knowableness contradicts inexpressibleness. So the shruti which declares Brahman to be inexpressible, shall have to be moulded and adjusted to mean अप्रसिद्ध or fully not known or comprehended. (साकल्येन अगोचरत्वात्) This is the gist of the contention of sidhanta. The thought can be put in syllogistic form thus Brahman is expressible because he is comprehensible and knowable to some extent. But that Brahman is beyond thought and word means not completely unknowable but partially knowable. This knowable Brahman is not absolute or shudha Brahman; but is Gaura Brahman. As the Hetu of knowableness is not in shudha Brahman, he cannot be expressible. Now sidhantakara shows that Shudha Brahman is knowable and Raghavendra notes that this knowableness is not direct visualisation of Brahman (अपरोक्षज्ञान). Knowa-

bleness (ज्ञेयत्व) referred to in shruties belongs to shudhā Atma and not Gauna; because the word Atma is used and because one devoted to it is said to get Moksha.

The contention that expressibleness proved by knowableness is refuted by another shruti stating inexpressibleness, is held in abeyance and is reduced to mean absence of perfect knowableness, (अप्रसिद्धे वाच्यं). Before the inadaptability of the reason Ikshaneeyatva (ईक्षणीयत्व) Avachyatva or inexpressibility yields and becomes ready to adopt a limited meaning-not utter absence of expressibility, but absence of perfect and complete expressibility which is in conformity with expressibility in word (वाच्यत्व). Again there is the corroboration of smṛiti which explains this shruti to mean inexpressible in the limited sense. If on the other hand complete absence of expressibility in word of Brahman is meant, then you are reduced to a dreadful absurdity. There is the shruti 'अशब्दं अस्पर्शं अरूपं' and अच्ययं (ब्रह्म) and अशब्दं (inexpressible) describes in the primary mode the nature of Brahman is utterly inexpressible than even the word अशब्दं can connote the nature of Brahman: then Brahman is expressible. If it cannot connote inexpressibility, then Brahman is not inexpressible; just as if a thing like Ganga cannot be expressed by the word Ganga then that thing cannot claim Gangaiva in i self.

An instance is quoted. "We do not know whether we are Brahman or not". This shows that there is doubt of our Brahmanahood on account of our ignorance of Brahmanya which could not be ascertained. In the same manner, shruties like words returned along with mind signify difficult to be known and difficult to be expressed. For Brahmanya is found in him who is born of a Brahmana woman. But the connection of a Brahmana is difficult to

to be ascertained; and hence Brahmanahood is difficult to be ascertained. Here why difficult to be known ? Here the reason is 'wonderfulness'. On account of the possession of infinite number of perfections (of Brahman).

“ योऽपि चैवात्म शब्दात् ”

Sutra : 6

Bhashya-

But (Knowable) is one tainted with Gunas (like sattva, Rajas and Tamas) and (hence that bound soul or jeeva is expressible and not the untainted or the absolute Brahman. This is not so. For the word Atma is used (as the object of seeing or knowing).

For he is called Atma, who is completely bereft of Gunas and untainted with blemishes (like misery and others), and who is immune from (undesirable attributes) and imperfections. He who is different from this, is considered by the wise to be non-Atma. The word Atma is used to denote Anatma only figuratively (Vamana).

Brahman has two forms- one is Atma and (Vamana) another is Anatma. He who is Atma, is eternal (never changing his body) pure, unmixed with insentient jada and free from the bondage of Gunas. Then he who is different from this is Anatma (Talavakara Brahmana).

When the chief meaning is (suitable) secondary is not advisable.

“ तन्निष्ठस्य मोक्षोपदेक्षात् ”

Sutra : 7

One who knows that (Parmatman) is said to get Moksha (in the shurti). Therefore that mainly or primarily denoted by the word Atma is not one bound by Gunas).

Bhashya-

“For one who knows Guna Jeeva Atma cannot claim Moksha which is release from the bondage of Gunas.” Because he (Vishnu) is the creator of all therefore he is the creator of vayu. Vishnu himself is omniscient and having entered the middle portion of the body the cave of his heart, he is seen. Then he grants his own capital place to the knower of the Atma. “Thus one who knows Atma is said to get Mokshna in the shuruti. This Atma (who is immanent in Rama and Brahman) is Vishnu only (Ma-Upd).

“(That eternal entity) is called Brahma Paramatman and Bhagavan”. (From Atri, Anasuya gave birth to) sons who were with Vishnu Rudra and four faced Brahma. These three sons were Dutta, Durvasa and Soma.”

“The sentient are of two kinds-one is Jeeva and another is Atma, oh Lord; The Jeevas are Brahma (four faced) and other souls While Atma is only Janardana”.

“In the case of others the word Atma is used in a limited figurative sense. For it is said that only by the knowledge of that Nirguna Atma one gets Moksha. Others are said to be bound with Gunas and their knowledge does not produce Moksha. Because Vishnu is supreme therefore smriti tells us that we get Moksha from “Him” (Padma)

“ हेयत्वावचनाच्च ”

Sutra :

Un-knowableness is an undesirable quality and is not attributed to Brahma for the sake of Moksha; on the other hand a desirable quality like knowableness is attributed to Brahma. Therefore Atma does mean Guna-bound Atma, but He is bereft of Guna.

“Know only Him who alone is Atma; Refrain from talking of other Jeevas”

“He is a bridge to the released”. (Mud. Upd). Thus others are not enjoined to be known for the sake of Moksha, while He is enjoined in the shruti to be known for Moksha. Therefore he is not Guna bound Atma.

“ स्वाप्ययात् ”

Sutra :

He absorbs himself. Therefore in आत्मानं वि लपयति Atma is shudha or pure; For he absorbs in himself

Bhashya-

"The Original nucleus of Brahman is perfect. Form derived from that nucleus is also perfect. This perfect form comes out of the original perfect nucleus at the time of creation. Thus perfect taking its perfect, is absorbed fully in the perfect".

"That Atma or Vishnu comes out of himself and then is absorbed in himself. And remains Atma in the original form" "That luminous Lord free from Gunas assumes many forms (at the time of creation). Then that creator Hari withdrawing all those forms into Himself sleeps again"

"Here Himself is said to be absorbed in himself".

"Never an Atma that is pure is absorbed in Guna logged Atma (we do not fear) that in other branches contrary statements might be found.

“ गतिसामान्यात् ”

Sutra :

(For) knowledge derived from different branches of veda is found uniform (So no other than Vishnu need be feared to be the creator of the universe)

Bhashya-

"All vedas, reasonings, and all good instruments of knowledge, reveal the uniform highest Brahma-knowledge. No denial or contradiction

from any quarter in the vedas or in the field of history (Paingi shruti). So all all vedic knowledge is uniform

“ श्रुतत्वाच्च ”

Sutra :

Shruti declares Him to be (one luminous Lord) Hence He is expressible in words.

Bhashya-

“This one luminous Lord Immanent in all beings and pervading all, Spatially and temporally and quatitatively) is the internal controller of all beings and presides over all activities. He support, all, being their direct supervisor, fully of consciousness unmixed with the insentient, and immune to the three Gunas”.

No inexpressible thing can be expressed in shruti Nor should we go to the length of imagining improbable events. (like secondary implication of an inexpressible object). For an utterly inexpressible object cannot be implied even through secondary mode

Thus ends Ikshatyadhikaranam

Bhavadeepa:-

Raghavendra explains Guna as ‘bound by Gunas like attva and others’. He justifies the use of masculine gender after गौणः In the previous sutra (ईक्षतेः ना शङ्कम्) because तत् had been drawn from तत्समन्वयात्, अशङ्कं, had been put

in neuter gender-. But here in गौणः चेत् नात्मा शब्दात् is used in masculine gender taking into consideration the use of the word आत्मा. (आत्मानं पश्येत्). Atma is said to have two forms. Rupa or form means essential nature in the case of Atma. But in the case of Jeevas different from Atma, Rupa or form means 'idols' or Pratima, or Symbol.

Here in तन्निष्ठस्य मोक्षापदेशात् an objection is raised that Atma mainly means Gauna Atma and not shucha Atma. Then Atma and Anatma already referred to mean sentient and insentient. This interpretation is simple and direct. (आजंब). Raghavendra explains why it is straight forward and natural. For Atma and Anatma are popularly known as sentient and insentient, and hence popularity is not affected. Then again Rupa in the previous shruti will have one sense namely idol or symbol (both sentient and insentient are idols of Vishnu) So this interpretation save us from thinking of two meanings for Rupa (Nature and idol).

The present sutra तन्निष्ठस्य मोक्षापदेशात् is a rejoinder to the previous objection. Atma does not mainly mean Gauna Atma. For one who knows Atma is assured of Moksha. So तत् or that (a pronoun) refers to Atma in the previous sutra (आत्मशब्दात्). Now Raghavendra adjusting apparent differences seeks uniformity of interpretation among different works.

First according to Tattva pradepa the interpretation of the sutra is तस्मिन् in him (Atma who is referred to as knowable) loyal Moksha is declared. (one who knows him (Atma) is assured of Moksha.) So this Atma is Nirguna. But in गौणश्चेन्नात्मशब्दात् it is objected that one that is expressible on account of its knowableness is Brahma tinted with Maya and not pure or absolute Brahman. And sutra replies this objection.

But in *Sāmanyaya Ratnavali*, both this *sutra* and the previous one are employed to refute the objection that the knowable is *saguna* still there is no other *sutra* contradicting the contention that *Jeeva* be the main meaning of *Atma*. There *Tattvapraakashika* and *smṛiti* previously quoted, represent neither objection nor rejoinder. Then you should not grumble that *Shruti* and *smṛiti* requisitioned in *Bhashya* are futile as they do not serve to strengthen the hands of the *Hetu* (ईक्षते:). For *Atma* means one who is the object of knowledge calculated to bestow *Moksha*, as directed by the *sutra* तच्चिच्छस्य and this meaning is compatible with only *Nirguna* (one bereft of *Gunas*). And under the direction of clear and unequivocal *shruti* like अयमात्मा the previously quoted *shruti* and *smṛiti* running counter to the popular meaning of आत्मा and अनात्मा as चेतन and अचेतन (Sentient and insentient) refer to *Jeeva* and *Paramatman*. Thus they serve the purpose of settling that meaning.

अयमात्मा ब्रह्म *Shree*, *Brahma*, and all other *Jeevas* have no freedom of doing good and leaving evil according to our experience. But they are found to do these things and hence it is inferred that there must be one in them, actuating and impelling them, to do these things. And that one is *Atma* (आदानादि कर्ता— one who gives and takes). This is *Brahman*.

Dattatreya is the incarnation of *Vishnu*. But *Brahma* has no incarnations allowed. So in *soma* there is mere presence of *Brahmadeva*. हेयत्वादचनात् *Raghavendra* puts the whole contention in a syllogistic form:— *Atma* is not a *Gauna*; For he is not spoken as 'heya'. If he is *Gauna* then he shall have to be spoken as 'heya'. On the other

hand shruti tells us that he is Aheya. We have made statements about Vishnu not being 'heya' and his being 'Aheya', because there are statements about his being Aheya. In Tattva pradEEP it is stated that in shruti आत्मानं जानय Vishnu is to be known excluding others because he is to be known distinctively, distinguished from all others. "He is distinct because he is superior to all" is stated in Rigbhashya. In this Bhashya he is declared to be 'the bridge' to add one more reason to the already stated three reasons like 'non statement of 'heya'va'. That reason is 'being a bridge to the released' which will be referred to in मुक्तोपसृप्य व्यपदेशात्. Or to suggest that the reasons 'knowableness, statement of being Atma, knowledge of Atma leading to Moksha and non-statement of being 'heya', should be amalgumated into one sentence. It is objected that the reasons like knowableness as stated in पुरुषमीक्षते, the word Atma as stated in आत्मानं पश्येत्, statement of Moksha in यस्यानुवित्तः and statement of Aheyatva' in आत्मानं जानय- are not found in one place. But in Tika it is shown that all these qualities inhere only in Vishnu and hence no such objection can stand.

But another objection is raised. Here on the strength of the non-statement of 'Aheyatva' the word Atma used here is said to mean primarily Vishnu. How then again in मुक्तोपसृप्य व्यपदेशात् another is suspected to be Atma; and in the end that doubt is dispelled ?. But this objection does not stand. For no doubt already it is proved that Atma

Note : प्रतिबुद्धः is सर्वज्ञः (All knowing) संदोहः means देहः (because it is the result of the conflict of causality) गुहा means गहन thick. अनुवित्तः is known

chiefly means Vishnu, yet he is said 'to be born' (जायमान) and depending upon this distinguishing mark it is doubted that by secondary mode Atma might mean 'other' (than Vishnu); but when he is said to be 'the bridge to the released' the doubt is cleared. From this you should take the clue that the non-statement of 'heyatva' should be read in the coming sutra Muktopasripya' also. So that in this sutra it is proved that Atma does not primarily mean Jeeva for the four reasons stated. And in the coming sutra it is proved that Atma even by secondary mode does not mean Jeeva for the same four reasons. Hence there is no tautology or the defect of Repetition. We must really appreciate Raghavendra's skill in exposing all this hidden meaning which he read in between the lines of the text.

स्वाप्यात् : At the time of Pralaya Vishnu is not absorbed in other things, but in him-self he is absorbed; hence he is not Gauna but Nirguna and this Nirguna is expressible; because he is stated in shruti and smriti.

Upon this an objection is raised. What does 'statement in shruti and smriti' mean? It is an object of knowledge produced by shruti and smriti. There Vishnu is not inexpressible, because he is an object of knowledge produced by shruti. This is the meaning expressed in the sutra ईक्षतेः नाशद्वम्. For there also Brahma being the object of knowledge (ईक्षणं) produced by one of the Upanishads is said to be inexpressible (Hence there is repetition).

Now this objection is not sound. For we must critically trace the progress of thought from the beginning of this Adhikarana. Raghavendra helps us to trace the process of thought in the sutras. In the first sutra Brahma is said to be the object of verbal knowledge in general; and this is made the reason or Hetu. But in order to

remove the doubt that this reason is not to be found with Brahma the Paksha, quotations from shruti were offered to prove Brahma to be the object of knowledge. But these quotations were again doubted to refer to Guna-bound Soul. Then the reason was again found absent from Nirguna Brahma. Through three sutras gradually the logical flaw of non concomitance of Hetu and Sadhya in Paksha was proved to be false. And in the present sutra it is proved that in the shruti Nirguna Brahma alone has exclusive characteristics of being absorbed in himself and others which form a strong unequivocal mark, untainted with the doubt of being applicable to Gauna Atma, and that Brahman aided with mark is the object of knowledge of this exclusive shruti. Thus the shudha Brahma is proved in-controvertibly to be expressible. Hence no logical flaw can be shown in this argument.

But some others seek to remove this logical flaw in a different way. In the first sutra Brahman was proved to be expressible for the reason that Brahman is beyond five senses and at the same time he is knowable. Here in this sutra because Brahman is stated in the shruti, he is the object of knowledge produced by the shruti. As other modes of interpretation are not applicable, Brahman is directly and primarily connoted by shruti. So he is not inexpressible in word; but he is expresible. In the same manner we must be able to show that Brahman is proved expressible directly in one place and indirectly in another place in the coming sutra. गतिसामान्यात् Proves uniformity of import in shruti, smriti, Itihasa and Yukti श्रुतत्वाच्च. Brahma is expressible not only on account of its knowableness but also on account of its being stated in shruti. Here also we must add, as before, "as लक्षणा or secondary

mode is not applicable, primary mode alone should be utilised."

Now Lakshana cannot be logically used in the case of Brahman because it is not expressible in any word. The Vyapti or concomitance is that, that which is Lakshya is expressible in some word, like the bank. For the bank is the secondary meaning of the word Ganga; because it is expressible by the word तीर though it is not expressed primarily by the word Ganga. But Brahma is accepted as not expressible in any word. Hence it cannot be indicated by secondary mode of Lakshana.

At this stage Jayateertha in his Tattvapraakashika institutes a critical discussion about the fundamentals of words and their relation to meaning. This discussion is known as 'Avachya Lakshanavada' (अवाच्य लक्षणवादः.) The syllogistic argument advanced by Jayateertha cuts at the very root of this vada. बिप्रतिपन्नं न लक्ष्यं केनापि पदेन अवाच्यत्वात् वैयर्थेण तीरवत् The disputed subject cannot be indicated by the secondary mode as it cannot be expressed by any word what so ever, unlike 'the bank' in गङ्गायांबोवः The cow-pen is in the Ganga.

The objector questions how expressibility is related to the Lakshana mode, in order to argue the absence of Lakshana from the absence of expressibility or vachyatva. There is a vital connection between indirect suggestion like Lakshana and direct expression. For a colourless entity without any characteristic attributes like Advaiti Brahma, if not expressible in words it is also not indicated by any indirect mode of suggestion in Lakshana. You must be able to tell in words what is that, that is indicated by Lakshana. If that is also indicated by Lakshana then there is infinite Regress.

When questioned 'what is Brahma' the answer is सत्यं ज्ञानं अनन्तं ब्रह्मा. In this definition, the thing defined namely Brahma is expressible in word or vachya, while the defining words सत्यं ज्ञानं अनन्तं are indicative secondarily of their meaning. Therefore there is infinite regress. If Brahma is vachya why not others? Advaitin asks if Brahma is vachya, we must know the power of expression of that word to know its meaning. If the meaning is to be known we must know the thing it means. Thus again the first question 'what is Brahma' stands unanswered. Hence there is again regress. A fitting reply is that, as made clear in Sudha, words in the holy texts should be interpreted with the help of marks given in the holy texts. For the derivative (योगिक) words are as good as sentences. Hence they need not seek again for new semantic connections. Hence in the case of Vachya words like Brahma there is no infinite regress.

The Advaitin argues that the adjectives सत्य, ज्ञान and अनन्त refer to the pure essence of Brahma, in order to avoid expressiveness of these words which they exhibit when connoting the distinct qualities in Brahman.

If these words do not convey by Primary expression the distinct qualities of Brahman then they will be listed as synonyms all connoting the same meaning of the essence of Brahma.

Advaitin contends that though the words convey the same meaning yet as they serve different purpose they cannot be listed as synonyms. For instance the word satya distinguishes Brahma from unreal (अनन्य) and so on and so forth.

But he forgets that Brahman has no distinctive characteristics and as such seven hundred purposes like these

cannot save these words from the grip of synonymity. Again if the distinguished Brahman has no distinctly different qualities the question—"what is Brahma" is not at all answered, by merely stating the pure essential nature of Brahman. For nobody asks a question about a thing without knowing the essential nature of the thing.

Different interpretations, and associations of sutras adopted by different schools are referred to, by Raghavendra and for their full course of thrashing he throws the burden on Chandrika. His Prakasha also throws its light on these problems. He respectfully refers to his Gurupada's Kantakodhara for details of topics adopted in the panchadhikarana by Bhashyakara and its justification as against the topics of different schools.

Naya Muktavali :

There are seven sutras in this Ikshatyadhikarana. So long we saw a discursive scrutiny and critical survey of this Adhikarana in an analytical process, dissecting the body of thought into scrutinisable pieces. Now Raghavendra with superb skill and ingenuity adopts a synthetic process assembling the pieces into a living whole. All the seven sutras are run into a closely knit argumentation, cutting off the offshoots, and rounding the rough angles. Raghavendra's planned lay-out, succinct and epigrammatic expression, adoption of a strange verbless syntax, yet crystal like clarity of sentences, is flawless logic in a few but meaningful words, all these grow from strength to strength and from beauty to beauty. Colossal thought reflected in a small mirror of presentation has a charm of its own. Instead of speaking much about it let us allow it to speak about itself.

In the previous Adhikarana it was proved that Brahman is the object of import of all shastras in the prime mode of

interpretation. An objection is raised and a reply is given on this statement. A doubt arises if Brahman is the object of the purport of all shastras in the primary sense. The objector contends that Brahman is not the purport. For shruties like यतोवाचो निवर्तते tell us Brahma is inexpressible in words. No such counter argument as "पुरिशयं पुरुषमीक्षते tells us the knowable nature of Brahma. Brahman is knowable only through upanishads and not through any other means of knowledge. Hence Brahman is expressible in words" is of any use. For this knowable Brahman is not pure absolute Brahman; But he is lower type of Brahman (Gauna Atma). Pure absolute Brahman is referred to by the secondary mode of interpretation and hence may be said to be knowable without being expressible in words अवचनेनैवप्रोवाच tells us how Brahman is knowable without being expressible in words in the primary sense. Yet he is indicated in the secondary sense. No counter argument like "As a reply to a question-what is indicated by secondary mode? - you must use a word like Brahman which his primarily expressive. Even if that also is secondarily indicative then there will be infinite regress," is of any use. For this is a logical flaw which is common to both sides (Primarily expressiveness and secondarily indicativeness. Even in the case of Primarily expressiveness, the word becomes connotative only when known related with the meaning. This relation-ship to be known requires the knowledge of the related thing. This related Brahman though known through upanished only requires some other sashtra to know it. As there is this infinite regress here also, let there be no partiality for primary expressiveness. Besides claiming for Brahman, शास्त्रयोनित्व (object of the import of all shastras) is pretentious. For Vedas are innumerable and men of the limited knowledge, short life cannot pretend to know the whole of the veda

with this import, So he cannot comprehend that all vedas denote primarily Brahman within his life period, which is ridiculously short. Thus the opponent has made a strong case against the Sidhanti.

Now the Sidhanti is ready to dare the opponent in his own den. In shruties like आत्मन्येवात्मानं पश्येत् the knowable one is said to be Atma, and one who knows Atma is said to get Moksha. Naturally it follows that knowable one is Sudha Atma and if he is indicated by secondary mode then the previously intimated infinite Regress automatically follows. Besides if the ever lasting and self luminous Brahman is secondarily indicated, then the shastras are of no use. And the protagonists of expressiveness of Brahma do not incur the offence of infinite Regress. Because derivative words are as good as sentences and hence do not require separate cognition of relation and hence there is no infinite regress. And यत्तवाचोनिवर्तते can be adjusted to state that though Brahma is expressive in words yet they are in conformity with Brahman being beyond the reach of mind, as they mean that Brahman cannot be known fully. Even if vedas are innumerable, yet they are not beyond the understanding of man. Even a small branch when studied gives the correct gist of all vedas; For vedas are uniform in their meaning. Hence Vishnu is the import of all shastras when interpreted primarily. This Adhikarana has uniformity of meaning, though it is devoted to show two meanings; For both the meanings are said to be the senses of one sum (सम्.)

Raghavendra now connects this Panchadhikarana with the rest of the Adhyaya. Samanvaya in Brahma is declared. And objections against this samanvaya are met with squarely in the remaining parts of the Adhyaya. In this Adhikarana the main plank for samanvaya is the

expressibleness and this expressibleness is proved by the reason of Ikshanneyatva. In the remaining parts of the Adhyaya, samanvaya that was declared is treated in detail. The words in the veda whose samanvaya in Brahman is to be proved are of four kinds- 1) famous in Brahman. 2) famous in the meaning other than Brahman, 3) famous both in Brahman and elsewhere 4) famous only else where.

Of these four kinds it is carrying coals to New-castle, to prove the samanvaya of words meaning Brahman, in Brahman. So of the others each one is to be divided into two divisions- 1) Names or Dharmis. 2) Marks or attributes or Dharmas. And according to the maxim of conquerring the strongest enemy first, we chose the group of words which mean other than Brahman and are substantives or Dharmis in the first Pada and in the second pada words that substantive yet known through attributes, in third pada, we have chosen amphibious words well known to denote both Brahman and others. Last come words which are known to denote only others (than Brahman) These are chosen last for the reasons that 1) they demand great effort and that they do not want all to know this kind of samanvaya, and are very difficult to understand at the first stage. That is why different padas are assigned different kind of samavaya.

Of the four divisions some are over-lapping and therefore they seem to be defective divisions from the logical stand point. This drawback is removed in chandrika and the divisions are shown perfectly logical.

Tattva Manjari :

Raghavendra in this work follows the course of thought as exhibited in Anubhashya. To justify samanvaya the prerequisite basic principle of expressiveness of Brahman was established. Now words, that are to be referred to

Brahma in the course of samanvaya of those words in Brahman, are classified. They were classified in one way in Naya muktavali. But here another method of classification is followed without infringing the metaphysical principles. He does not take the credit to himself; he only praises the rich suggestiveness of Acharya's classification.

All vedic words are of two kinds. 1) words familiarly known to connote Vishnu and known to connote others. The latter variety is divided into three sub-varieties. 1) known to connote others 2) known to connote 'even' others. 3) known to connote others 'only'. All these three varieties are referred to in general as connoting others. All these three varieties, consist of 1) words of substantive nature and 2) of adjective nature. This Adhyaya is mainly devoted to show that words of these varieties both substantive and adjective connote, primarily in the highest sense, Vishnu. Words having Vishnu as their reference need not be taken here for consideration. This variety again may similarly be divided into three sub varieties- as, denoting Vishnu, denoting Vishnu also and denoting Vishnu only. In the second sub variety there are words which connote others. But they are already included in the second in the second sub variety of the first division. But the first and the last are included in the variety of words denoting Vishnu. So these have been formed into one group called 'words denoting Vishnu'.

But there is one objection raised against this. Brahman is defined as 'the source of all' (सर्वकर्ता). And in order to avoid its overextension the causal statements (कारण वाक्य), alone should be shown to refer to Vishnu exclusively. In the coming pages, this samanvaya should be treated in detail. There is no necessity of showing all vedic statements to refer to Vishnu. For that is beside the point.

This objection is refuted by the phrase (सर्वगुणत्वतः) in Anubhashya. This is dissolved as सर्वगुणाः यस्य तस्मै. Here the termination तस्मै (thought commonly used in the sense of Ablative) is used in the sense of the dative being based on the sutra आद्यादिभ्यः तस्मै. Hence the meaning is- (All vedic statements shown to refer to Vishnu) in order to show that Brahman is 'full of all perfections' which is the meaning connoted by the word Brahma. At the end of the Adhyaya it is shown that words connoting attributes through derivative mode of interpretation, refer to Vishnu, proving there-by that Vishnu, denoted by these statements is full of perfections. Brahma sutra also as shown above treat the same subject namely that Brahman is referred to by words through derivative mode proving Vishnu to be 'full of all attributes' by the process of सर्वशब्दसमन्वय.

Tantra deepika :

In one sentence Raghavendra states the subject matter of this Adhikarana. The meaning of सम् (in समन्वय) is by implication both expressibleness and the subject matter of all the sastras. Then he goes on to explain words in the sutras. अशब्दं (न विद्यते शब्दः वाचकः यस्य) means that which has no word or phrase to express it. Which ultimately means inexpressibleness. ईक्षते: is a verbal form (Genative of ईक्षते the verb) which by implication means ईक्षण knowledge. ईक्षति: is in the Ablative and means 'for the reason of' (being the object of knowledge). Now an unrelated word cannot constitute a reason; and the relation if it exists must be subject or object; but this relationship runs counter to shruti (For shruti posits Brahman pure and

absolute without any relational attributes). If the opposite alternation is accepted, not that there is no contradiction. Hence object of knowing is the ultimate meaning. So the meaning of the sutra is:-Because of being the object of knowledge (ईक्षतेः ईक्षणीयत्वात्), Brahman is not inexpressible (नअशद्वं). You cannot doubt knowability of Brahman. For shruti tells us that he sees or knows Purusha lying in the body. Knowability has a definite purpose to serve. For knowability of Brahman cannot be established but through word, because knowability through perception and inference, the only other two instruments we have no access to. And knowability through word is through Expressibility of Brahman.

The syllogistic form should begin with pratigna or statement of what is to be proved; and the reason or Hetu finds a place. So the sutra should be 'नाशद्वं ईक्षतेः' But the sutra does not observe this order because formal logic does not give importance to any scheduled order. For the judgement or conclusion arises even with irregular steps. Just to show that no regularity in steps need be observed when a conclusion is coming out of as few steps or disorderly steps, the sutra is irregular in order.

Mere shruti stating expressibility of Brahman is contradicted by another shruti stating in-expressibility of Brahman in syllogistic form-the logic of which is based on shruti-in order to add strength to vedic testimony which is stalemated and checked in its operation by a contrary shruti. The word अशद्वम् in the sutra reminds us directly the shruti अशद्वमस्पर्शमरूपमव्ययम्.

Instead of a positive statement, a statement of two negatives is adopted in the sutra, to show that shruti should be interpreted to mean both assertion of expressi-

bility of Brahman and denial of in-expressibility of Brahman.

The next sutra (गोणश्चेन्नात्म शब्दात्) raises an objection over what is already stated and refutes that objection. The objection is that the shruti पुरिषाय पुरुषमीक्षते refers to the knowability of Jeeva who is tied with the three Gunas and not of Vishnu or Brahman. Hence Brahman is not knowable nor can he be on that account-expressible.

This objection is rejoined with the reply that in that shruti Atman is referred to (आत्मानं पश्येत्). So this Atma is stated to be knowable. This by implication states that Purusha and Brahman also are stated to be knowable. Some discrepancy of gender is explained away by Raghavendra. In the previous sutra अशब्दं referring to तत् is put in neuter gender. Here referring to Atma the word गोणः referring to the same referent is put in Masculine gender.

In spite of these references to Atma and others why should it not refer to Jeeva? The reply is given in the next sutra तन्निष्ठस्य मोक्षोपदेशात्. The one referred to by Atma is not Jeeva tied with Gunas. For one devoted to Him is declared to enjoy Moksha or Final Release. And it is absurd to state that by knowing one having Gunas, it is possible to get release from Gunas. Hence in the sutra instead of Jeeva a significant word Gauna is used (one having gunas).

Now Gauna is not of that type हेयत्वावचनात्. The shruti तमैवेकं जानन्न आत्मानं अन्यावाचो विमुच्यते (only know Atma alone; give up the other talk) does not condemn the referent of Atma. On the other hand it is talked as not condemnable; while the other is talked as condemnable.

Raghavendra refers to difference of statement between Sudha and Sanyaya-Ratnavali and Tattvapradeepa. For Gauna is said to be shabala Brahma affected by Maya. Accordingly all these three sutras are elucidated in Sudha. But in Sanyaya Ratnavali and Tattva Pradeepa the first sutra states that not only Gauna is not knowable on account of the word Atma being used in the context; but also for reasons given in the other two sutras. So the other two sutras are elucidated differently.

Now even Nirguna is said to be expressible स्वाप्यायात्. Here Nirguna is mentioned and it should be read with 'it is not inexpressible'. There is another shruti—"The original goes out into the incarnate (at the time of creation) and then gets himself absorbed in the original." So Nirguna Brahma is not inexpressible but expressible. Thus the topic may be dealt with out-side. Why the one mentioned in the shruti should be Nirguna? On this doubt being raised it is replied-स्वाप्यायात् in Himself is absorbed. Therefore 'for the reason of himself being absorbed (destroyed)' is not the way of interpretation.

But in other branches of shastras another god like Rudra might have been mentioned as the source of creation of the world. There is no scope for such doubts. For गतिसामान्यात्. This should be read with तत्तु and शास्त्रयोनि. Because (गतेः) all knowledge derived from all shastras being uniform (thus it is stated in shruti and reason also upholds it); therefore Vishnu alone is accepted as the only source of creation as mentioned in all shastras. Thus let it not be doubted that in other parts others are mentioned as the source.

This sutra may be interpreted differently also. It means 'For the reason of uniformity of import (of shastra).

On the strength of the branch whose import was determined by the sutrakara (as an instance) it is inferred that the other branch has the same import, because it is the branch (of the uniform veda). But in chandrika another doubt is entertained. All these reasons, as the use of the word Atma, mention of Moksha, Non-mention of condemnable and absorption in the self-may be found associated with self bound with gunas in different branches. With this introduction it is asserted that 'the import is of uniform type in all branches'.

Again Nirguna is stated as being expressible. श्रुतत्वाच्च निर्गुणं and तत्त्वं अशब्दं should be read with this sutra. In the shruti केवलो निर्गुणश्च the one without gunas is mentioned. Therefore Nirguna is not inexpressible. If this mention in shruti is understood as secondary and not primary in meaning then it is already stated that it leads to Infinite Regression.

Prakasha:

Chandrika begins in a right royal fashion upholding the dignity of the Brahmasutras. Other commentators, have shown irrelevance as between Adhikarana, and Adhikarana, But Shidhanta is an advocate of strict relevancy as obtained between Adhikarana and Adhikarana. Hence chandrika presents the thought development of the first five Adhikaranas to prove the relatedness of each Adhikarana with its past and future Adhikarnas. Raghavendra in his own manner has already presented the chain of thought of the Panchadhikaranas. But here we find a new thought process as obtained in the development of the five Adhikaranas.- "In the first sutra the definition of Brahmana has been suggested by the वेद word, to be 'abundance of perfections which distinguishes

Brahma from Jeeva, In the second sutra, in order to prove his abundance of perfections and to disprove Jeeva to be the meaning of Brahma, Brahman which is to be investigated is defined as the source of all dispensations of the world. In the third these two definitions are shown, not to apply to any other than Vishnu by calling forth the evidence of shastra. In the fourth, shastra is denied to have any other import in order to prove the applicability of these two definitions only to Vishnu or Brahma; and the import of all the shastras through the primary mode of connotation is shown to be Vishnu, in order to prove his abundance of perfections through the process of learned derivation of all words, pointing out the characteristic attribute of each word. In the present sutra expressibility in word of Brahma, and his being the import of all shastras as shown by स्म are questioned and replied. Hence there is sequential connection with the previous sutra. Or for this very reason it is said that there is objectionary connection.

If these two are the topics of the sutra, it is further objected that there is diversity of topics which is considered as defect of integrated composition. But really speaking these two topics are the meanings of one word स्म which are now justified. Hence there is unity of topic and no diversion is indulged in. If this explanation is not accepted, the whole Adhikarana suffers from diversification of the topic. For the sutra गतिस्मादस्यात् would mean, when different meaning is feared in some other branch (vedas being innumerable) that there is no opposition from such a branch, as uniformity of meaning is ascertained both by shruti and inference. While other sutras of this Adhikarana are engaged in establishing the expressibility of Brahman. Thus there is clear

diversion of topic, which creates a division of topics in the Adhikarana.

But in Sidhanta this defect of diversity of topics is proved to be false and uniformity of topic is established, as regards this Adhikarana is concerned. The ultimate purpose of this Adhikarana is to prove expressibleness in word of Brahman. All other topics are merely ancillary to it. The topic of gauna Atma is introduced only to prove the knowableness of Nirguna Atma, which is the cause of its expressibleness. In the same manner Gatisutra also, is introduced to prove indirectly expressibleness, by proving the application of the word Atma.

Finally in expressions like 'Sudha is inexpressible' That which is expressed by the word 'inexpressible' is no other than sudha. Hence sudha is expressible. If a particular word, has no direct primary meaning in any other context, it cannot imply secondary meaning (Lakshna). Hence sudha cannot be implied even as secondary meaning by any word.

If Advaitin pleads that by Nirguna he means 'that which is specified as having no attributes' and that the specified object is not shudha by its very nature. For it is specified as having no attributes. Then this very reason proves that shudha is expressed by 'that which has the absence of attributes'. This is dealt with in detail in Nyayamritam.

If this sane interpretation is not accepted, then expressibility in toto is rejected in shruti 'अशब्दं अस्पर्शं अरूपं'. Then that which is not expressed by the word Ganga is not characterised with the attribute of Gangatva. In the same manner that which is not expressed by the word 'inexpressibility' is characterised with the absence of the attribute

'inexpressibility' (Absence of inexpressibility is expressibility itself). If otherwise (expressed) there is expressibility, so in such contexts 'inexpressibility' means 'very difficult to express'. For Brahman is wonderful on account of his innumerable perfections.

Chandrikekara places before us the progressive development of thought as depicted in the sutras of this Adhikarana. In the first Sutra knowability (of Brahman) is stated as the direct cause of expressibility (of Brahman). In the second sutra (Gauna) expressibility is found in the qualified and hence is not found in Sudha. This Asidhi is explained away. In the third and fourth तन्निष्ठस्वमोक्षोपदेशात् हेयत्वावचनात्. The use of आत्मा removes the Asidhi or proves knowability in Sudha Atma. But the knowable Atma might be Gauna. This objection is explained in these Sutas. For knowable Atma secures Moksha and hence he should be Sudha. And he is said to be no inferior in nature. Hence he is Sudhatman.

But it might be objected that even Saguna Brahma also indirectly (through Nirguna) may bring about Moksha. Thus even statement of Moksha with reference to Atma may not prove Sudha Atma to be the cause of Moksha. Really speaking there is no scope for such objection. For the declaration that, Atma alone is to be known excludes the consideration of Gatmatma अहेयत्वात् and हेयत्वावचनात् have only changed the place of the negative particle. Positive is given preference to negative expression. Hence तन्निष्ठ ranks higher than हेयत्वावचनात्.

Raghavendra here ushers in, an outsider with an objection against the Sidhanti. In this Adhikarna, the topic of expressibility in word of Brahman is established. But the Sidhanti cannot prove expressibility of Brahman

without committing the fault of apostasy in this Adhikarna. For in III Adhyaya II Pada 37th Sutra (तथान्यत् प्रतिवेष्टात्) the shruti तदेव ब्रह्म त्वं विद्धि is cited and the aspirant at the time of meditation sees in his mind a certain image which is the object of his meditation. So the Pratibimba is the object of meditation and not the Bimba Brahma. Otherwise if the real Brahma is seen in the mental meditation how the real Brahma is Avyakta or indiscernible? Thus Brahma who is not fit to be meditated upon, in the context of enjoining of meditation the words expressing the object of meditation, must be considered as inexpressible. In the same manner in all the vedas that describe the creation etc. of the world that attributes of Brahman are mentioned for the purpose of meditative worship Sidhanti concedes this point in the sutra अध्ययनाय प्रयोजनं भावात् (III- III-15). Then innumerable words in the veda are found useful in the meditation of the aspirant; and not the original Brahma. Hence all the words refer to the image (Pratibimba) and not the original (Bimba), only in the secondary mode of implication and not the primary mode of connotation. Therefore Brahma is inexpressible in words and not expressible.

This objection of the opponent to the statement of expressibility of Brahman as proved by the sidhanti is considered too hollow by Raghavendra. For the Sidhanti concedes that original or Bimbabhuta Brahman is distinctly different from the image or Pratibimba who is consciously cognised in the course of meditation in the mind of the aspirant. He has also conceded that all vedic statements supply the attributes of Brahman for his meditation. Still he does not forego the creed that Brahman is expressible in all words. For Dhyana is defined as

'visualisation in mind of an image made of mental impressions'. Thus the image that is present before the mind's eye is only made up of mental stuff. This mental stuff is the product or samskara of direct experience through the senses. Brahman inaccessible to other sources is apprehended only through upanishads. All the vedic statements describe the attributes of Brahman in order to afford us the experience which will be duly transformed into mental impressions or Samskaras to shape into a form for meditation. These attributes cannot be described in any other but primary mode of connotation.

Now what is the meaning of all attributes being useful only for meditative worship? It is enjoined that one must study (Shravana) and understand (Manana) all Vedas and thus gather experience through the process of Shravana and Manana. This experience is transformed into Samskaras or mental impressions which form the stuff of mental images required for meditation. This is the meaning of attributes being useful for meditation. Thus the words expressive of attributes refer to Brahman who is thus expressible. No doubt the original Brahman is not directly worshipable; yet for the sake of his knowledge he must be expressible. For, knowledge is as indispensable as worship. गुणाः सर्वोपदेत्तव्या व्यातव्याश्चैव सर्वशः. At the time of meditation the knowledge that the original is present in the reflection or image is essentially required. This immanent Brahma in the Pratibimba who receives the worship and awards the reward.

All the statement enjoining upasana or worship fulfil their mission by offering a fit object for worship and their meaning collects itself into the aspirant's experience which, being transformed into mental stuff, shapes itself into a fit form and becomes visible in the meditation.

Shch meditation should be undertaken. Therefore Brahman is expressible; and he cannot be suspected at any stage to be inexpressible. Videkantakodhara for a detailed account of this subject.

Some other interpretation of this Adhikarana is critically reviewed and its shallow nature is mercilessly exposed. The exponent takes into consideration some Riks from Chandogya and Atharvana like सदेवसोम्येदमग्र आसीत्, तदक्षत बहुस्यांप्रजायेय.....यः सर्वज्ञः They declare that Brahman is (ईक्षित्, सर्वज्ञ जगदुपादान) the knower and all-knower and material cause of this world.

It is doubtful if this cause is sentient or insentient. Now Sankhyas think that if the sentient were the cause of this world it would be an all knowing and all powerful knower. For the sentient does not undergo any modification and all-knowing knower is the agent of the activity of all cognitions. But an insentient cause is capable of agency of knowing and of possession of power. So Sankhyas maintain that insentient Pradhana is the cause of the world. This very idea is corroborated by the above mentioned Shruties.

The present Sutra shows that Shruti declares the cause to be the knower (ईक्षित्); and hence it cannot be insentient. For this knowing is not figurative as in the case of an insentient thing. For this cause is said to be सद् and is also called आत्मा and hence knowing or ईक्षण is real and not formal. But in instances like ममआत्मा भद्रसेनः (My soul i. Bhadrasesa) self is formal Atma and one's own is real Atma. Self being formal ईक्षण or knowing also is formal. On the other hand here in तत्त्वमसिश्चेतकेतो Swetakatu is to be

re'leased and is called सत्. Thus addressed to a soul who is to be released "you are that" if identity with insentient being is declared, then such sastra will be invalid. Then Atma must be real and sentient.

Advaitin contends that in order to point out a very small star like Arundhati, a near by, big star is shown; so also in order to cognise the subtlest Brahman, the grossest near by, Pradhana, the insentient primordial cause of the world which is used here by the word सत्, is signified by the word Atman. But this analogy leads us to a trecherous ground. For just as we come to know later on, that the big star is not the star Arundhati, we shall know that this प्रधान or सत् (Prakriti) is not Atma. Then we shall have to use deprecatory words with reference to Atma. But actually no such words are used in Shruti.

But in the shruti, Atma is said to merge into itself; this is possible only when Atma is insentient Prakriti and thus सत् means this primordial Prakriti. This is not reasonable. For Laya or merging in something means, 'being reduced to that nature'. Hence Jeeva or sentient self cannot be reduced to the nature of insentient Prakriti when the self merges into it. So the support for merging of all the Jeevas cannot but be Brahma Chetana. Hence Brahman alone can be the cause of creation of the world. In the whole of the vedanta shashtra a sentient being is recognised uniformly as the cause of the dispensations of the world. It need not be objected that mere knowing (ईक्षण) cannot be interpreted as (ईक्षितृ) knower. For even though mere fire cannot burn, yet fire in contact with an iron ball burns. So also consciousness covered with nescience may act as knower or agent of knowing. Therefore as against Sankhya's insentient Prakriti, Advaitin

contends that Chetana or sentient self is the cause of creation and others.

The interpretation of the sutra yielding this meaning shall be proved to be forced and unwarranted afterwards. Now the theory of the Advaitin involved in this interpretation of the sutra is scrutinised and lack of coherency and consistency is exposed.

In the shruti ब्रह्मणो the Chetana is only the material cause and not the changable cause. For the cause is said to be immutable. Hence the chetana is only the Achisthana or Locus of the illusion of the world. Now the question is whether the qualified chetana is the mutable cause of the world according to this Shruti and its interpretation according to you ; Or are you going to prove that the qualified is the agent cause of the creation ? Or the third alternative is that unqualified or pure chetana is merely the locus of the illusion.

The first two alternatives do not hold good. For the qualified being unreal you cannot attribute to it such attributes as सत् and अद्वितीय. These attributes cannot be empirical ; For at the time of dissolution all except the real have been dissolved. No empirical can raise its head. Otherwise the real cannot be one without the second. Again you cannot have anything unreal at that time ; because in the previous Sutra Samanvaya has been announced in pure and Akhanda Brahman ; and hence here in the Shruti and in this Adhikarana also the pure is concerned and not the qualified. In the second alternative too there is discrepancy to be found. For the objector had proved that Prakriti was the changeable cause of this world. A consistent reply to the objector is not given. For when he has proved that Pradhana is the mutable cause the sidhanti's assertion that

Brahma is the cause does not disprove what the objector has proved. Hence the third alternative too goes the wrong way. For lack of concomitance of sadhya and hetu cannot be avoided. If he has asserted that Pradhana is the mutable cause the counter assertion should be that Brahma is the mutable cause ; and not that Brahman is the locus of world illusion.

Thus exposing the weak points in other's interpretations Chandrikakara shows the strong points in the interpretation of the Shichanti. In his interpretation- "Anandamaya is that Brahman" 'That' is asserted to supply the Predicate (विधेय) and it is to be construed here as the subject-That is not inexpressible on account of its knowability. Thus there is concomitance of both Hetu and Sadhya. But look to Advaiti's interpretation- "The Ashabda Pradhana is not the cause ; for the cause is said to be the knower". Here the Hetu is not used with its proper case, either ablative or instrumental. For Pradhan is not said to be the cause because it is 'Ashabda' (not propounded in Veda). अशब्दम् in the nominative case cannot stand as the reason of the inference. At the most it can stand as Sadhya. But the Advaitin did not accept it as Sadhya ; in its place 'Karana' is accepted as understood and with the change of its case was supposed to be repeated and was found to be stuck in the logical fallacy of lack of concomitance of Hetu and Sadhya.

There is much meandering in this interpretational discussion, and chandrikakara conclusively proves that Advaitin's interpretation is unwarranted by the text of the Sūtras, being inconsistent with the thought-link of the Adhikarana ; and directs us to expose the defects in the other sūtras, guided by sūtra.

But Raghavendra comes to our help and shows himself the flaws in the interpretation of the other sutras. He affirms that the real meaning of the sutras has already been supplied. He begins to expose the defects of the Advaiti's interpretation of the Sutra तन्निष्ठस्य मोक्षोपदेशात्. The expressible Atma was supposed by him to be Gauna or overpowered by Gunas. When that was questioned the fair and logical reply of the next sutra should have been that there is no inconsistency and positive contradiction of other evidences to this supposition. But the next sutra is हेयत्वावचनात् and is not consistent with his supposition. For the sankhya does not suppose that one should be initiated into the principle of Pradhana for the realisation of Advaita.

Besides 'derogatory term' too is unfit to be used even in the context of Pradhana just as Atma is used even in the case of Annamaya and others (in the Sutra आनन्दमयोभ्यासात्) though they are different from Brahma. But the analogy quoted is not suitable. For in आनन्दमयोभ्यासात् Anandamaya is the real Atma residing inner most in the Vijnana Kosha which is inside Manomaya. Manomaya again is inside Pranamaya which again is inside Annamaya. To Annamaya, Pranamaya is Atma ; To Pranamaya Manomaya is Atma; to Manomaya Vijnanamaya is Atma and to Vijnanamaya Anandamaya is Atma. The Former is shown as Atma, (though it is not so) only to remind you that the inner covering is Atma with reference to the outward shell. Here in the case of Pradhana there is no context like that.

But even in this context 'there is the manifestation into many forms' (बहुस्यांप्रजायेयेति) which may serve the purpose

of the four shells stated above. Hence the instance quoted is not unsuitable.

Again in the fifth sutra (स्वाप्ययात्) the merging of Jeeva in Brahma is instanced as reason, for Atma being not gauna but mukhya. So sidhanti questions Advaitin how he argues that the merging of soul in Atma proves to be Mukhya Atma. For let him make clear if by merging he means, mere contact of the soul with Brahman or identity of the two. Mere contact is possible even in the case of Pradhana. And identity is impossible even in the case of Brahman.

Thus Raghavendra goes on laying bare the defects in the interpretation of this Adhikarana by Sahankara. Already Ramanuja's interpretation also was critically reviewed. Thus by a comparison of these two interpretations with that of Madhva we are convinced of the superiority, sobriety, and simplicity of the latter's interpretation over that of the former.

Pradharam requires an adjective in neuter gender to qualify it and not one in masculine gender as in the present sutra (तत्तत्) And according to Bhashya and in the direction shown before, Atma mainly means Vishnu and does not mean Shiva when the sense is conveyed through full connotation.

Some others still contend that Sat might not mean an insentient thing; but it may easily mean the soul or jeeva. For knowing and the use of the word Atma are justified with reference to Jeeva. But the Sutra तन्नित्यं precludes the possibility of Jeeva being सत् for, one devoted to jeeva cannot get Moksha.

But this doubt itself is not sound. For बहुस्यां प्रजायैवेति at the very beginning manifesting in many forms is mentioned which is not found compatible in Jeeva. Besides the Sankhya has not accepted Jeeva as the cause of creation.

ANANDAMAYADHI KARANA

“आनन्दमयोभ्यासात्”

Sutra :

The one expressed by the word Anandamaya is Vishnu only and not Prakriti (the primordial entity). For in every context Anandamaya and others are repeatedly mentioned as associated with Brahama in Veda.

Bhashya :

The Same Samanvaya (the method of deriving the meaning of Hari from all words of all Shastras through the primary mode of interpretation, well applying the canons of interpretation like upakrama and umsamhara) that has been enunciated (in तत्तुसमन्वयात्) before, is expatiated upon (with reasons and instances) mostly by the whole of the Adhyaya beginning from the Sutra, आनन्दमयोभ्यासात्.

Mostly in this Pada Samanvaya of words, commonly understood to be conveying other sense, is shown in the great Lord No other arrangement

with regard to Padas can be shown as it is not borne out by the text.

It was stated that enquiry should be instituted in Brahma This is known to be (the foot)the limb of Anandamaya in ब्रह्मपुच्छप्रतिष्ठा. Hence leaving aside the whole, a mere part is not fit to be known. When thus objected it is stated that आनन्दमयोभ्यासात्.

Now(a doubt arises)whether this Anandamaya is (four faced) Brahma and others or the principle of primordial entity (Prakriti) or Vishnu. Because the word Brahma conveys the sense of Hiranyagarbha. He is also said to be शतानन्द (One having hundred fold bliss) Rudra also is a relevant meaning because Anandamaya is said to abide in Surya (यश्चसावादित्ये); and Rudra is said to have eight bodies (of which the sun is one). Thus Anandamaya is said to refer to others also.

On the other hand Anandamaya might be Chit Prakriti (a sentient principle presiding over Primordial entity). For she is called Brahma. ममयोनिःमहत्ब्रह्मा Mahat expressed by the word Brahma is my womb (in which I deposit the germ) and Prakriti (the insentient and primordial) assumes many forms.

Even embodied souls also are Anandamaya ; for they are called Brahma which means Jeevas as per Kosha (बृहजाति जीवकमलासन). They are also अन्नादिमय

They preside over bodies that are the products of अन्न (food and other things).

Still (all these presumptions are baseless). They are not referred to by the word Anandamaya. Only Vishnu is meant thereby.

“Brahma which is closely associated with Anandamaya is Vishnu Only. For by the convention of the learned, He alone is Brahma.”

“This alone is called Brahma”

The word Brahma is primarily used in the sense of Vishnu ; for He is perfect and not in any other sense. Because others are imperfect, they are referred to by the word Brahma formally and not primarily ”.

“The ascetic should meditate upon Brahma in the form of Vasudeva in his mind, repeating the Mulamantra as an alternative ”

From these and other Sources the word Brahma is known to be repeatedly used referring to Anandamaya

SUTRA : विकार शब्दान्नेति चेन्न प्राचुर्यात्

It should not be objected that as the termination मयद् meaning modification is used, Anandamaya is not Vishnu, for मयद् means प्राचुर्य or abundance which ultimately means ‘fully filled’ (and not modification)

BHASHYA :

The suffix मयद् (used in आनन्दमय and others) suits the context of प्रकृति and others better; for Prakriti and others undergo modification or pre-side over that Prakriti undergoing modification; but not the context of Paramatma. But this objection does not stand. For he is आनन्दमय because he is the modification of bliss. Though आनन्दमय is cited with अन्नमय yet it does not mean modification; For अन्नमय also means abundance of अन्न (and not its modification) This interpretation suits the Vedic derivation of अन्न as अद्यते अतिचमूतानि (Living beings are sustained by Him; and He consumes them). And अन्न of this kind (Sustenance and consumption) is abundantly found in Vishnu. Thus being eaten up is nothing but sustenance. In Taittareayaka also (सत्राणः), begins a new context (So long, body fed by material food was treated and Atma or soul different from the body is now treated).

In Shruti like येन ब्रह्मोपासते, अन्न is found associated with Brahma [in the same manner Prana, Mana, and Vijnana are found appositionally used with (Brahma); this proves conclusively that modification is not the meaning. In the same manner assumption of multifarious forms is found justified

as there is no contradiction of this Shruti by the shruti which states Brahma to be one (एकमेव)

Even when (आनंद and other things) are the essential nature of Brahman, this usage of abundance is found justified as in the examples of "the sun being abundantly refulgent" (refulgence is the essential nature of the sun.)

SUTRA :

तद्धेतुव्यपदेशाच्च

Reason is adduced for him (Anandamaya) being Vishnu.

BHASHYA :

The reason of being impellor to the world is cited in the Shruti "If the all refulgent (आकाश) were not perfectly or wholly blissful who else would prompt the world and who else would direct it in sacred and secular deeds?"

SUTRA :

मांत्रवर्णिकमेवचर्णीयते

Brahma that is prescribed in Mantra as (सत्यं ज्ञानं अमृतं) is sung (as Anandamaya). (So Anandamaya is Brahma).

BHASHYA:

"One who knows Brahman, realises that" great thus suggesting the Mantra defines the great

thus suggesting that the Mantra defines the great Brahma as "सत्यं ज्ञानं अनन्तं that Brahma is propounded in words, अक्षमय and others".

But its being a part of Brahma does not run counter to the theory of Vishnu being Ananda-maya. For in ChaturvedaShikha the Same Vishnu is stated to be ("He is the head, he is the right side, he is the left side. He is the middle portion of the body; He is the feet"), the part (of the whole).

Narayana is the head; the right hand, and also the left hand, are Pradhyumna and Aniruddha; the middle body is Vasudeva or (in this multi-bodied person) Narayana is the middle body, Vasudev is the head, and Sankarshana is said to be two feet. Thus the great Purusha is divided into five parts. The great Lord assumes the form of a part and of a whole in sportly spirit. In the unimaginable majesty and Sublime wealth of attributes, no in-compatibility of the part and whole should be conceived, in Janardana, no logic can assail this irrational entity, with its sharpest weapons. How can there be any stick to measure the immeasurable?" thus it is said in Brahat Samhita.

In expressions like (सदा एव अक्षरसमयः) the word रस as an adjective signifies "the essence of each

one of them" (the controller of each one of the Koshas, is the pure and untarnished sentient entity only, which is nothing but Brahma.

(But this leads to a logical mess from which we cannot extricate ourselves). For in तस्माद्वाएतस्मात् अन्नरसमयात् अन्योत्तर आत्मा प्राणमयः Pranamaya though one, is said to be different from Anandamaya. "But Vishnu of unlimited power and wealth is thus said to be different, though identical, and to be one though having many forms." Thus it is said in Brahmanda Purana.

You should not suppose that Annamaya and others are god four-faced Brahma and others, because of these words that indicate them. For

SUTRA : नेतरोऽनुपपत्तेः

Others (like four faced Brahma and others) are not meant (to be आनंदमय) For it is inconsistent, to say so; as they are not visualised to get Mukti)-

BHASHYA :

It is not consistent to think that one gets Mukti by the visual perception of others. (only the realisation of Brahman leads to Mukti and the realisation of Ananda and others conduces to Mukti hence Anandadi must be Brahman or Vishnu and not others.) "One who knows him only, becomes Amrita or Mukta. For Moksha there is no other path". It is said so.

SUTRA : भेदव्यपदेशाच्च

Difference or differentiating qualities are mentioned between four faced Brahma and Anandamaya. Therefore others are not Anandamaya).

BHASHYA:- "Four faced Brahma's Ananda or bliss is hundred times that of Prajapati or Rudra"

In the unknowable, devoid of qualities of the human soul, not fully describable, and not having any other support, (the eligible) is so established mediatively that he is fearless, then he has reached the fearless "He is in the (Lower) soul" Thus difference is shown. Vedic texts like अहं ब्रह्मास्मि. तत्त्वमसि (meaning identity) and others do not contradict this statement. "All vedic words enter into him [connotatively]" Bhallaveya Shruti]. For each word in the highest primary sense mean Vishnu (Even if they mean identity that identity is not incompatible with difference). For "this world though different is the Lord Himself. (Because) He is the source of Sustenance, destruction and birth"

"Though distinctly different from all, He is all" (Turashruta) (because He is the Lord of all). The (real) knowledge is that which comprehends difference (of Vishnu and Jeeva or Vice Versa).

"The four faced Brahma (alongwith the sages) apprehending difference, with high regard for Hari, and with disinterested work (enters, at the time of dissolution, into the great Purusha).

"When the Jeeva knows the Lord to be served by all and other (than himself) alongwith his prowess, then he is released from misery."

"Though called by the name of all He is all as it were; though immanent He is known as non-immanent; though found in the body He is known to be outside. Thus one alone is known in different forms."

"Because He is immanent in all, and is called by the name of all; therefore He is called by the pro-nouns: this, I, you, that, and others, and not because he is one in essence, with them

"Oh the leader of the Kurukula! (the wise) do not like the idea of only one soul" These and others.

But (in Shruti ब्रह्मैव सत् ब्रह्माप्नोति) Brahma means Jeeva only. For it is said (ब्रह्माणि जीवा सर्वेऽपि)

"Release of a soul" is not self contradictory; for bondage of a soul is due to ignorance

It is stated in Bhagvata-- "Mukti or release consists in getting rid of unnatural form and reverting to its natural form.

The respective inferences (proving the identity of the soul and God) do not contradict (the statement of difference)".

SUTRA: कामच्च नानुमातापेक्षा

(Inferences based in Shruties and proving identity are not available; and) unaided inferences are available at our beck and call (कामात्) and hence such dry inferences (to prove things beyond senses are not wanted.

BHASHYA :-

It is possible to infer as one desires. Therefore in respect of Reality independent inference is not desirable.

It is stated in Skanda,

"Because inference (disproving shruti and) independent operates at our desire, therefore it must be employed to reconcile (the beginning and end of) the Shruti, in conformity with Shruti; and (inference), otherwise, no where is desired."

"Inference should neither prove nor disprove Parabrahma" (Katha)

SUTRA:- अस्मिन्नस्य च तद्योगं शास्ति Thus it is

Because (Shruti) ordains, in the context of Anandamaya, Jeeva's contact with Anandamaya Therefore Anandamaya is Brahma).

BHASHYA: अस्य means "of Jeeva" It is a conjunction to join the reasons (adduced). "He enjoys the fulfilment of his desires in the company of omniscient Brahman (four faced).

"In one having no other support, he gets a place "

"This Jeeva after transmigration from the body, migrates to this Pramatman of perfect bliss." These and others.

BHAVADEEPA: From what Sutra the fist Adhyaya begins is the present question. Really speaking the Adhyaya begins with the present Sutra आनन्दमयोऽव्यासात् and this point is made clear in the Jijnasadhi-karana. Still Sudhakara thinks that the Adhyaya begins with तत्तु समन्वयात्. Now that the nature and function of Brahma are exhaustively treated, so far, to what is the remaining portion of Adhyaya devoted?

The question is pertinent and must be satisfactorily answered. The author admits that there is no new purpose to be served by the remaining part of the Adhyaya. Yet what has been assumed in तत्तु समन्वयात् the Sutrakara makes clear by examples and illustrations showing how it is corroborated by the canons of interpretations like upakarma and upasamhara.

Raghavendra states the process of demonstration of the principles enunciated. Through the etymological process of derivation the meaning of each word is settled and the sentence is shown related with its purport through a

process of applications of the canons of interpretation. He takes a particular sentence with the constituent words. Through the above mentioned process it purports to convey the particular meaning. This is the method of clarification or expounding the application of Semantic interpretation of a sentence.

Thus Samanvaya, or showing that each word or sentence refers to Vishnu by this process of interpretation is mostly the topic of this first Adhyaya. 'Mostly' because in two Adhikaranas topic of eligibility to study the Vedas is discussed in respect of Gods and Shudras.

Words whose references are now contemplated, are only Vedic or sacred and not secular.

Thus Samanvaya, or showing that each word or Sentence refers to 'Mostly' because in two Adhikaranas Topic of eligibility to study the Vedas is discussed in respect of Gods and shudras.

Words whose references are now contemplated are only Vedic or sacred and not secular. They are of four types-1) known to refer only to others (than Vishnu). 2) Known to refer to both (Vishnu and others). 3) Known to refer to others and 4) known to refer (only) to him.

The fourth type should be taken in its exclusive (only) reference; otherwise (if they refer to both Vishnu and others) they will be subsumed under उभयत्र प्रसिद्ध category. and there will be only three types and not four; of these four you need not explain the reference in the case of the fourth type. For those words which are not doubted to refer to others only are brought under this category.

As for the order in which these four types of reference are considered, the first type is the most difficult to make it intelligible and hence is treated in the fourth Pada. Besides one thing to be noted is that references of only words, letters and sound or accent are to be considered and not of sentences. Therefore words of third type are taken up first for consideration. Words of the second type (उभयत्र प्रसिद्ध) are denied the privilege of priority over the first type for the reason that already the words are established in the sense of Vishnu. So we need not run after explanation of its reference to Vishnu.

All words are again of two types : 1) words of the nature of names 2 and words of the nature of attributes. Of these two types, Names are words referring to things having attributes and the others are attributes themselves. Names are conventional while attributes are derivative. And the names directly denote other things while attributes indirectly through connotation denote other things. Hence, words of the nature of Names must be first shown to refer to Vishnu (Samanvaya) and they deserve priority. In order to have complete samanvaya their reference to others must be made null and void. In order to put the saddle on the right horse all attributes must be shown to refer to Brahman. For, through reference of an attribute of a substantive, to Vishnu, the name of the substantive would be firmly established in Vishnu. This also shows that attributes are derivative, names are conventional and attribute-cum-names are derivative cum-conventional.

Raghavendra supplies us with precise definitions of words even when they are used by other schools. In some context they use the phrase स्पष्टलिङ्गानां (clear attributive

marks). Raghavendra makes clear what स्पष्टत्व or exactness means when attributed to marks according to them. स्पष्टत्वंनास वाक्यांतरे ब्रह्मधर्मतया निर्णीतत्वं वा जीवादी स्वारस्येन अनुपपद्यमानत्वं वा Exactness (of Brahman) is its unambiguous use as an attribute of Brahman in some other context; or its nature of not chiming with other things (than Brahman) like soul or Jeeva.

Raghavendra also defines समन्वय शपकमाद्यन्यतमप्रमाणक शक्ति तात्पर्याभ्यां अभिव्रान Most primary connotation of meaning on the strength of the connotative power of the word or the import of a sentence as corroborated by one of the Tatparya-lingas like uppakrama and others one of the Tatparya Lingas itself as evidence which conduces to connotation of that kind.

Now आनंदमय is said to be a name according to Anubhashya. But according to Taitva Pradeep this is said to be an attribute. This word is inclusive of अन्नमय, प्राणमय मनोमय and विज्ञानमय. This Anandanmaya is found used referring to others for three reasons. 1) On account of the Shruti अन्नमय प्राणमया मनोमय विज्ञानमय आनंदमय से श्रुयताम् where आनंदमय refers to some insentient thing 2) आनंदमय is associated with Brahman which is used to refer to Jeeva by convention without being contradicted Or still it is suffixed with मयद् which means change or multability.

Investigation of Brahman advocated formerly is unreasonable. For Brahman to be investigated is heard (in Shruti) to be a part or a limb of some other substance. And without the whole, a limb of it only cannot be profitably investigated. So this Adhikarana is related to the

previous Adhikarana as an objection, raised against it, and replied.

Now आनन्दमय and others are declared to be properties of Brahma. And these are considered to be very auspicious qualities of Vishnu. Hence Samanvaya of these qualities in Brahma is first attempted. Again this is worshipped as one who would bestow Ananda on the devotees. Hence this purnananda generally coveted by all is first chosen for samanvaya. This is another connecting link.

Here Raghavendra quotes from Taittiriya Bhashya a verse which explains the evolution of this panchakosha. उत्तरैः पूरिताः पूर्वनिश्छिद्रत्वेन सर्वशः सर्वेषु पुरुषाकाराः तत्रात्पूर्वसम्भवः There is Anandamyakosha having the form of the body of man in which is encased the Jeeva. This is all material. In this material Kosha and in Jeeva there is blissful or आनन्दमय Narayana of pure bliss. This is Brahman. Outside this and covering this closely there is the Kosha विज्ञानमय which is material & which encases the self or Jeeva. In this case there is essentially pure Vasudeva presiding over pure vijñana out of Narayana comes Vasudeva who is also equally pure and blissful. In the same manner closely covering Vijnanamaya comes out Manomaya, the Shankarshna principle; thought-abundant and immanent in the Kosha and Jeeva of that name. Manomaya expels pranamaya, Pradyumna which covers Manomaya. Last comes the Anandamaya body of the Jeeva in which pure Annamaya Aniruddha resides. अन्नमय प्राणमय मनोमय विज्ञानमय and आनन्दमय are the five Koshas. The former kashas are filled with latter Koshas and evolution

is from subtle to the gross And the latter covers the former closely. All these Koshas possess the human shape. And the former emanates from the latter. Thus Anandamaya is the source of evolution as Vijnanamaya emanates from Anandamaya.

The following paragraph summarises the whole of the intricate situation thus- "The five koshas in which the embodied self is manifested have their own constituent parts. In each of these koshas is present a corresponding form of Brahman, which is likewise designated by its name but in the specialised sense of the terms (as explained above). The koshas are only modifications of food and energy and so on. But the forms of the supreme present in them (for purposes of their origination, Sustenance, Control etc) are of the purest essence of spirit without any touch of material defilement. Thus Pranamaya possesses abundant spiritual energy. Manomaya abounds in spiritual thought essence and so on. The hands and feet, head and limbs of the immanent forms of Brahman are similarly of pure spiritual essence in each case. Though invisible they are referred to by the demonstrative pronoun 'this' or 'that' in virtue of their inner proximity to the limbs of the physical body of man." (Brahma Sutras and their Commentaries).

Now Brahman is to be meditated upon, with his limbs. And the different limbs are mentioned to show that there is no difference between parts and the whole in respect of Brahman or still, to achieve gradual realisation of Brahman each limb or part is fixed upon in meditation, in succession beginning from feet and ending with the topmost limb. Thus the Pucha of Brahman becomes fit for investigation.

There is doubt as regards Anandamya being Brahman. For the word Brahman associated with Anandamaya is used in the sense of god Brahman or Prakriti or Vishnu. Purva Pakshakara asserts that Brahman is used in one of these senses and not Vishnu.

But Shidhantin reasserts that inspite of these references, Anandamaya is used to connote Vishnu only. For in Shruti like स्ति ब्रह्मति Brahma is stated in the context of the fact that there is Mukti only for those who know the existence of Brahman and there is infernal darkness for those who know the non-existence of Brahman. Hence in the context of Andamaya there is twice the repetition of Brahman associated with Anandamaya.

In Bhashya विकारशब्दाच्चेति चेन्न प्राचुर्यत् आनन्दमय has been turned into प्रचुरानन्दः and it means that he is blissful untainted with misery. But in shruti and Sutra आनन्द प्रचुर is the order of words in the compound. Hence it gives scope to the idea of something different from bliss or joy in Brahma. For in both these cases (आनन्द प्रचुर and प्रचुरानन्द) there is no scope for the idea of something different from bliss. Just as we talk of the sun as full of light when we compare him with the twinkling stars, so also Brahman is full of bliss when we compare him with human souls, those small puddles of joy. If doubt of misery is to arise here then in the case of the sun also a doubt of darkness would creep.

In respect of अन्नमय also Mayat means abundance. (अद्यते अतिव भूतानि) The living beings depend upon, and

are being consumed by Vishnu. But this is derived meaning and conventional meaning is preferred to derived meaning. Hence by conventional mode अन्न means ordinary food.

This objection is explained in the Sutra क्वपनात् and the convention of the ignorant cannot claim any preference over the derivation of the learned.

In the case of Pranamaya Manomaya and Vijanamaya, mayat means abundance. Full of energy, full of intelligence, full of understanding-so Vishnu is Mahapranu, Mahabodha and Maha Vijnana.

With regard to अभ्यासात् in the Sutra a clarification is needed. Abhyasa mainly means 'Repetition of one and the something' (एक विषय असकृदुक्तिः). There is no such repetition of Brahma in the shruti. But in all the five Prakaranas together is the expression of Brahm once with each of the Anadamaya and others. Thus only with Anandamaya and Vijnanamaya, Brahma is repeated.

Really speaking real Abhyasa of Brahma is to be found in the context of Vijnanamaya (विज्ञानं ब्रह्मचेदद) Now Annamaya and Anna are one and same. Hence येन ब्रह्मोपासते अन्नं ब्रह्मोतिव्यजानात् twice in every context Brahma is repeated, even in the context of Annamaya and others, real Abhyasa of Brahma is to be found.

Of the five, Anandamaya has been chosen and mentioned in the Sutra (1). Because Anandamaya is said to be the feet of Brahma. But Anandamaya with its exuberance of joy unmistakably indicates its completeness of Brahma.

Hence the preference to Anandamaya or 2) Ananda; and others are qualities and Anand is an auspicious quality. Hence priority is accorded to it. 3) or in order to supply ecstatic delight (of Braham) as the cause of cosmic creation, when objected that a fully complacent Brahma need not engage himself in such an immense work as creation of the world. An intoxicated drunkard engages himself in dancing and singing in rapturous ecstasies. 4) or to explain unknowableness or inconceivableness of Brahma as unlimited, abundance of joy and not in all respects.

Raghavendra explains what Vishesha is. (विशिष्यते अयंगुणः अयंगुणीत्यादिरूपेण वस्तु येन सः विशेषः) an essential intrinsic power of a thing which distinguishes one as attribute and another as substance with attribute. It is said even in homogenous thing there is this Vishesha by Virtue of which a distinction is created for practical purposes. In the integrated indivisible being of Para Brahman or Vishnu, His attributes activities and others which are completely identical with his essential nature, are yet distinctly talked off as his attributes and activities, as if they are different from Him. It is because of the inherent and intrinsic power called Vishesha in Him.

तद्वेतुव्यपदेशात्

How Ananda prompts Brahma to activity is further analysed and traced to the deeper and original cause. It was stated that activity like dancing and singing were due to pleasure and crying and weeping due to pain. Psychologically any four-attachment and hatred, pain

and pleasure- are recognised as the fundamental impetus to activity. But the first three are admitted to be conspicuously absent in Vishnu. In Chandogya (सुखं लब्ध्वा करोति) it is stated that it is His essential pleasure or His full measure of delight which impels Him to activity.

मात्रवर्णिकमेवच गीयते

The previous Sutra adduced reason only for Anandamaya to be Brahma. But this Sutra proves like the first Sutra all the five to be Brahma. Now reasons are adduced. Annamaya and Pramamaya are Brahma because they are said to be Satya on account of their creation. By their intelligence and understanding they are said to be Jnana-unlimitedness was expressed by Anandamaya.

The च or 'and' in the Sutra conjoins two arguments for Anandamaya to be Brahma. He is Brahma not only because there is the repetition of Brahma: but also there is the hymnal song to that effect.

The concept of parts and whole in respect of Brahman is tackled. In Bhashya, shruti is quoted to prove the integrity of the whole and the indivisibility into parts. And Smriti is quoted to reconcile the contradictions on the strength of Vishnu's inherent capacity to make possible the most impossible.

The four emanating forms or Vyuhās from the original Narayana have been adjusted with Anandamaya and others. There is the kosha called Anandamaya and Narayana is its-presiding deity and the original of the four emanations is Narayana and this Narayana is the limb of that Narayana (it is the nature of Hari to enjoy this play of being whole and part.) Thus he is there in the other four Koshas.

These five are further super qualified as अक्षरसमयः which means साराक्षयः. There is abundance of best Anand

and not ordinary or material Anna. In the same manner Brahma is the abundance of the best of energy. प्राणरसमयः मनोरसमयः, दिज्ञातरसमयः and आनन्दरसमयः.) Thus Anna is Consumer of all beings and Prana is impellor of all beings.

Here an objection is raised. In कामाच्चनानूमानापेक्षा there is no evidence of pratyaksha warranting us identity of Brahma and Jeeva. And Shruties propounding identity, like तत्त्वमसि would be explained in the Sutra तद्गुणसारत्वात् तदव्यपदेशः प्राज्ञवत्. Therefore it is right that here inferences alone are disproved. Therefor it is futile that Advaita shruties are cited to oppose the shidhanti and then they are disproved.

Now this objection is repudiated thus : In Tadguna-sutra the Advaita shruties are explained as merely propounding similarity. But by the principle of derivative connotation every word is made to convey Vishnu on account of the possession of the characteristic property in unlimited quantity. This is shown by Bhashya and in the same manner identity is explained here on the virtue of liberty. Expression of identity between two things is not merely due to self-sameness of the e two things but it may be also due to liberty, special qualification, sameness of place and opinion, similarity. Here the sutrakara takes into account the reply implied by the sutra तद्गुणसारत्वात् and rebuts it and raises this doubt in order to show that there is no shruti at the basis of the Advitin's inference.

Raghavendra supplies us useful hints to elucidate Bhashya and Teeka and the context of the quotations therein. To give on instance we may quote भेददृष्ट्याभिमानेन निसंगेनापिकर्मणा । (भाष्य). He tells us that it is quoted

from III skanda of Bhagavata. Then he quotes the lines that go before अद्यः स्थिरचराणां वेदगर्भः सहस्रिभिः । योगेश्वरैः कुमारैः सिद्धैः योगप्रवर्तकैः Then he quotes also lines that follow the quotation: कतृत्वात् सगुणब्रह्मपुरुषं पुरुषर्षभ । स संगत्य पुनः काले काले नैश्वरमूर्तिना जातेऽगुणधृतिकरे यथापूर्वं प्रजायते ।

Raghavendra shows the grammatical order of words in a sentence where it is not clear. For instance, Brahma is said to be full of attributes (ब्रह्म सगुण) For सगुण is explained as 'full of attributes' (गुणपूर्ण) and Brahma is shown to be substantive the subject and Saguna to be the adjective (predicate).

But Raghavendra here also reconciles some discrepancy between this explanation and that of the commentary of karminiraya. For there, in it, is stated that "He is not merely one with attributes (सगुण) but he is also Brahma (ब्रह्म) 'full of'". Purusha is said to be the name of Vishnu. But he is called पुरुषर्षभ to remove the idea that he is an ordinary man like us. This sense is shown by 'Because he is the source (of creation) he is full of attributes.'

Now संगत्य takes an object in the accusative case. And following sudha and Tattva Pradeep he construes as 'He at the time of dissolution joins Brahma (Vishnu) and again at the time of creation by kala, a form of god, the three gunas are disturbed and as before he is born with the memory of distinctions and differences due to knowledge. His birth is special; for he is released and is manifested in his own essential bliss and other things. There he is not stated to attain (प्राप्तः) Still

this discrepancy should not be taken seriously. For it is adopted because it is the ultimate meaning and considered to be useful.

After explaining the expression Advaita on the principle of immanence, Bhashya kara explains it again on the principle of "one chief or extraordinary entity". The quotation is from Mahabharata, Mokshadharma, where Vaishampayana answers a question of Janamejaya. "The wise do not like to posit only one soul. There are many souls of which one is said to be the source of all. Hence He is the supreme head of all. Because there is one of supreme and special type, therefore he is said to be one though there are many. Just as if there were only one great Brahmin it is said that there is one Brahmin though really there are many.

Really speaking Vishnu is different from these empirical souls and prompts them all to activity. But through arrogance the soul arrogates to itself all power of impelling body, senses and Budhi and calls himself conductor of these. Hence all this talk of oneness or identity of man is through his vanity and his vainglory.

Eschatology affords another proof, a decisive evidence proving difference between soul and supreme Vishnu. There is the general difference prevailing in the attainment of released state. For there is something attained, and there is some one who attains it. But all that is attained is nothing new; the natural state of Brahma bhava is only made manifest. That bliss, and consciousness innate with the soul is said to attain equality with Him. In the same manner the soul may attain oneness with Brahma.

But there is also something new that the released soul gets. The joy he gets while playing with women of

his essence is something new. Ananda no doubt is the very stuff of the soul; it is nothing new no doubt yet Vishnu plays a positive part in giving the soul the joy of release. For it is the will of Vishnu that is the thickest screen to conceal the essential nature of the soul to it self. While nescience is only a nominal veil. Therefore when nescience withdraws itself not the whole of essential bliss is exposed. Only when Vishnu withdraws his will to cover, then the essential effulgence of bliss and conscience shines in full blaze. Hence Vishnu is said to be the giver of bliss. The talk of boiling up and boiling down of joy is justified. Hence there is something new to be attained and hence reign of difference continues undisputed even in the state of release.

Tantradeepika;

In this Adhikarana words of the nature of names are made to refer to Vishnu through primary connotation. These words mean substantives with attributes (गुणी) generally and also mere attributes. तत्तु (That only is) should be added to every Adhikarana generally till the end of this Adhyaya, as it will supply Sadhya

Brahma or Vishnu. So the whole Adhikarna comes to mean that नेतरीये अन्ता आनन्दमयादया पंच तत्तु तदेवब्रह्मैव Anandamaya and others stated in Taittareya, in all five are Brahman only. For they connote Brahma through primary mode. Thus you must construe each Adhikarana.

तद्वेतुव्यपदेशात् If Anandamaya were not Brahma and मयद् does not mean abundance then there would be no cause for Vishnu (named Akasha) to be completely blissful.

In नेतरीनुपपत्तेः Raghavendra offers a grammatical justification for the use of ablative after अनुपपत्ति. The

rule is विभाषागुणे स्त्रियाम् in non-feminine gender, when some Guna or property is the reason, the ablative is used optionally. But अनुपपत्ति is feminine gender-how to explain Ablative after it. Here योगविभाग is adopted. (योगः विभज्यते) The principle of deletion is adopted. So अस्त्रियाम् is deleted and विभाषागुणे alone remains, Thus even in Feminine gender when some property is the reason ablative is used. Thus अनुपपत्तेः is found to be grammatically correct in its use of Ablative.

Tattvamanjari.

This Pada is entirely devoted to work out Samanvaya of words that are known to refer to other things than Vishnu. These words are names in nature.

It was enjoined in the first Adhikarana that Vishnu alone should be enquired into. Now this Brahma is declared to be the Pucha of some Anandamaya (ब्रह्मपुच्छ प्रतिष्ठा); And Anandamaya on the strength of the termination मयट् is inferred to be the mutable and hence different from immutable Brahman. Besides the investigation of a part without reference to the whole is not justified.

As a rejoinder to this objection the sutrakara asserts:-

आनन्दमयोभ्यासात् It was already stated that Vishnu was to be enquired. Now again it is stated that Vishnu alone is expressed. Even when the word Vishnu could be imported from the previous statement yet it is newly expressed for one strong reason. The word 'alone' is construed with समन्वयात्. Thus the phrase being broken

is not in fact to be imported. Hence Vishnu is freshly repeated instead of old importation.

The other reason is that the first five Adhikaranas constitute a group outside the Adhyaya and Pada. Adhyaya and Pada begins from Anandamaya. Therefore विशुद्धेव in the outside group has not been imported into the inside of the Adhyaya and Pada. It is again freshly repeated here. Anandamaya is one of perfect bliss and that is Vishnu alone and so he is jijnasya; and one undergoing modification like Prakriti cannot be called Anandamaya. This Vishnu is one or alone because He is one with each one of his limbs. His integrated being does not allow any internal divisions; still due to his essential wealth of powers, even his limbs are referred to as different from his body for practical purposes.

This Anandamaya is paraphrased as पूर्णानन्द; but according to its original name it ought to have been आनन्दपूर्ण. But this reversion of order has some purpose to serve. In आनन्दपूर्ण पूर्णत्वं or abundance is (विशेष्य) a substantive when there is scope, even a little, for the converse of Ananda. Just as in ब्राह्मणप्रचुर ग्राम there is scope even for a small number of shudras; so also in आनन्दपूर्ण there is also a touch of sorrow. But in पूर्णानन्द where पूर्ण or abundance is an adjective there need be no touch of its converse sorrow.

The real Explanation is like this: Whether प्रचुर or abundance is an adjective or substantive there need be no scope for the supposition of the converse of Ananda. For when we say प्रकाश प्रचुरोदधि: we mean only that the Sun is more full of light or effulgence than a star and not that he has a touch of darkness the converse of light in him. So Vishnu

is Anandamaya or more full of bliss than a human soul which is only thinly filled with bliss. Samanvaya of seven names is worked out in seven Adhikaranas of the first Pada of the first Adhyaya. But these represent seven types of name having reference to other things than Vishnu. The method used in applying these words to Vishnu, when extended to other words will easily bring all vedic words under operation of samanvaya and make them refer to Vishnu through the connotation of the characteristic quality of a word, thus ultimately proving that Vishnu is the abode of innumerable qualities or perfections.

Even अन्नमय, प्राणमय, मनोमय and विज्ञानमय mean full of those things and not the modifications of those things. Hence there need be no disparity of construction and Signification in these five expressions, which all without exception refer to Vishnu for their abundance. For instance अन्नमय through Vaidica derivations, means either a great agent of consumption or a great object of consumption (महाभोक्ता or महाभोग्य which is Vishnu). In the same manner प्राणमय means महाप्राण. मनोमय means महामना: and विज्ञानमय means महाविज्ञानवान् or महाबोधः. Thus though expressed in many words, yet essentially he is one. For localization of Vishnu (नस्थानतोऽपि) does not tend to bring variety in him, by affecting his unity.

The laconic and yet richly significant word सर्वगुणत्वतः with its different shades of meaning serves an apt reply to many objections raised. 1) How Vishnu, though one is expressed by many words? As all the connotations of different words are ultimately subservient to (गुणत्वतः)

Vishnu, they express him. For instance different forms of Vishnu immanent in different things called by different words are also called by those words. Vishnu is one and indivisible and yet assumes different forms while abiding in different places

Then it may be objected that variety in Vishnu is only formal and not real. But that is not so. For even in indivisible homogeneous unity of Vishnu there is something to be called second due to the innate richness of capacity of Vishnu. It is this *vishe-ha* which justifies variety in him without affecting his intrinsic unity.

2) The properties like-object of knowledge conducive to Mukti, to be approached by the released, uncontested supremacy, worshipped even by gods, one who impels the world to activity-all these that are now under review, here in Vishnu.

Besides, words like *Atma* and *Brahma* through primary connotation denote Vishnu. Some interpret *मयट्* to mean 'identity' and not 'abundance'. But that is not correct, for this very reason. Because in shruties like *कोह्येव अन्यात् कः प्राप्यात् यदि आकाश आनंदो नस्यत्* declare Vishnu to be 'impellor of all to activity' which quality proves Him to be *पूर्णानंद*. So *मयट्* means 'abundance' and not 'identity'. This meaning is covered by the three sutras - *तद्धेतुव्यपदेशात् मात्रवर्णिक* and *अस्मिन्नस्यच*.

If it be so, and if all the five (*अन्नमय* and others) attributes refer to Vishnu why did sutra-kara not incorporate them all in the sutra? If only one is to be mentioned, why did he not choose *अन्नमय* instead of *आनंदमय*? 3) The reply to this objection also is *सर्वगुणत्वतः*:

For Badarayana's sutra conforms to the conditions of a good sutra and therefore possesses all those qualities

that are the requisites of a good sutra. Brevity is one of those qualities. So for the sake of brevity, one of the five is chosen and not all the five. The selected आनन्दमय implies the other four. Though अज्ञमय has priority, pre-dominance goes to Anandamaya for its auspiciousness, for its universal popularity and unconditioned attraction. For आनन्द or bliss is coveted by all—learned and lay men. ब्रह्मानन्द is an object of worshipful adoration to secure bliss. Hence आनन्दमय is chosen as important in preference to others, that are unimportant (गुणत्वतः).

4) Besides the mention of Anandamaya in the sutra, is highly helpful to Adhikaranas that precede this sutra and follow it. It is a general rule that one full with perfections is entitled to be full of bliss. (योर्वै भूमा तत्सुखम्). If Brahma is shown to be आनन्दमय then he will be easily proved to be full of perfections and hence he will be entitled to be enquired into (जिज्ञास्य).

In the same manner it can be shown to be beneficial to the coming Adhikaranas also.

Nyaya Muktaavali

Ecstatic delight is universally coveted. But it is the result of self-realisation, for which meditation is prescribed. As spiritual bliss is our aim we are directed to meditate God Hari as an unlimited ocean of bliss, which hence, must be first expressed. Therefore Atma used, was justly disproved to be self, bound with qualities (Sattva Raja and Tamas)

But in shruti “एवमानन्दमयमात्मानं” this Gauna Atma which is different from Brahma, is stated to be, Anandamaya. This is the objection raised on what has been said before; and Purva Paksha is built upon this objec

tion. In Taittareeya सवाण पुरुषः अन्नमयः the words अन्नमय, प्राणमय, मनोमय, विज्ञानमय and आनन्दमय which usually refer to Gauna Atma, are the subject for discussion. It is doubted whether they refer to Brahma and some others than Vishnu or Vishnu himself. He is different from Vishnu is the stand of the opposer.

The opposer argues thus:- The मयत् at the end of these five, connotes modification and Brahman is stated in shruti to be immune from modification, and mutability and hence he cannot even preside over it. Even if मयत् means "abundance" it is not incompatible with a touch of misery. But Brahman is exempted from it. There is a reference to the body which is a clear production. And this reference is corroborated by the perception of limbs like hands and feet. Hence it is clear that मयत् means modification and not abundance. Besides, of these five, one is said to be the body of the other successively. In अन्नमय the मयत् clearly connotes modification and there is no reason why this meaning should not be accepted uniformly in all the five cases. Besides, these five are the sheaths; and Brahma is said to be the limb of Anandamaya. And Anandmaya cannot be Brahma; For there cannot be two Brahmas; and both part and whole cannot be the same.

Thus these five are mere cases or sheaths being productions, Or Prakriti, as the presiding entity of a production, Or some soul or Jeeva or some thing else is denoted by these five. And by no means are they Vishnu.

Now starts the Sidhanta; All the five Annamaya and others-are unequivocally declared to be Brahma. For in येन ब्रह्मोपासते ये प्राणं ब्रह्मोपासते you find Brahma is stated repeatedly in association with each one of these five. In

the same manner (अन्योन्तरे आत्मा प्राणमयः and so on) associated with these five Atma also is repeated. Moreover Annamaya is derived on the strength of shruti to mean the support of all, consumer of all, senior to all, one approached by a devotee—which are the invariable marks of Brahma. Prana is said to be the prime mover of all gods; and is the subject of knowledge conducive to Mukti. In the case of others also invariable marks of Brahman are cited.

Inexpressibleness and inconceivableness in the case of Manomaya; and superiority and being worshipped by all gods in the case of Vijnanamaya are steady and unmistakable marks of Brahma. Ultimately in the case of Anandamaya, purposeful creation, immanence in all, are equally identifying marks of Brahma. Besides, shruti recognises, Perfect blissfulness to be essential prerequisite of Prime-moverness. Annamaya Atma is the ultimate goal to reach for one, gifted with such correct knowledge of five. Again this chapter is shown to be recognised as belonging to Brahma, by declaring सत्यं ज्ञानं अनन्तं of the Mantra as the characteristic marks of Brahma who was so far identified with Annamaya and others. Bhṛiguavalli is quoted as corroborative evidence.

As for objections raised on the basis of मयट् an ingenious method of explanation is adopted. मयट् means प्राचुर्य 'abundance' necessitating the existence of its opposite in however small quantity in the same place. ब्राह्मणप्रचुरः ग्रामः means Brahmins in great number but non Brahmins in small number. This is विजातीयसमानधिकरणभत्वं. So प्रचुर requires this condition to be fulfilled. But shidanti says that the reverse also is possible. Looking to the small

quantity of Joy in Jeeva you may posit abundance of joy in Hari. सजातीय भिन्नाधिकरणं अहम् Looking to the small quantity of joy of human soul Hari is abundance of joy.

The statement of inwardness and otherness (of each successive one with reference to the previous one) can be explained stating the fact that the Kosha, being the support, are 'others' and Hari assuming many forms is immanent in them. The birth of Hari that is referred to is His manifestation. In एवः अन्नरसमयः, रस clearly precludes the possibility of अन्नमय being the body; Pointing out that to be the head, इदमेवक्षिरः and meaning Atma, is justified by a similar part "This is the knee" by pointing to a piece of cloth that covers the knee. Both limbs and Anandamaya are equally and fully Brahman which will be explained later on. Hence the five forms in the five koshas are the Vyuhās or forms like Aniruddha, Pradyumna and others which are Brahma. The Purpose of this Adhikarana is to refute the objection that the so called Brahman to be investigated is said to be avayava or Anandamaya; and the part cannot be investigated without the investigation of the whole.

Prakash: This first, Adhyaya is devoted to work out samanvaya as announced in the general scheme of arrangement of the whole book of Brahma Sutra. The sub-divisions of Samanvaya are the topics for each Pada which are said to be four. Words chosen for the working out of Samanvaya are chosen from Veda. Raghavendra adds a note here. In Teeka there is mere mention of 'शब्द' which must be taken to mean वैदिकशब्द. Again in

Lokavedadhikarana it is recognised that all secular words are derived from vaidika words; hence there is not much sense in excluding secular words. But he means by vaidika words, not those used in the spoken language of the people.

These vaidika words are sub-divided into four groups so as to allot each one of them to each Pada of this Adhaya- 1) words well known to denote only others than Vishnu 2) Amphibious words denoting both Vishnu and others. 3) Words denoting other than Vishnu and 4) words that denote Vishnu.

These four seem to be defective groups; for, just as there is a division for Annyatraiva (only for others) so also let there be a division for Tatraiva (for Vishnu only). It is not fair to argue that 'for Vishnu' means 'For Vishnu only'. Then Tatra is equated with Tatraiva. Annyatra would be equated with Annyatraiva. If that is not so Annyatra means 'even Annyatra' and that will be subsumed under 'ubhayata' (both Vishnu and others.) So in Sudha it is said that Tatra means 'Tatraiva' Brahma alone. If this is so Annyatra means Annyatraiva and there need be no separate Annyatraiva group.

The opponent has raised cudgels against the arrangement adopted by Madhva and his followers in Bhashya Sudha and Teeka. When the System affects pure reasoning he has not spared anyone. Some sort of mitigation is adopted thus:- The group 'Anyatra' is limited to these words which in secular parlour are 'Annyatraiva' while 'Annyatraiva' are limited to words that are 'Annyatraiva' in shruti.

Bhasbya and Teeka are called forth as corroborative evidences. And 'Tatra' and Tatraiva' (in Vishnu, and Vishnu only) are one and the same as samanvaya need not be worked out equally in both the cases.

This is not also a fair defence, says the opponent. For words like Indra and Akasha connote Indra and Akasha and words like Avyakta and others, through signifiatory marks are confined to them only. Anandamaya and other words are well known as 'Anyatra' and words that are of the nature of meaningful marks. Sarvagata and Antaryami denote 'Anyatra' like Aditya. All these 'Anyatra' words are not known in secular world. Hence they shall have to lose their claim, to be 'Anyatra'. Besides they shall have to be "Anyatraiva". For they are known in Shruti to be 'Anyatra'.

Thus many of defects of illoligical division like overlapping division are shown. Divisions must be mutually exclusive; other wise there would be cross-divisions. This fallacy of cross-division is exposed by the opponent in the ubhayatra division also.

Now the opponent takes objection to the distinction of Nama words and Linga words. His intention is to refute the causes for the division into Padas in general and in particular. So long the general grounds on which the Padas are based are tackled with. Now the question of distinction of Name and Linga words lead to scrutiny of the Particular grounds.

The first Pada reviews the operation of Samanvaya of Nama-words in Brahma. Namatmaka words are those which directly connote substantives; those that connote attributes directly and through them the substantives that

are qualified by them, are called *Lingatmaka* words. *Chandrikakara* makes the same distinction clear by stating that conventional (रुढि) words are *Namatmakas* while derivative (यौगिक) words are *Lingatmakas*.

Now this distinction is not sound. For even the words whose *Samanvaya* is worked out in the first *Pada* are *Lingatmaka*. For they are derived from internal constituents. For the very aim of *Samanvaya* is to make public the characteristics that are exposed through the door of derivation and that go to add to the wealth of perfections, in the course of operation of *Samanvaya* of those words in *Brahma*. If this derivative mode is not accepted, then there will be no perfect wealth of attributes and the aim of *Samanvaya* is defeated.

If the *Sidhanti* reverts to the position that *Nama*-words convey this meaning through both *yoga* and *Rudhi*; which *Linga*-words do through *yoga* only. As *Samanvaya* of all words is worked out in *Brahma* only through the highest mode of derivation to achieve abundance of perfection (महायोगवृत्ति) than the convention of the wise is accepted; hence you cannot avoid convention in the case of the *Nama*-words, and *Lingawords*.

Again conceding the distinction of *Nama* and *Ling*-words, the objector contends that *pada* arrangement cannot be accepted, for if one *pada* is devoted to *Nama* words that convey others and another *Pada* to *Lingawords* conveying others will be no distinction between the two *Padas* as both are equally devoted to words that are अन्यत्रप्रसिद्ध

Nor the order, of the strongest to be first confuted and the easiest the last is consistently observed, for the strongest would have been words conveying only other than *Vishnu* (अन्यत्रैव प्रसिद्ध) and their *Samanvaya* should have

formed the topic of the first Pada. But if an ascending order of narration is to be accepted, the easiest Samanvaya forming the topic of the first Pada would have been अन्यत्र प्रसिद्ध words of the amphibious kind. And the present order adopted is the most whimsical and eccentric as it is not based on any one principle or rule.

The strong objection is squarely met with by the Sidhanti. Now he defines these three kinds of words whose Samanvaya being the topic of each pada, is worked out in the respective Padas 1) Those words, in secular world are neither used in the sense of Brahma nor in the other sense, there is search in Shruties to find out the denotation of these words. There these words are used both in the sense of Brahma and in the other sense, even according to the Purvapakshin. Hence when a relevant Shruti is quoted, apparently the other is introduced by the same power of denotation. Therefore those words which are deterred from denoting Brahma by the mere introduction of the other thing, are known as ubhayatra Prashiddha. 2) In the secular world those words denote other things and the Purvapakshin does not agree that they denote Brahman contrary to that. Therefore the relevant Shruti introduces by denotation only the other-thing and not at all Brahman. Thus the introduction of the otherthing and the non-introduction of Brahman through samanvaya is the deterrent to the working out of Samanvaya in Brahman. These words are अन्यत्र प्रसिद्धाः. 3) Now even in the secular world those are well known to denote the otherthing; and even Shruties are there to corroborate this meaning. Hence this relevant Shruti apparently yet strongly introduces the otherthing only.

Thus the introduction of the otherthing and the non-introduction of Brahma form a very strong deterrent, conceivably impregnable against the working of the Samanvaya of these words in Brahman. These are known as अन्यत्रैव प्रसिद्धाः

But these definitions are subject to flaws natural in definitions like over-applicability, partial inapplicability and others. For in ज्योतिरूपक्रमात् first it was used in the sense of Vishnu and it was objected to by the Purvapakshin. But the word ज्योति there in, was used in the sense of Vishnu and the Purvapakshin has agreed to it. Let this come under the category of उभयत्र प्रसिद्ध. This is not a fair objection. For in 'वसन्तेज्योतिषायजेत' we find no mark of Vishnu. In the secular world ज्योतिष has no hindrance to be known in other sense. Besides if that word is not used in the other sense (rituals) there would be a lapse of ritual obligation which is a serious objection. Hence this word is [subsumed under 'अन्यत्रैवप्रसिद्धः'. There the Samanvaya of words like ज्योतिष्टोम, वसन्त and others, is worked out. Hence merely the word ज्योतिस् is used to be not worked out. Thus we show the Samanvaya of such words in their proper context.

Here some objections are expected and explained. There is the category of words that are अन्यत्रैवप्रसिद्ध namely अव्यक्त and others and वसन्त and others. These must be considered as अन्यत्रप्रसिद्ध only and allow themselves to be understood in their original sense of Prakriti by अपरममुख्यवृत्ति or the common mode of interpretation. And they connote Brahma only by the higher mode (विद्वद्रूढि महायोग) of interpretation so that in Shrutis like वसन्ते वसन्ते as samanvaya of these words are worked out in Brahma by the

higher mode, by the lower made rituals and deities are also connoted to facilitate the daily performance of the sacred rites. For there are no other evidences to prove the efficacy of these Shruties. Thus असत् and others, are explained by the mode of अपरममुख्यवृत्ति common primary interpretation in Bhashya. But in Teeka, it is said that (असद्वाइदमग्रआसीत्) has no other meaning to connote even by this ordinary primary mode. And it is cited because it shows that in some Shruti at least असत् is used in the sense of शून्य primarily and in the sense of Brahma secondarily. Thus in असद्वाइदमग्र also असत् is used in the primary sense of शून्य.

An objection is raised against this statement. In yukti-pada in असदितिचेत् प्रतिषेधमात्रत्वात् असद् is accepted in the other sense and an objection is raised on that basis. So this goes against the statement that असत् is अन्यपरत्वरहित) has no other sense.

This objection is not fair. For here अन्यपरत्व does not mean 'only other sense' but the other sense accepted by the Purva Paski. For the discussion begins like that. Here in असद्वा Asat is taken to be 'aantecedent non-existence' (आगभाव) and the Purva Paksha is raised on that basis and not on the basis of Shunya as its meaning.

But this reply is not to the point. For in एतेन सर्व व्याख्याताः also असत् might mean non-existence (अभाव) and Purvapakscha might be raised even on that; and this अभाव being mere negation applies to Pragabhava and to Shunya both.

Besides there is no hard and fast rule that अन्यपरत्व should mean only the one accepted by the Purvapakshee.

Thus in असद्वा if by ordinary primary mode it does not mean 'other' there would be no purvapaksha based on that. Bhashyakara himself corroborates this statement, in तदधीनत्वादर्थवत् by stating that though all words signify Brahman by the process of Samanavaya yet the other meaning also is connoted by the lower mode of interpretation and असत् is thus posited. Therefore what has been raised as an objection that is accepted as the basis of Purvapaksha, and what was stated in Teeka is not relevant.

This is a long objection presented with ramifications and references, all the while closely arguing the case with unassailable reasoning. Now the refutation begins. Sidhanta never cites 'असद्वा' as connoting 'others'. But a question arises that if both the meanings (Vishnu and others) are allowed in instances like विश्वस्मात् इद उत्तरः how to get consistent meaning? असदेवेदमग्रआसीत् Then both will be supreme which is absurd. So this shows that these words have no अन्यपरत्व but convey only Vishnu. In असदेवेदमग्रआसीत् the exclusiveness of एव also is at par with असद्वा and, does not encourage us to accept the sense of otherness.

Then how to account for the stand of the Purvapaksha who out and out bases his objection on the sense of otherness and for the statement in Bhashya to that effect? To this objection the rejoinder is that generally all words have both the senses (Vishnu and the other) according to the reasons given in the fourth Pada. But when this rule is threatened with contradiction, the followers of Badarayana restrict these words to the sense of Vishnu alone. Not knowing this restriction the Purvapaksha raises an objection based on the other sense of words like असद्. But this does not prove the otherness of

the sense. Bhashya means this. This really proves that the objection raised by the Purvapaksbin is due to his erroneous knowledge and it is a desirable thing.

But this explanation lands us in another difficulty. For in असदितिचेत् the Purvapaksbin is disillusioned as to the sense of otherness. So he need not raise the Purva Paksha based on the sense of otherness in असंभवस्तु. But he raises the Purva Paksha.

We agree with that; but we need not change our position. For in असद्वा the erroneous knowledge of a negation or Abhava is sublated and he does not entertain the sense of Abhava. But he can as well continue the doubt of a positive other thing.

Raghavendra shows that Vyasa-raja has this rich significance in his statement अयपरस्परहित्तय. In the same manner he now takes up the division of Nama and Ling words to serve as basis for the division of the Padas.

Nama words are those that are apparently conventional; while Linga words are those that are yogika or yogarudha or those that are apparently yogika. Really speaking those that are not apparently conventional consisting of a single word or many words connote a Dharmi or Substantive through its attribute, and are Ling words. The others opposite in nature (conventional or conventional cum derivative) are Nama words. Linga and Nama words are equally अयप्रसिद्ध and yet the Padas that treat them are different on account of the internal differences.

As for the arrangement of the Padas, the highest order of Samanvaya denies eligibility to all. Or a different mark of the subject matter of the fourth Pada might be stated thus: a doubt like the following arises only after the first three Padas. After the Samanvaya is worked out,

n Brahma by the use of Shruti and Linga why should not otherness of these words be proved by those very Lingas and Shruties? Hence the characteristic of the fourth Pada is to expose the quality of the thing signified by the verbal power of the word and not at all the demonstration of causality being established.

The order of the first three is established, on the principle of trying conclusions with the strongest wrestler first. So words meaning the other is taken first for Samanvaya. Or those that mean others depend upon mere publicity and hence their Samanvaya is gross and simple; while words meaning both depend upon Shruties and hence their Samanvaya is subtle; and those that signify others only depend upon both shruti and publicity and Samanvaya in Vishnu is more difficult. Thus the Padas are arranged. Chandrikakara enters deep into this vast field of discussion of the arrangement of the Padas proposing alternatives of reasons for the priority and posteriority of the Padas. Raghavendra follows him with his work of elucidation by supplying references; filling up elipses, explaining contexts, making comparisons and other allied things. At last he comes to the conclusion that division of Padas according to others is not justified.

Then he refers to relation-ships or Sangatis which are said to be of five kinds: 1) Relationship with Shashtra 2) with Adhyaya 3) with Pada 4) with Shruti and 5) Adhikarana. With ample illustrations from the text these Sangatees are explained. He assures that the characteristic nature of these relationships would be made clear in the coming Adhikarnas.

In the course of exhibition of Pada Sangati Ananda-maya is called a nama (आनन्दमय नाम्नः) in the Teeka. Here some explain this fact by taking recourse to Jaimini Sūtras, (उद्भिदायजेत पशुकामः) In अपिवा नामधेयस्यात् यदुत्पत्तीच अपूर्वं अविधायकत्वात् 1-4-2 a doubt is raised whether उद्भिद् is the name of a quality or is it the name of some ritual. This word उद्भिद् is not used conventionally like व्रीहि; but through the connotational sense of its parts (ऊर्ध्वं भिनत्ति) by derivation the word conveys the sense of 'breaking up' (as with a pick-axe) so as to prompt one to activity. Thus does this word enjoin some quality in the pick-axe to bear fruit in Jyotishtomayaga ? Or does it enjoin another ritual itself with that quality ?

The word उद्भिद् is heard here So the meaning (activity or क्रिया) of the rest is likely to be enjoined. So the quality cannot be enjoined. As after उद्भिद् there is no मतुब् ति is no separate Karma. The significant parts jointly connote some activity to bear fruit in creating some effect. So it is found that it is some name. Just as, then उद्भिद् though derivative in its sense is the name of some Kriya, so also आनन्दमय and others, though derivative in sense yet are names of the Koshas.

Thus in the first Pada, as is stated in Anuvyakhyana, words conveying those having qualities in general are shown to apply to Vishnu following the theory of Samanvaya; and also words singifying qualities are shown to apply to Vishnu, on the strength of the same theory.

Now begins the appreciation of the aptness of words in the Sutra, and their order. Though Annamaya begins

the series yet Anandamaya is quoted to state that all the five by implication are meant. Still Annamaya, being Scanty in letters and prior in the order would have been preferred to Anandamaya. But Anandamaya is still chosen; because it is associated with the Pucha or feet of Brahma, which is the whole of Brahma. Besides the Sutra supplies grounds to object to the investigation of Brahma because it is the foot of Anandamaya. This forms the basis for the objection of the Purva Pakshin.

Chandrikakara quotes an instance from Jaiminisutras. Raghavendra explains it at length. In the first Adhyaya in the fourth Pada (Jaimini Sutra) there is a sutra यस्मिन् गुणोपदेशः प्रधानतोभिसंबन्धपंचदशानि आज्यानि. The question at issue is 'what is this आज्य? Does this word आज्य connote the quality of ghee or is it the name of some stotra? This is not a derivative word like उद्भिद् and a name; but it is used with a numeral (पंचदश) and hence it means Stotra without the defect of lack of unity.

So here is enjoining of Guna in a stotra. But when we study the wording we come to know that it is an uncompounded expression. Hence we cannot avoid the defect of disunity in the sentence. For we do not read these about some substantive qualified by the numeral. So here with regard to आज्य the numeral is predicated, to avoid the defect of disunity in the sentence. Further there is the statement स्तुवते and there is the further statement यदाजिमीयुः तदा आज्यानां आज्यत्वं which shows that the word is derived from its root meaning. Hence the word आज्य is the name of a stotra. This is the sidhanta.

In the same context it is read चित्रया यजेतपशुकामः. Now what is the meaning of चित्रा?; Are चित्रत्व and स्त्रीत्व predicated as a quality or are they the name of some Karma? As in the case of आज्य, चित्र also is some Guna for some Pashuyaga is made the subject and चित्रत्व and स्त्रीत्व are predicated to it. Thus चित्रत्व and स्त्रीत्व are properties and are asserted about the Pashu. But this leads to disunity in a sentence. (पशुः चित्रः स्त्रीत्व) And in order to avoid this disunity, we assert an uncommon karma with the substantive a Pashu, characterised by two properties, चित्रत्व and स्त्रीत्व. But taking to an assertion of a special kind is a lengthy process. To get rid of this flaw we run to the reference that the yaga consists of various things like curds, honey, ghee, water, fried rice, and rice and forms Prajapatya yaga. So the enjoinderment means (चित्रनामकेन यागेनपशून्भावयेत्) In the same manner as told before, आज्य is a name of stotra and only 'fifteen times' is ordained. Thus आनन्दमय is preferred to अन्नमय for the special reason that it affords a cause for the objection of being a limb over the statement of investigation of Brahma in Jijnāṣa Sutra.

Next point for discussion is अभ्यासात् in आनन्द मयोभ्यासात्. Real अभ्यास means (एकविषयासकृदुक्तिः) repeating many times the same thing. But there is no uniform repetition in the case of अन्नमय if Brahma is taken to be repeated. Instead, if you take आत्मा a synonym of ब्रह्म as repeated, there is uniform repetition. Thus there is Brahma stated in Anandamaya while there is real repetition of (not Brahma) but of the synonym of Brahma viz Atma.

Bhashya and Smṛiti are quoted in support of this statement.

Even then Bhashya which quotes- “येन ब्रह्मोपासते” is out of place. It ought to have cited “अन्योत्तरात्मा” only. But Bhashya includes this latter quotation in the former by the use of ‘आदि’ (in इत्यादि ब्रह्म शब्दात्) and asserts that meaning not in contravention of this latter meaning. The four faced Brahma is one of limited bliss; and he is Gaunatma. Accordingly one referred to in ‘यस्यानुवित्तः’ प्रतिबुद्ध आत्मा is also gaunatma. And Ikshaneeya is not gaunatma.

But this sort of refuting of the argument does not stand. Thus the opposer uses this statement for his objection. How can Sidhantin use it for his purpose though running in the opposite direction? Abhyasa of this Atma also proves that gauna Atma alone is repeated and never does it favour the postulation of Shudha Atma. Chandrika itself takes to refutations based on such arguments. Therefore it is better that Anandamaya and others should be proved to be Brahma on the strength of other evidences (and not आत्माभ्यास) and then that word आत्म should be provided to connote Brahma. Then the previous objection also should be refuted.

This objection is not tenable. The repetition of Brahma is the evidence to prove (that Anandamaya is Brahma). For that purpose only the objection based on the word Atma is presented. If the word Atma is the evidence then the sutras also having Atma would be objected. Or Atma is principally used in the sense of Paramatman and there is no objection to accept the subordinate sense in pre-

ference to the principal sense. But when मयट् is taken to mean "abundance" (प्राचुर्य), all objections are easily waved. Thus the Atma is accepted to be Paramatman and for this purpose it is said to be the means of proving Anandamaya to be Vishnu.

Thus this discussion with objections is continued till at last it is considered whether अभ्यासात् should be construed with आनंद alone (आनंदाभ्यासात्) or निरतिशयत्वविशिष्ट (आनंद) ? Mere 'Ananda will not prove, when repeated, it to be Brahma. In the second alternative निरतिशयत्व is not yet proved. Thus you find loop holes in the interpretations of the Sutras by others.

For instance in तद्धेतुव्यपदेशात्, एष आनंदयतीति Brahma is said to be the cause of the bliss of Jeeva. Therefore Brahma is Anandamaya. This is not correct. For this only proves that Anandamaya being the cause of the bliss of Jeeva is different from Jeeva. But it does not prove him to be Brahma. For women, being not Brahma, may prove to be the cause of human bliss.

Again there is the doubt whether this Anandamaya is Jeeva or Shiva. It is argued that Jeeva is Anandamaya. For मयट् is used in the sense of modification. There is the shruti "आनंदो ब्रह्म" and this Brahma is some modification called Ananda. Jeeva can very well be the modification of Ananda and this agrees with the prayer that Anandamaya be purified. In the gradation of Ananda मनुष्य आनंद is at the lowest rung while that of Brahma is at the top. Brahma is Shiva who is un-

rivalled in bliss. Here मयट् is "abundance" and suits the context. This is also equally untenable. For in the previous Adhikarana Jeeva is denied to be Brahma (तन्निष्ठस्य मोक्षोपदेशात्)

Even the Purva Paksha that no one but Shiva can grant Mukti is justified. For in no way can we explain the fact that Jeeva is the modification of Brahma. It is explained that Jeeva is the modification of Brahma. It is explained that this chapter is dedicated to Vishnu in the Bhashya on Taittareya. Besides, Atma and Brahma, and the aim approachable by the released are invariably referring to Vishnu. That Shiva is not concerned here is proved by the Sutrakara in नेतर अनुपपत्तेः

Then another objection was raised that Annamaya and others are not koshas but they are the five chetanas Brahma Vishnu Iswara and Sadashiva. This is not borne out; but contradicted by evidences.

Finally the discussion in this adhikarana is rounded up by stating that words like Anandamaya and others assert in Brahma properties like dependence of other objects on him but they do not assert any other thing or substance. Thus Brahman alone is Narayana, Vasudeva, Sankarshana. Pradyumna and Anirudha (the four Vyuhās emanating from Narayana) representing, आनन्दमय, विज्ञानमय, मनोमय, प्राणमय and अन्नमय.

Significance of the Picture on the Jacket

Raghavendra offers a harmonious interpretation of the Brahma Sutras which is Symbolically represented by a Veena being played on by his deft fingers. But he does not claim any Originality in the composition of the Spiritual music. It is at the inspiration of Badarayana-Vedavyasa and his favourite disciple Shri Madhva, both of whom are represented as being in different worlds and yet interested in his interpretational music. His five glosses that are Summarised here, are Bhavadeepa, Nyaya muktavali, Tantra deepika, Tattva manjari, and Prakasha, which are Symbolically represented by his glowing heart, pearly necklace, a burning lamp, a garland of Tulsi leaves, and the Spiritual light lighting his face. Thus the picture is real and yet Symbolic and highly Significant with esoteric meaning.

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